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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009

For those who haven’t been following this saga, the Aban Pearl, a semi-submersible drilling rig, sank off of Venezuela on 13 May 2010. The seas were calm and the skies were clear, so the cause of the accident is a mystery.  We have learned from a reliable and knowledgeable source that PDVSA, the national oil company of Venezuela, has conducted an official investigation to determine the cause(s) of this accident.  We urge them to release their report so that all may benefit from their findings.

While searching the web for other information on the Aban Pearl, I was surprised to find that the rig was reported to be listing offshore Trinidad & Tobago in August 2009, and that assistance was requested from the T&T Coast Guard. This incident occurred nine months before the rig sank offshore Venezuela.

According to Public Relations Officer at the T&T Coast Guard Lt Kirk Jean Baptiste, the T&T Coast Guard received a distress call from the rig around 2.45 pm. “The Coast Guard received a call that one of the flotation devices on the rig was taking in water which caused the rig to lean on one side,” he said. Sources said it belonged to an Indian company, but was registered in Singapore. They said it was not working, but just passing through T&T waters. Rigs are normally moved with the help of other boats.

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We have commented frequently about the similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, particularly the root cause casing shoe issues. In this post, Colin Leach draws attention to the float shoe and collar issues that permitted oil and gas to enter both wells. Click here to view the full post.

The Bly report (page 70) noted some significant “inconsistencies” in the operation of the float shoe/float collar (see full post). This is so similar in nature to the “inconsistencies” in the 9 5/8″ cement job on the Montara well to be scary. The bottom line is that both disasters could have been prevented if these “inconsistencies” had been recognized and additional barriers placed above the float collar. In fact even if there are no “inconsistencies”, the placing of an additional barrier or so seems like an exceptionally prudent step, which would not take that much time or effort.

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As previously posted (July 27, 2010), deep water had little to do with the well integrity problems and other contributing factors leading to the Macondo blowout. The Bly (BP) report further confirms this position.

Of the eight key findings in the Bly report (listed below), only number 4 could be considered to be more of a deepwater issue.  The BOP failures may also have been influenced by deepwater factors.  However, as previously noted, surface BOPs have a much higher failure rate than subsea stacks.

While the Montara blowout was in relatively shallow water, slight variations of findings 1 through 4 were the primary causes of that accident.

BP findings:

  1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.
  4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.
  5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.
  6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.
  7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.
  8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

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Secretary Salazar, Deputy Secretary Hayes, and BOEMRE Director Bromwich testified at today’s National Commission hearings. Director Bromwich made several important announcements and comments of interest to BOE readers:

  1. He has completed his public meetings and will submit his report to the Secretary by the end of the week, approximately two months ahead of schedule.  Does this point to an early end to the drilling moratorium?
  2. Two significant interim final rules will also be issued by the end of the week.  These rules will address well integrity,  BOP performance, and other issues raised in the 30-day report submitted to the President at the end of May.
  3. New drilling will not be authorized until operators and contractors can demonstrate compliance with the new rules.
  4. BOEMRE resources will be reallocated to assist with the workload associated with the resumption of drilling.

Chairman Reilly expressed concerns about the leasing and regulatory functions reporting to the same Assistant Secretary under the new organizational structure.  He also drew attention to the regulatory regimes in Norway, the UK, and elsewhere, and the importance of studying those programs.

Secretary Salazar’s goal is for the US offshore oil and gas program to serve as the “gold standard” for safe and clean operations around the world.

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Monday’s hearings will be broadcast on CSpan 2 beginning at 0900 ET. Admiral Allen will be the first witness and will address decision-making within the Unified Command.  Given the number of high profile witnesses and the limited time allotted to each witness,  in-depth questioning would seem to be unlikely.  Will this be a day of short speeches?

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From the Huffington Post:

Oil-producing countries on Thursday rejected a German proposal for a moratorium on deep-water drilling in the Northeast Atlantic that reflected environmental concerns after the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

So Germany, which has essentially no offshore oil and gas production in its sliver of the North Sea, proposed a ban on deepwater drilling at an OSPAR meeting in Bergen, Norway?  Does the word chutzpah come to mind?  The equivalent might be a Norwegian proposal to ban the manufacturer of luxury cars at a meeting in Stuttgart!

The German proposal also called for making sure that offshore operations meet the highest safety standards and demanded an analysis of whether the circumstances that led to the Deepwater Horizon accident could also occur in the Northeast Atlantic.

Now there is some original thinking.  No one has ever suggested that before! (sarcasm intended)  Don’t you think Norway, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other countries that actually produce oil and gas might be looking into these issues?  I can assure you that they are, but that they are doing so quietly and professionally without the type of “grandstanding” demonstrated by Germany at the OSPAR meeting in Bergen.

Representatives from Germany and other nations with concerns about the safety of offshore oil and gas operations are encouraged to join us in Vancouver next month for serious discussions about the regulatory practices, technology, and management systems that minimize safety risks.

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Aban Pearl

The Aban Pearl sank off the coast of Venezuela in May.  Shortly after the accident, Venezuela announced that a high-level commission would investigate. However, interested parties, inquiring through official diplomatic channels, have been unable to even confirm that the sinking is being investigated.

Until operators, contractors, and governments agree to conduct accident investigations and release reports in a timely manner, offshore safety objectives cannot be achieved.

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Montara Blowout, Timor Sea

I awoke to two very important developments from Australia as reported by Anthea Pitt with Upstream:

  1. According to Energy Minister Martin Ferguson, the Montara Inquiry Report will be publicly released by the end of the year. As BOE readers know, there are important similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, most notably the production casing cementing issues that created a flow path via the shoe track on both wells and the evidence that both disasters would have been prevented if negative flow tests had been properly conducted and interpreted.  Would Macondo have been prevented if BP and Transocean had followed the Montara hearings and made sure that all drilling personnel were aware of the causes of this 74-day blowout in the Timor Sea?
  2. Minister Ferguson also announced that the role of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) will be expanded:

By expanding Nopsa’s role, one central agency will look out for the safety of our offshore workers and the environment from exploration to decommissioning. That means it will be responsible for approvals and regulation of safety and environment, as well as integrity of facilities and day-to-day operations.

Bravo to Australia and Minister Ferguson! As I indicated in  a submission to the Montara Commission and testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, a single agency must be responsible and accountable for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations if safety and pollution prevention objectives are to be achieved.

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Why is action needed?

  1. Accidents happen for a reason; they are not mere matters of chance.  By better understanding their causes, we can prevent their recurrence.
  2. International data on accidents at offshore oil and gas facilities are incomplete and inconsistent.
  3. Some governments release little or no information about accidents within their jurisdiction, and may not even confirm that investigations are being conducted.
  4. Some companies provide little or no information about their accidents.
  5. Prosecutions, legal actions, and domestic politics impede investigations and delay or prevent a complete understanding of how accidents happened.

What should be done?  Governments should support an international treaty to improve data gathering and analyses and help prevent future disasters at offshore facilities.  Here are some suggested provisions for such a treaty:

  1. Nations agree on accident reporting criteria, definitions, and information collection procedures.
  2. Nations agree to investigate any accidents within their jurisdiction that exceed specified casualty, pollution, or damage thresholds.
  3. Nations agree to release investigative reports within specified time frames.
  4. Nations agree to assist each other with investigations.
  5. Nations agree to delay prosecutions and enforcement actions until the official accident investigations are completed.

We have been talking about accident investigation and information shortcomings for decades.  It is time to do something!

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Now that Admrial Allen has officially confirmed that the dead Macondo well is in fact dead, what is the legacy of the relief well?

  1. The relief well was Macondo’s opposite – a technological marvel that was flawlessly planned and precisely drilled without incident.
  2. The relief well verified new sensing and ranging tools for locating a well.
  3. The relief well contributed to the “burial” of Macondo by further cementing and pressure testing the annulus
  4. Perhaps most importantly, the relief well provided further confirmation that Macondo flowed inside the production casing and not in the annulus surrounding that casing.  Was this an unstated BP objective in supporting the decision to complete the intercept operation? Remember that after the top kill cementing operation killed the well, BP requested that the Unified Command “consider foregoing the relief well.”  This was an appropriate request since the annulus could have been secured through conventional plugging and abandonment practices. Whether or not BP changed positions on the intercept, the completion of that operation seems to have helped the BP legal defense.  Misinterpreting negative pressure tests, missing signs of flow, and mis-routing that flow would seem to be more defensible than improperly designing the well, ignoring centralizer recommendations, and foregoing the cement bond log.

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