Comments on the 3 risk reduction factors cited in the letter:
Factor 1: Those “robust insurance policies” may soon be tested given the costs associated with the turbine blade incident and potential law suits. (The notice pasted below informs that Nantucket officials will meet on Tuesday to consider litigation. A question for attorneys is the extent to which Nantucket is compromised by their good “Good Neighbor Agreement” with Vineyard Wind. That agreement essentially calls on Nantucket to promote the Vineyard Wind projects in return for payments that seem modest relative to the economic benefits from tourism and fishing.)
Factor 2: To the extent that GE Vernova Haliade-X 13 megawatt turbines are proven technology (and that is very much in doubt), the use of proven technology doesn’t prevent premature abandonment associated with unexpected incidents.
Factor 3: Reliable power generation and predictable long-term income remain to be demonstrated.
Nantucket Current photo: Vineyard Wind turbine AW38 with a damaged blade that has caused thousands of pieces of debris to wash ashore on Nantucket since Tuesday.
“This morning, a significant part of the remaining GE Vernova blade detached from the turbine. Maritime crews were onsite overnight preparing to respond to this development, though current weather conditions create a difficult working environment.”
“We are staying apprised of GE Vernova’s efforts to manage the situation, including the removal and recovery of the remaining blade attached to the turbine.”
Staying apprised? As operator, Vineyard Wind is fully responsible. This is their situation to manage.
BSEE has ordered Vineyard Wind to suspend power production and wind turbine generator construction.
Kudos to BSEE for their decisive and timely action. They need to better understand what happened before allowing operations and construction to continue.
Imagine the pressure on the regulator if the project was providing a significant portion of the region’s electricity.
BSEE’s comment that there has been “no harm to any marine resources or mammals from the incident” is premature given the extensive marine debris and the associated risks to mammals.
What about the CVA?
The regulations at 30 CFR § 285.707-712 assign important responsibilities to Certified Verification Agents (CVAs), independent third parties with established technical expertise. These responsibilities include detailed reviews of the design, fabrication, and installation plans.
Oddly, the CVA’s “Statement of Qualifications” and “Scope of Work and Verification Plan” have been redacted in their entirety from Vineyard Wind’s Construction and Operations Plan (COP) (see Appendix I-C and I-D).
Who was the CVA and why was that important information redacted?
Were any of the CVA requirements waived per 258.705?
Will BOEM, the lessor and Federal wind program manager, be making a statement? Will they be reassessing their COP review procedures?
BOEM should temper their over-the-top promotion of offshore wind. The complete shutdown of the first utility scale offshore wind farm heightens public concerns about the intermittency of this power source, and the need for reliable backup sources.
In the wake of the Vineyard Wind turbine blade incident, it’s important to note that marine debris is a significant risk factor for mammals. This is a particular concern for baleen whales, like the endangered right whale, which filter large amounts of water. Per NOAA:
Marine Mammals: Many species of marine mammals have also been confirmed to eat marine debris. A review by Kühn and van Franeker found that 69 species of marine mammals have been found to ingest debris – that’s 56% of all marine mammals! This includes 44 species of odontocetes (toothed whales), manatees, and multiple seal species. Marine mammals are highly protected, which can make it difficult to research them. Most research on marine mammals takes place after an animal dies, making it difficult to understand what marine debris live animals eat. However, we do know that because baleen whales filter extremely large amounts of water while feeding, they may get plastic debris entangled in their baleen plates.
An Argentinian study describes the “finding of plastic litter in the digestive tract of a southern right whale (Eubalaena australis) juvenile male, which was found dead on the shores of Golfo Nuevo, Chubut, Argentina in 2014.”
“A team of BSEE experts is onsite to work closely with Vineyard Wind on an analysis of the cause of the incident and next steps,” the agency said in a statement.
On Sunday (7/14), Capt. Carl Bois, of the fishing charter Topspin out of Nantucket, told the Current he noticed a significant amount of debris in the Vineyard Wind lease area.
“There was so much debris at the wind farm,” Bois said. “We covered many miles and only saw the debris at the wind farm site: big sheets of fiberglass with foam core and lots of loose foam.”
On Saturday night (7/13) the Coast Guard warned Mariners as follows: “Coast Guard received a report of 03 floating debris 10 meters by 2 meters in the vicinity of approximately 26 NM SE of Marthas Vineyard and 22 NM SW of Nantucket in position 40 59.559N 070 25.404W. All marines are requested to use extreme caution while transiting the area.“
On Monday (7/15), Vineyard Wind confirmed that a turbine blade incident occurred on 7/13: “On Saturday evening, Vineyard Wind experienced blade damage on a wind turbine in its offshore development area. No personnel or third parties were in the vicinity of the turbine at the time, and all employees of Vineyard Wind and its contractors are safe and secure.”
On 7/16, Vineyard Wind issued another statement advising that they were deploying teams to Nantucket to clean up debris from the incident.
Comments:
Not a good look for the first large-scale offshore wind project in the US.
It’s unclear what the status of operations was at the time of the incident.
Vineyard Wind seems to be passing the buck a bit when they note that “GE, as the project’s turbine and blade manufacturer and installation contractor, will now be conducting the analysis into the root cause of the incident.” While GE’s findings are critical, Vineyard Wind, as operator, is fully responsible and accountable for the incident and should be leading the analysis.
Was their a third party review of the turbine design?
Was the incident reported to BSEE, the safety regulator for offshore wind? State and local government?
BSEE and the Coast Guard should ensure that Vineyard Wind’s findings and their own independent report are made publicly available in a timely manner. Ditto for Safety Alerts.
What other incidents have occurred during offshore wind facility construction and operations?
BOEM’s land rush approach to offshore wind leasing will add up to 1086 turbine towers and 28 offshore substations (OSSs) in the Atlantic just from active projects with approved Records of Decision (RODs). (See the table below.) Another 17 active Atlantic commercial projects have yet to reach the ROD stage. Those projects should increase the total number of structures to >3000. Five more Atlantic wind lease sales are scheduled.
project
turbine towers
offshore substations
Coastal VA Offshore Wind
202
3
Revolution Wind
100
2
Sunrise Wind
94
1
Atlantic Shores South
200
up to 10
Ocean Wind 1
98
up to 3
Vineyard Wind 1
100
2
Empire Wind 1 & 2
147
2
New England Wind (phases 1&2)
150
5
Per the Construction and Operations Plan (COP) for Vineyard Wind, the topsides for a conventional electrical service platform (ESP) (also known as an offshore substation or OSS) are 45 x 70 x 38 m, which is larger in surface area than a typical 6-pile oil and gas platform (~30 x 30 m), and is comparable in size to a large jackup drilling rig.
The Atlantic Shores plan calls for 10 small, 5 medium, or 4 large OSSs. (Uncertainty regarding the number and types of structures seems rather common in wind COPs.) The large OSSs have topsides that are 90 m by 50 m and rise to 63 m above MLLW. These are large offshore structures whether for wind or oil and gas.
Per BOEM, the “Rule to Streamline and Modernize Offshore Renewable Energy Development” is intended to “make offshore renewable energy development more efficient, [and] save billions of dollars. Unfortunately, the savings associated with relaxed financial assurance requirements translates to increased risk for power customers and taxpayers.
BOEM signaled their intentions on offshore wind (OSW) decommissioning three years ago when they granted a precedent setting financial assurance waiver to Vineyard Wind. Despite compelling concerns raised by commenters, the “streamlining” regulations codified this decision.
No one knows what the financial future will be for wind projects and the responsible companies. Financial assurance should therefore be established when the structures are installed, not years into the future as allowed by the revised regulations. What leverage will BOEM have then?
Nordsee One substation, Germany. Rystad Energy projects 137 new power substations offshore continental Europe this decade, requiring $20 billion in total investment.
Recent disclosures indicate that BOEM, which very publicly promotes the offshore wind projects that it regulates, has waived a fundamental financial assurance requirement at the request of Vineyard Wind (approval letter attached). Given its broad applicability, this precedential waiver could have the effect of revising a significant provision of the offshore wind decommissioning regulations without public review and comment.
The issue is the “pay as you build” financial assurance requirement at 30 CFR § 585.516, which was waived by BOEM. This requirement, which is intended to project the public from decommissioning liability, is fair and reasonable given that wind developers must only provide financial assurance “in accordance with the number of facilities installed or being installed.” Companies that don’t have sufficient financial strength to comply with this requirement should not be installing and operating offshore wind turbines.
Vineyard Wind was either unable or unwilling to comply with the requirement. They instead requested to defer providing the full amount of the required financial assurance until year 15 of actual operations. The waiver changes “provide assurance when you install” to provide assurance 15 years after installation if everything goes as planned (hoped?).
After their waiver request was denied in 2017, Vineyard Wind resubmitted the request in 2021 seeking a favorable decision from an administration concerned that project cancellation or delay might tarnish the program that they were enthusiastically promoting.
BOEM (as directed from above?) granted the waiver, citing the general departure authority at 30 CFR § 585.103. However, that authority is intended for special situations, not for broadly applicable waivers that have the effect of revising the regulations without the public review required by the Administrative Procedures Act and Executive Orders 12866 and 13563.
There are no criteria in the Vineyard Wind waiver approval that could not apply to other wind developers. Vineyard Wind has simply committed to the same “risk-reduction factors” that apply to all offshore wind projects: damage insurance, the “use of proven turbine technology,” and long-term power purchase agreements. How could BOEM deny the same request from other companies?
It’s noteworthy that the regulations specific to financial assurance at 30 CFR § 585.516 provide no criteria for waiving the assurance requirements; nor do the regulations provide for the 15-year payment plan approved by BOEM. Given the precedential nature of the BOEM action and its enormous financial implications, a revision to the decommissioning regulations that provides criteria for such payment schemes should be promulgating before any similar departures are approved.
In light of the waiver, the public will likely incur substantial costs if Vineyard Wind fails, walks away, doesn’t fully fund their decommissioning account in a timely manner, or seeks new concessions after some or all of the 62 turbines have been installed.
Given the decommissioning obligations, what company would want to step in and assume responsibility for a failing project 10-15 years from now? What happens if Vineyard Wind’s project revenues don’t meet expectations and contributions to their decommissioning account are insufficient or used improperly? More concessions? We’ve seen this dance before.
Whether the project is for oil, gas, or wind energy, protecting the public from decommissioning liabilities should always be prioritized over facilitating development.
Nearly 17 years after the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (incorporating language drafted by Minerals Management Service staff) authorized wind energy projects in Federal offshore waters, commercial offshore wind power is not imminent. Despite enthusiastic political support and promised State and Federal subsidies, no commercial scale offshore wind development has commenced. The groundbreaking ceremony for Vineyard Wind I (pictured above), the first project approved by BOEM, may prove to have been premature. The project faces multiple lawsuits from commercial fishing organizations and an organization concerned about possible impacts to the endangered right whale.
Washington, D.C. (9/13/2021) —Responsible Offshore Development Alliance (RODA), a broad membership-based coalition of fishing industry associations and fishing companies, filed a Petition for Review today in the First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals regarding the Secretary of the Interior’s July 15, 2021 decision approving the Vineyard Wind 1 offshore wind energy project. This action is the culmination of many years of conscientious participation by fisheries professionals only to see their expertise and value summarily ignored by decision-makers during the leasing process.
The RODA statement is quite strong. While the new administration understandably wants to advance offshore wind development, they would have been wise to accept input from RODA and other interested parties before approving Vineyard Wind I. The fishing industry certainly has a legitimate interest in the outcome of this and other offshore wind projects.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 