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  1. They spent the week fishing (for drill pipe) at Macondo, without much success.
  2. More negative pressure tests have confirmed that the well is dead.
  3. The objectives of the relief well intercept are still a bit of a mystery.  As we have previously discussed, there are other (better?)  means of ensuring that the production casing annulus is plugged.  Is the intercept  just a risky and expensive ceremony?  Not according to BP CEO Bob Dudley who offered the following explanation: “there are several reasons for the relief well to be completed, including demonstrating that the difficult procedure can be done, providing more scientific data about the leak and giving closure to an oil-weary public.” The first and third reasons confirm the “ceremony” theory.  We don’t need to prove that you can complete a relief well, and the public needs solutions, not symbolic gestures. With regard to the “scientific data” argument, the intercept may provide some limited information on the condition of the annulus that will help to better understand the cause of the blowout. Whether that information is sufficiently important to justify the delays and added risks remains to be seen.
  4. The hurricane season continued to be kind.  Will the good luck hold?  While time has been less critical since the well was capped on 15 July and the endgame should not be rushed, we are surprised by the absence of urgency.
  5. We continue to wonder what the response would have been like if the responsible party was not a supermajor.
  6. BP and the Unified Command have still not given us their latest thinking on the Macondo flow path, even though some legislative and regulatory actions are being driven by flow path assumptions and speculation.
  7. Another garbage article about MMS’s “flawed culture” appeared in a major newspaper.  These articles are great theater; too bad their major premise isn’t true.
  8. A few former government officials, who showed little or no interest in offshore safety during their careers, have emerged to criticize the OCS oil and gas program.  Where was the criticism during the 40-year period when all was going well?  Why are the officials who have publicly voiced strong support for MMS personnel not being quoted?  These supportive comments have received almost no coverage.  Also, why are the Inspector General quotes limited to those that paint the worst possible picture of the offshore program and MMS?  These same Inspectors General have praised the overwhelming majority of MMS personnel.  Finally, those calling for more inspectors and other regulatory personnel might want to start by showing some respect and support for the staff that is already onboard.
  9. More silly comments about the evils of “industry standards” have appeared in the press.  BOE will address this nonsense later in the week.

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Since it’s already Monday morning in Oz, our Australian bureau has returned to work and is eager to pass on some news:

  • The sense in Australia seems to be that sensitive regulatory issues delayed the release of the Montara report until after the election (and perhaps much longer if another election is needed to resolve the stalemate).

We received this comment from an oil industry manager in Australia:

The Montara report damns the regulatory agency and there are many that think that is not appropriate.  That is the reason for the holdup.

Comment: I assume the report’s criticism is primarily directed at the Northern Territory regulator.  In defense of the regulators, the current division of responsibilities between the Federal government and the States is unworkable. You can’t have one agency responsible for well integrity and another responsible for rig and facility safety.  The US has similar issues with the division of safety authority among the Departments of Interior and Transportation (pipelines), and the Coast Guard.  If the regulatory responsibilities of the former MMS are not retained in a single bureau, but divided between the two new Interior bureaus, these problems could be exacerbated.  Most of the recommendations in my 11 May testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources have received at least some attention.  One very important recommendation (no. 1) calling for a streamlined OCS regulatory regime, has not been addressed.

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BOE does not officially resume posting until 30 August, but we wanted to make sure you were aware of Magne Ognedal’s recent remarks to Upstream

“It is very frustrating,” Ognedal said. “We do not have the information we need to finish the job. We know from the transcripts of the inquiry that the Macondo and Montara blowouts appear to have very similar causes.  However we cannot draw any conclusions until we have access to the report.”

I also suggest that you read the text of Magne’s excellent speech during the Safety Luncheon at ONS in Stavanger.

Magne Ognedal Addresses ONS Safety Luncheon

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Colin Leach brought this paper to my attention: Subsea Accumulators – Are They a False Reliance? As BOP actuation and shearing power issues take center stage, this paper warrants further review.  Unfortunately, we were only able to link the abstract at this time.  We will post the full paper if permission is granted.

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The Canadian Senate has decided that the facts do not justify banning Canada’s offshore drilling operations.  The full report is linked.

The Senate also showed support for the International Regulators’ Forum.  Canada will be hosting a major international conference in Vancouver in October.

The committee heard sufficient evidence to make it comfortable with Canada’s (federal and provincial) approach to striking this risk/reward balance andwith its new judgment-based and goal-oriented regulatory approach. Canada is a leading participantin the International Regulators Forum, a group of offshore industry regulators from the most activeoffshore drilling nations, including Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, NewZealand, the Netherlands and Brazil. Interestingly, none of these nations have called for or imposedbans on current offshore drilling operations within their jurisdictions following the BP incident.

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Aug. 19, 2010 letter, click to enlarge

With the new BOP in place, and the capability to enter the well from the top, squeeze cement into the annulus, and set and test plugs, the relief well intercept appears to add nothing but risk.  Is the relief well being finished because of the repeated “read my lips” statements about its necessity or is there a valid reason that we are missing?

Also, with the well killed, should the Incident Commander be directing and approving operations that seem to fall under the plugging and abandonment category?  Those operations are under the purview of the Bureau of Offshore Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) in the Department of the Interior.  (Actually, according to the applicable MOU, (see section 10), BOEMRE should have had the lead on well control and flow abatement since the well blew out on April 20.)

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Like all swinging voters, Dirty Harry – a saltwater crocodile admired for his prediction prowess – took his time sniffing out the candidates in his enclosure at Crocosaurus Cove in Darwin today. Refusing to make a snap decision, Harry – reluctantly it seemed – chose the chicken carcass that was attached to a caricature of Prime Minister Julia Gillard.

Link

Should the croc be correct, BOE friend Martin Ferguson will presumably retain his cabinet position and release the Montara report as promised.  Why is the release of this report so important?

  1. While the transcripts of the Inquiry hearings do a pretty good job of identifying the well planning, cementing, barrier, and management issues that were contributing factors, the Commission’s confirmation of the specific root causes of the blowout is essential.
  2. Only a few BOE geeks and a handful of others have actually read all of the testimony and submissions.  The Macondo planners and Deepwater Horizon crew either were totally unaware of what happened at Montara or ignored what they had learned.  I suspect that the former was the case.
  3. Important emergency response issues, which received minimal attention during the Montara hearings, will likely be discussed in the report.  Montara demonstrated that capping and containment operations can be more difficult for a surface well than they are for a subsurface well.   For safety reasons, a surface capping operation was prohibited at Montara.  Even if the operation was allowed, it probably wouldn’t have been successful because of the way the well was suspended.  Should well suspension practices take into account the possibility of a surface capping operation?
  4. The decision to move a rig from Singapore to drill the Montara relief well, rather than use rigs that were operating off Australia, has broad industry and regulatory implications.  Will this decision be assessed in the report?
  5. Finally, the Montara Commission makes recommendations for Australia’s offshore regulatory regime. These recommendations will be of great importance to the US and other nations that are reorganizing or initiating their regulatory programs.  We expect the Commission to recommend that a single agency regulate operational safety offshore Australia.  This is consistent with the recommendation in my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the approach taken by Norway and other leading offshore regulators.  A regulatory regime that includes multiple agencies with overlapping or segmented jurisdiction guarantees conflict, confusion, gaps, and inefficiency.  Wells, platforms, and pipelines are integrated drilling and production systems, and must be regulated as such. Similarly, permitting, auditing, and inspection are integrated regulatory functions that cannot be effectively divided among multiple agencies.  One regulator must be responsible and accountable.

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Not surprisingly, the television networks embraced the “Georgia Study,” which estimates that up to 79% of the Macondo spillage remains in the Gulf. Correspondents, bobbing from boats, rushed to report the news.  Does this mean that the networks will resume their courageous Key West oil-watch?  How about those damage projections for East Coast beaches?

Anyone who thinks that 79% of the oil remains hasn’t spent much time observing oil spills.  NOAA’s peer reviewed numbers are more credible.

The major newspapers, to their credit, seem to be providing balanced coverage of the new report.  The New York Times has a good article and this comment from Ed Overton seems to be pretty much on target:

Other marine scientists involved in evaluating the impact of the spill defended the government’s findings. “I generally agreed with the results,” said Edward Overton, a biologist at Louisiana State University who was one of several scientists who reviewed the federal study prior to its release. “I think it’s close to being on the mark.”

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We are currently working with BP engineers and our science team to look at test results and do investigations to lead us to the best way to mitigate any risk of intercepting the annulus and increasing the pressure in the annulus. Admiral Allen

This insistence on drilling into a “killed well” reminds me of the Unified Command’s plan to end to end the “well integrity test” and vent the well after it had been successfully capped on July 15.  Fortunately, the Command showed good judgement and reversed that decision. Perhaps they should do the same with the relief well intercept, which no longer appears to be necessary and may be hazardous.

The obvious next step is to re-enter the well from the top, perforate the production casing and squeeze cement into the annulus, and proceed with the plugging and abandonment operation.  If the Command has reasons why this would not be the best approach, we’d like to hear what they are.

Despite the repeated “my way is the relief well” pronouncements, I trust that the Command will choose the option that accomplishes the objectives with the fewest risks to safety and the environment.

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Letter from Admiral Allen to BP:

… in response to BP’s request to consider foregoing the relief well, the government scientific technical team has determined that the benefits of the bottom kill procedure outweighs the risks.

  1. Did BP really ask to forgo the relief well or was this just a point of discussion?  If so, it would be nice to hear BP’s side of this.
  2. Is BP confident the annulus is plugged?  If so, what is the basis for their confidence?
  3. If the annulus is plugged, what is the objective for the relief well?  To confirm that cement is in place?  Inject additional cement? Is there sufficient information to properly assess the risks associated with such an injection procedure?
  4. If not unprecedented, it is certainly unusual to drill a relief well into a well that has been killed.  Could measures taken during the abandonment operation (e.g. cut the production casing and set a plug over the production casing  stub) assure the Unified Command that the annulus is sealed?

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