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Posts Tagged ‘offshore drilling’

This information is unconfirmed but the source is highly reputable:

We just received word this morning that the Transocean Marianas rig  has developed a large crack in one of the pontoons on the #5/#6 anchor chain locker while they were picking up anchors, and is currently taking on water and listing.  The bilge pumps are keeping up (barely), but there’s certainly concern that it might sink on location. So far, 68 people have been evacuated from location.

According to RigZone, the Marianas was working offshore Nigeria. [Per one of our readers, (see comment below) Petrodata shows the rig operating offshore Ghana.]

More:  The Marianas, spudded the Macondo in October, 2009, but was damaged by Hurricane Ida and towed to shore.  The Deepwater Horizon was the rig that replaced the Marianas.

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BP settled Macondo litigation with Weatherford, manufacturer of the float equipment equipment used in the Macondo well. The failure of this equipment was a key contributing factor in the Macondo blowout. Under the agreement, Weatherford will pay BP $75 million.  This money will be applied to the $20 billion Macondo trust fund.

Weatherford is the first of BP’s contractors to formally agree with BP that the entire industry can and should learn from the Deepwater Horizon incident. Accordingly, Weatherford has committed to working with BP to take actions to improve processes and procedures, managerial systems, and safety and best practices in offshore drilling operations. BP and Weatherford will encourage other companies in the drilling industry to join them in this improvement and reform effort.

Comments:

  1. $75 million seems like a rather modest payment by Weatherford given the magnitude of Macondo damage costs. BP will “indemnify Weatherford for compensatory claims resulting from the accident.”  Presumably, Weatherford’s sales agreements provide good legal protection.
  2. One of the root causes of the Montara blowout was also a float collar failure. That float collar was also supplied by Weatherford.  I’m surprised that this common cause and supplier have received almost no attention. Of course, no one has paid much attention to Montara, either before or after Macondo. Had more attention been paid to the Montara inquiry, Macondo might have been avoided.  (Note that most of the post-Macondo commentary still implies that deep water is the threat even though Montara was in 80 m of water and the root causes of Macondo were not water depth related).
  3. When do we learn more about the “improvement and reform effort” described in the quote above?

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Resources Minister Martin Ferguson is determined to establish a single national regulator after the Montara oil spill in the Timor Sea leaked oil and gas condensate for more than two months in 2009.

The WA government is at odds with Mr Ferguson over plans for a national regulator and wants to maintain responsibility for oversight of the industry in the state.

Senator Eggleston and Senator David Bushby said the federal government had introduced the legislation to parliament before concluding ongoing negotiations with the WA government. Herald Sun

Meanwhile, still no news regarding any penalties for Montara operator PTTEP.  Will there be none?

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Perhaps the congressman was “distracted” when he chose to sponsor these two bills:

No New Drilling Act of 2011: Amends the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to prohibit the issuance of any lease for the exploration, development, or production of oil, gas, or any other mineral on the outer Continental Shelf.

Alaska Oil Drilling Leases: To prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from selling any oil and gas lease for any tract in the Lease Sale 193 Area of the Alaska Outer Continental Shelf Region until the Secretary determines whether to list the polar bear as a threatened species or an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, and for other purposes.

 

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Because of recent involvement with products and systems that have Safety Integrity Level (SIL) ratings, I read the comment (below) in the PSA Deepwater Horizon review with interest. While administrative and effectiveness issues must be carefully assessed, the application of SIL should be part of the BOP performance dialogue.  SIL ratings may also be appropriate for entire well control or well integrity systems.

Today’s requirements stipulate a risk analysis for the control system of a drilling BOP, with specified minimum requirements for its safety integrity level (SIL). As a result of the DwH incident and of the fact that blowouts are not confined to drilling operations, the question is whether such an analysis, with a specified minimum SIL level, should also apply to all types of BOPs, including well-intervention models. In addition, consideration should be given in this context to whether other control and management systems related to well integrity/control exist which should be subject to such requirements.

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From the standpoint of post-Macondo safety and regulatory issues, this concise summary is the most comprehensive and useful report that I have read since the blowout.

I have pasted (below) comments about information management – one of the many important topics considered in the report – and hope you take time to read the entire summary. It is only 12 pages.

Conducting a critical review of the information used to manage major accident risk is one of the measures relevant for the companies. This work could include an assessment of
 the relevance, reliability and modernity of the indicators used to follow up risk trends
 inappropriate use of indicators, incentives and reward systems
 the need for better indicators and other information about the business which can be used to secure an early warning about a weakening in safety-critical barrier elements.
The PSA is of the opinion that the quality of information applied in managing major accident risk is also a question of what overview the players have of their own business, and thereby a question of the players’ own control. The PSA assumes that managing major accident risk cannot be outsourced. In light of the DwH accident, it could be relevant for the companies to review the processes intended to provide the necessary information about the business, assess in part how these processes support a culture of accountability and how various management and audit functions, third-party verifications and so forth contribute in this connection.


					

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Thanks to a reader, we have obtained a copy of a report on the Jack Ryan crane failure (August 2010) that killed one worker and injured three offshore Nigeria. As BOE readers know, we have been pursuing information on this accident for months.

At BOE our highest priority is drawing attention to and disseminating information on offshore accidents.  In that regard, we greatly appreciate the support we have received from readers.

Excerpt:

Link to Jack Ryan report.

We understand that Total is conducting an inquiry, and assume that Transocean has also investigated this accident. We hope those reports are made publicly available.

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Aban Pearl listing off Trinidad in August 2009

While our interest in the sinking of the Aban Pearl pertains to what went wrong and why, former PDVSA board member Gustavo Colonel continues to question Aban Pearl contracting irregularities. Is PDVSA refusing to release the report on the Aban Pearl sinking so as not to draw further attention to these contracting issues?

The whole Board is responsible for the loss of about 800,000 barrels per day of oil production; for the fraudulent certification of “proven oil reserves” in the Orinoco heavy oil region; for the irregular contracting, with a ghost company, of the offshore drilling barge Aban Pearl for twice the amount really paid to the owners of the barge; for the importing of 180,000 tons of food that later went to rot in Venezuelan ports but provided some of the members of the board with millions of dollars in criminal profits; and in numerous other corrupt practices that are well documented.

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Like the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, the Montara Commission of Inquiry, the Norwegian government, and leading safety and regulatory authorities around the world, the IADC recognizes the risks associated with complex, multi-agency regulatory regimes. A single authority should be responsible and accountable for safety and pollution prevention at offshore facilities, and should draw on the expertise of other agencies and organizations as necessary to achieve performance objectives. 

The safety and environmental  risks associated with fragmented or compartmentalized regulation include gaps, overlap, confusion, inconsistencies, and conflicting standards. Industry and governmental personnel spend too much time coordinating with multiple parties and not enough time managing safety and environmental risks.

Link to IADC comments.  Key quotes:

IADC continues to be concerned by seemingly duplicative regulatory requirements imposed by the Coast Guard and BOEMRE, particularly where the agencies appear to have divergent views regarding the placement of regulatory responsibility.

One cannot holistically address safety when faced with the unyielding and overlapping demands of multiple narrowly-focused regulatory agencies.

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“It would seem to me, reading between the lines, that the cockpit crew weren’t confident of the information that was being presented to them on the data displays. Maybe — and it’s only a maybe — they took some action that led to the stall warning, and the plane stalling and then being unable to correct it.”

The above quote from a new article on the Air France crash should sound familiar to BOE readers. At both Montara and Macondo, the evidence of hydrocarbon influxes was clear, but personnel misinterpreted or ignored that information. Was this wishful thinking on their part? Was their training flawed? Lack of sleep? Overstressed? Distracted? These issues need to be carefully studied.

Improving well control preparedness is not simply a matter of modifying stack design.  The thought processes and human response tendencies that contribute to well control incidents and other accidents must be fully considered. Monitoring systems must provide timely, accurate, and understandable information, and training programs must teach workers not to rationalize negative signals, but to respond with caution pending further assessment. Trainers must remind students about past disasters and how they could have been prevented.

Nearly 20 years after it was written, Paul Sonnemann’s excellent paper on the Psychology of Well Control (excerpt below) is even more relevant today. We need to build upon and apply the lessons.

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