“BOEM’s short-term (20-year) production forecast for existing leases shows steady growth from 2022 through 2024 and declining thereafter (see Section 5.2.1). The long-term nature of OCS oil and gas development, such that production on a lease can continue for decades makes consideration of future climate pathways relevant to the Secretary’s determinations with respect to how the OCS leasing program best meets the Nation’s energy needs.“
If last fall’s Hurricane Ida dip is excluded, the latest production figure in 2021/2022. New projects should boost production over the next 2 years, but not enough to reach the August 2019 peak of 2.044 million bopd.
Meanwhile the GoM rig count remains sluggish at 15.
“BOEM’s short-term (20-year) production forecast for existing leases shows steady growth from 2022 through 2024 and declining thereafter (see Section 5.2.1). The long-term nature of OCS oil and gas development, such that production on a lease can continue for decades makes consideration of future climate pathways relevant to the Secretary’s determinations with respect to how the OCS leasing program best meets the Nation’s energy needs.“
Basing leasing decisions on “future climate pathways” would seem to be a considerable stretch of the Secretary’s authority under the OCS Lands Act and may be inconsistent with the recent SCOTUS decision in West Virginia vs. EPA. A strategic shutdown of the offshore oil and gas program would dramatically increase energy supply and security risks going forward, and should be authorized by Congress.
Yet the proposed 5 Year OCS leasing program (p. 3) tells us that long term offshore production is not needed because the IEA’s “roadmap to net-zero emissions by 2050 for the global energy sector would require no new investment in fossil fuel supply projects (IEA 2021).”
Does the IEA dictate US energy policy? Dan Yergin has a far better grasp on the realities of energy consumption and transitions.
“Oil, discovered in 1859, did not surpass coal as the world’s primary energy source until the 1960s, yet today the world uses almost three times as much coal as it did in the ’60s.“
“According to EIA, declining production from existing Gulf of Mexico fields will largely offset the increases in oil production from the new fields, with natural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico continuing its three-year decline. During 2021, 15 percent of U.S. oil production and 2 percent of U.S. natural gas production was produced in the Gulf of Mexico.”
Given the importance of flaring and venting from both environmental and resource conservation standpoints, accurate and reliable data are necessary and should be readily available to the public. ONRR has advised me that they will begin posting flaring and venting data on their website within 2 months. This is a positive step. Currently, data from the 3 primary sources differ considerably.
Data Sources:
US Energy Information Administration (EIA): Per EIA, their flaring and venting data are received directly from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE).
Office of Natural Resources Revenue: ONRR is a sister bureau of BSEE within the Department of the Interior. Per BSEE regulations, all flared or vented gas must be reported to ONRR. As noted above, ONRR will begin regularly posting flaring and venting data within the next 2 months. This is a most welcome and positive step and may help address these inconsistency issues.
World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership: “a multi-donor trust fund composed of governments, oil companies, and multilateral organizations committed to ending routine gas flaring at oil production sites across the world.”
Comments:
The EIA (from BSEE) and ONRR flaring/venting numbers should be the same given that the ONRR data are reported in accordance with BSEE regulations, and BSEE is presumably providing ONRR data to EIA. This needs to be clarified.
The World Bank’s gas flaring estimates are based on observations from satellites. This explains their lower numbers given that vented gas would not be detected and some flares might be missed.
In a 1/2021 interview with World Oil, the exiting BSEE Director commented that the “industry has consistently achieved a ratio of less than 1.25% of flared, vented gas to produced gas.” However, based on EIA flaring and venting data (from BSEE per EIA) and EIA gas production data, the volume of gas flared/vented exceeded 1.25% of the gas produced from 2016-2020 and was as high as 1.8% in 2019. (See the chart below.) Even if the lower ONRR flaring/venting totals are used, those volumes exceeded 1.25% in 2019 (1.5%).
BSEE/ONRR should make more detailed flaring/venting data available so that the differences between facilities and sectors (e.g. deepwater vs. shelf) could be assessed. Efforts should also be made to post these data in a more timely manner. At this time, 2021 data are still not available.
p. 17 – “The 2015 BSEE/BOEM study on reducing methane emissions observed that “while natural gas production has declined, …vented and flared gas volumes as a percentage of produced natural gas are increasing” and noted that additional investigation is needed to determine why.” This is consistent with my observations and is probably due in large part to the fact that most gas production is now from oil-wells (e.g. associated gas).
p. 24 – “Argonne estimates, in 2015, platform startups for deep-water floating structures accounted for roughly 15% of the total annual flaring volume on the OCS and an additional 20% of the annual total resulted from monthly spikes associated with compressor outage, pipeline maintenance, and well-unloading.”
Univ. of Michigan study (2020): “Large, older facilities situated in shallow waters tended to produce episodic, disproportionally high spikes of methane emissions. These facilities, which have more than seven platforms apiece, contribute to nearly 40% of emissions, yet consist of less than 1% of total platforms.”
There are no private offshore lands, and the future of US offshore production is almost entirely in the hands of the Federal government. It has now been 525 days since the last offshore lease sale. The Administration chose not to appeal the DC Federal Court decision vacating Sale 257, leaving that to the State of Louisiana and API (parties that actually support offshore oil and gas leasing).
It’s disappointing that the reasoning behind the judge’s Sale 257 decision has received so little attention, especially given that it hinged on BOEM not analyzing the benefit of high oil prices. (i.e. <leasing = <production = >prices = <intl consumption = < CO2) The decision was issued as Russian troops were amassing on the Ukraine border only 28 days before the invasion. Oil prices (WTI) had already reached $87/bbl and would soon spike to $120/bbl, so the decision embracing higher oil prices was (at best) bad timing. Keep in mind that this was not a matter of BOEM failing to consider GHG issues; BOEM had conducted those assessments. The judge’s decision was specific to BOEM not analyzing the GHG benefits of reduced foreign consumption as a result of the higher prices associated with reduced leasing.
U.S. crude oil production in the forecast averages 12.0 million b/d in 2022, up 0.8 million b/d from 2021. We forecast production to increase another 0.9 million b/d in 2023 to average almost 13.0 million b/d, surpassing the previous annual average record of 12.3 million b/d set in 2019.
The short-term forecast doesn’t say how much of that production will come from the Gulf of Mexico. Last year, EIA forecast 2022 Gulf production to average 1.75 BOPD which seems about right based on the the most recent production data.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 