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Posts Tagged ‘Deepwater Horizon’

BOP stack awaiting post-Macondo inspection (from gCaptain.com)

In my 11 May 2010 testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I made ten recommendations. While many of the issues raised in that testimony are being addressed, one of the more important recommendations (no. 4) has received little or no attention. This recommendation calls for a public or private system for collecting and assessing failure date for blowout prevention equipment.  To the best of my knowledge, the only publicly available performance data for BOPE were collected by MMS and SINTEF and pertain to failures during BOP pressure testing, not failures during other operations.  How can we have a credible safety system without comprehensive failure data for such critical well control equipment?

Dr. Malcolm Sharples, an important BOE contributor, identified a number of BOP performance issues since Macondo.  Here are a few examples:

  1. During routine tests on the device, the locking system of one of the rams jammed in a locked position. Sevan is working with Petrobras and the supplier, Cameron, to find a solution.
  2. Reliance suspended all drilling work in the block after the Transocean rig Deepwater Expedition developed technical problems in its BOP. Reliance was drilling the KGV-D3-W1 well in the contract area since April 2010.
  3. The rig was offshore Australia for Shell early last month when newly installed BOP components failed during operations. Following several unsuccessful attempts to rectify the problems in the field, the failing BOP component is currently undergoing repairs in Singapore.

How is this information not important to every operator, regulator, and drilling contractor?  A comprehensive BOP failure reporting system should be a high and immediate priority for the offshore industry.  The information should be verified and published so that all may learn and future performance improved. Requirements for providing such information should be included in contracts and, if necessary, regulations.

An other major void that I have been talking about for years, without much success, is the absence of a comprehensive and verified international incident reporting system.  I assumed this would be universally recognized immediate necessity, and a critical element of the offshore industry’s initiatives agenda. Apparently that is not the case.  More on this to follow.

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Deepwater Horizon

Nothing new, but a but a very good Macondo commentary by Bill Campell, a retired Shell employee. Worth reading.

In my opinion this event is not so much about the well as designed but the well as installed. Installing a well is similar to any other civil engineering project in that what is installed has to be tested or commissioned before it is put into use, just as you would test a vessel or pipeline designed to contain hydrocarbons under pressure.   Wells, which are discovered to have a problem during integrity tests indicating for example a connection between the well and the reservoir, are worked over to rectify the problem and in a few hours after remedial activities have been undertaken, the integrity testing is re-commenced. Bill Campbell

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Link

The National Academy of Engineering and the National Research Council have released the interim report of the Committee on the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Fire, and Oil Spill to Identify Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents in the Future. The interim report includes the committee’s preliminary findings and observations on various actions and decisions including well design, cementing operations, well monitoring, and well control actions. The interim report also considers management, oversight, and regulation of offshore operations.

Comment: No significant surprises.

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In conveying our deep condolences and solidarity to the United States Government and while sharing in the anguish of those whose livelihoods had been seriously affected, I asked that the report ofthe investigation into the accident be submitted to IMO as soon as possible after it has been concluded, so that we may move swiftly to introduce, into the regulatory regime of the Organization, whatever lessons may be learned from the incident in order to enhance safetyand environmental protection in the offshore industry and strengthen, should that prove necessary, the provisions of any relevant IMO instrument. Remarks by Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos

The Secretary-General seems to be committed to an expanded role for IMO in regulating offshore oil and gas facilities.  Questions:

  1. Is an organization with a shipping history and culture the right body to be regulating drilling and production operations? While IMO has experience with mobile drilling units, primarily the vessel aspects, the organization has had little or no involvement with well construction and integrity, production operations or pipelines.
  2. What would an expanded IMO role  mean for existing offshore regulators and their cooperative efforts (primarily through the International Regulators’ Forum) to coordinate activities and improve safety performance?  Generally speaking, the principal safety regulators for offshore facilities have had a very limited role in IMO activities.

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BOP stack awaiting post-Macondo inspection (from gCaptain.com)

Other than the mildly amusing skirmish about the positioning of representatives of the various factions during the inspection process (Hey, how about access for bloggers!) and some silly comments about the independence of the inspection contractor, there has been very little attention paid to the Deepwater Horizon BOP examination that is scheduled to begin today at NASA’s Michoud facility in New Orleans. The absence of media interest is surprising given the importance of this part of the Macondo investigation. Presumably, there will be more extensive coverage beginning today.

While the inspection and testing will be quite technical, some important aspects should be rather straightforward.  What is the position of the rams, particularly the shear ram?  What is the condition of the ram elements and annular preventer?  Is there evidence of control line leakage?  What can be determined about the electronics and the sequencing system designed to automatically actuate the shear ram when power is lost or when the riser is disconnected?

Hopefully, the official investigation website, which currently has no information on the BOP inspection program, will provide updates.  While we don’t expect immediate information on the findings, there should be reports explaining how the inspection program is being conducted and what has been accomplished.

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I hate to say nice things about lawyers :), but the Commission attorneys handled the two days of hearings very effectively.  The outstanding staff preparation and support were quite obvious.

BOE has have long advocated more industry leadership on guiding principles, incident data gathering and verification, risk assessment, peer-audits, standards improvements, cooperative research, and failure data for critical equipment.  In that regard, we are pleased that Chairmen Reilly and Graham, the other Commissioners, and the industry and government witnesses commented positively on some of these important programs.

We need to effectively manage the safety and environmental risks associated with offshore exploration and production, because we can’t afford the economic and security risks associated with a diminished offshore oil and gas program. BOE advocates conservation and renewables, but projections by IEA and other leading energy forecasters make it clear that oil and gas will continue to be an important part of our energy mix for decades.

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With all of the discussion about the float collar issues, I thought I was listening to the Montara hearings this morning.   I’m surprised that neither the Commission questioners nor the panelists have mentioned Montara. When you have two major blowouts within 8 months and they have very similar root causes, the similarities should be of enormous interest. The absence of information transfer that might have prevented Macondo should be a major consideration in these and other hearings.

We have been talking about the similarities between Montara and Macondo for months.  Colin Leach’s 28 September post draws further attention to this issue.  Colin also hit the nail on the head with his comment that an additional barrier should have been installed above the float collar before proceeding.

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Hats off to the Commission attorneys and staff for today’s presentations and questioning.  They were very well prepared, conducted themselves in a professional manner, and focused on the causes (not who should be blamed). The format was excellent with the Commission presenting their tentative findings and then asking the industry panel how they felt about each finding.

Oddly, the only real speculation was by the industry panelists, most notably the comments below about the flow path and BOP performance. Not very subtle!

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Based on lower than expected pressure readings during the cementing operation, Halliburton (Richard Vargo) contends that hydrocarbons entered the annulus (outside production casing) during cementing, rose to the wellhead before the seal assembly was set, and raised the seal assembly after it was set.  They believe that subsequent flow was inside production casing, but that the initial burst was up the annulus. This position is inconsistent with current view of the Commission and all of the other parties.

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The hearing will focus on the causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and will be broadcast live on C-SPAN2.  The panelists and speakers are listed here.

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