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Transocean Ltd. (RIG, RIGN.VX) said Thursday that a Swiss administrative court ruled that the company cannot pay out about $1 billion to shareholders because of the numerous Deepwater Horizon-related lawsuits pending against the rig owner in the U.S. Wall Street Journal

The $40 billion question: How much will Macondo ultimately cost Transocean? Halliburton? Anadarko? Mitusi? Cameron?

Helix Q4000

Helix’s system, a competitor to a project led by Exxon Mobil Corp that is still in the planning stages, is built from equipment that was used to siphon oil from the sea floor after BP Plc’s Macondo well ruptured on April 20. Reuters article

Interesting. We don’t know the details, but this would seem to be a cost-effective approach that could be quickly implemented.

Clark Little photo, Hawaii

Check out this Hawaii news piece about Clark Little’s photography!

While the significance of these charts is debatable, the occurrence of two historic blowouts – Montara and Macondo – within an eight month period is a clear signal that we have problems. The disturbing similarities in these two blowouts tell us that well construction, monitoring, barrier verification, and personnel training practices are not where they should be.

Link to article

It looks like Montara has not affected frontier exploratory drilling offshore Australia.  Per Upstream:

New Seaclem-1 will be the first well to be drilled off the New South Wales coast and will target an estimated 6 trillion cubic feet of gas in the Great White & Marlin prospects.

Well site is in PEP-11 (Advent Energy map)

Washington Post report:

Workers on the doomed Gulf of Mexico oil rig were distracted by multiple activities going on simultaneously and didn’t try to shut the well until 49 minutes after potentially explosive gas particles began flowing in, a BP vice president told a federal investigative panel Wednesday.

Blowout: Is Canada Next?

Thursday, December 9, 2010 at 9 pm on CBC-TV

If the title and announcement for this CBC documentary are indicators, this won’t be a scholarly review of the risks associated with Canadian offshore exploration and development. Nonetheless, those of you who can view CBC programming may want to tune in and see what they have to say.

As presented this morning:
  • Core mission: achieve excellence in system safety across offshore oil and gas industryIndependent auditing function
  • Cannot lobby – cannot be the American Petroleum Institute
  • Company CEOs and boards of directors provide leadership and ensure engagement of employees with it
  • Institute is empowered to use real rewards and sanctions to help all industry players overcome the enemies of safety –ignorance, arrogance, and complacency.

Montara Blowout

According to the Australian Government’s report:

The draft Government response proposes accepting 92 recommendations, noting 10, and not accepting three. The three recommendations that are proposed not to be accepted relate to actions which are technically inappropriate.

While these numbers imply nearly complete Government concurrence with the Commission’s recommendations, the recommendation and response tables (beginning on page 17) tell a somewhat different story. A few examples follow:

  • For some of the recommendations, the Government’s acceptance seems to have little significance.   For example, recommendation 11 calls for a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among operators to provide emergency assistance in the event of a blowout.  The Government “accepts” this recommendation by commenting that such an MOA is an industry matter. Since the Commission recommended that operators enter into a MOA, they clearly understood that this was an industry matter.  That’s not the point.  The Commission would no doubt like the Government to exercise its influence and authority to ensure that the MOA was prepared and executed in a timely manner. The Government made no such commitment in its response.  When the Montara well blew out, every operator and drilling contractor in the region should have been prepared to suspend operations immediately and move their rig to the site. For reasons that remain unclear, that does not appear to have been the case.
  • Other recommendations are accepted/dismissed by saying that the recommended action is “accepted industry practice.”  While that may be true, the Commission is reminding us that there are problems and inconsistencies in the way industry interprets and applies these practices.  How will the Government ensure that these challenges are addressed?
  • Recommendation 19 calls for operators “to inform regulators of the proposed removal of a barrier, even if they consider that well integrity is not thereby compromised.”  The recommendation specifically states that the “the information should be presented by way of a special report.” The Government’s “acceptance in part” reads like “rejection in full,” since the Government comments that existing rules cover this and that the providing this information in the daily drilling report is sufficient.
  • Very good well control recommendations (57-62) are seemingly dismissed (although the text says they are accepted) by saying that “this is primarily an industry operational matter” and “the Government notes that operators already have well control and operating standards in place.”  How is that “accepting” the recommendation?  Yes, this is an industry matter, but improvements are needed in the standards and training, and it’s the Government’s responsibility to make sure that industry makes these improvements.
  • Recommendation 65 pertains to safety culture issues that apply to well control.  The Government dismisses the recommendation (“accepted in principle”) as an industry matter.  Can the Government can do nothing to promote safety culture? Norway has had a safety culture regulation since 2002 and Dr. Mark Fleming, a leading researcher on the topic, made it quite clear in his Vancouver presentation that the Government can and must influence safety culture.

In accepting the Commission’s recommendations, the Government has an obligation to be make sure they are implemented, regardless of which party has primary responsibility for the action.

West Atlas Jackup and Montara Wellhead Platform

While there has been much post-Macondo discussion about the complexity of subsea containment and capping operations for deepwater wells, Macondo was ultimately capped and killed before being intersected by the relief well. The same cannot be said for the shallow water Montara well, which was killed by a relief well after flowing for 74 days.

Capping a flowing well is never routine, regardless of the water depth. However, the safety risks are greater for surface wells.  Those risks combined with the low probability of success are why a capping operation was not even attempted at Montara.  These were the concerns:

  1. The risk of a fatality was estimated at an alarming 25-30%.
  2. The risk of ignition while retracting the cantilever of the West Atlas jackup, a necessary step in the capping operation, was high.
  3. Only the 20-inch casing was tied-back to the wellhead platform. The 13 3/8″ casing was suspended just above the water surface. (According to testimony during the inquiry, the 13 3/8″ casing was not cemented back inside the 20″ casing.)
  4. Unless they were going to tie-back the 13 3/8″ casing while the well was flowing (probably not feasible and not mentioned as a possibility in the Inquiry report), they would have had to install a specially made BOP on the 20.”  If they were able to install this BOP and shut-in the well, flow would have undoubtedly broached the casing at the 20″ inch shoe.  One possible alternative may have been to install a diverter under the BOP and attempt a dynamic kill operation (i.e. direct the flow downwind and away from the rig while pumping mud down the well).  This too would have been complex and risky.

Given the very high safety risk and the low probability of success, I believe the regulator and operator made the correct decision in forgoing a capping attempt. The experiences at Macondo and Montara indicate that capping considerations must be taken into account during well planning activities for both subsea and surface wells, and that they latter pose greater safety risks.  Given the fire potential, having the wellhead at the surface is not an advantage when it comes to capping a flowing well.  It’s better to have the wellhead on the seafloor where the robotic equipment is doing the work.