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Archive for the ‘well control incidents’ Category

…. and gleeful. 

“Is there likely to be litigation over new drilling permits? You bet there is,” said David Petit, a senior attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council.

“We’ll definitely litigate it,” Kieran Suckling, executive director of the Center for Biological Diversity, said of the federal approval of Shell’s plan. “It’s patently illegal.”

Environmental Suits Threaten Gulf Drilling- Wall Street Journal

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Chapter 6

Good Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute videos about their participation in the Deepwater Horizon scientific effort. 

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JL Daeschler, subsea engineer and inventor, sent me some preliminary drawings for a new BOP concept.

  • JL’s design concept is based on 2 slab gate valves, one above the other, that move in the opposite direction and are beveled for shearing.
  • The sealing element is fixed (solid, one-piece) to the main body of the BOP, does not move with the rams, and is fully protected in the drilling mode.
  • The hydraulic system would retract the gate rather than close it (fail-safe closed).
  • The upper and lower rams (gate valve type) are self-centered with a guiding system to minimize side movement and deflection.
  • Well pressure assists in forcing the upper ram against the sealing element.
  • JL is considering a similar concept (single shear) for xmas tree workover system.

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oil-eating bacteria

scientists led by Terry Hazen, a microbiologist at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, discovered that cold-loving microbes were making quick work of the oil (Greenwire, Aug. 24, 2010). These bugs were, in effect, oil-seeking missiles. They were highly mobile, armed with swimming flagella and protein sensors that could guide them to their oily prey, according to additional work so far unpublished by Hazen’s group.  New York Times

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This makes sense

“One of the goals potentially of the MWCC group is to see how we can work together with the Helix group to try to accommodate solutions for all of the Gulf of Mexico,” Dupree (BP) said.

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AP report:

“The Deepwater Horizon BOP was unreasonably dangerous, and has caused and continues to cause harm, loss, injuries, and damages to BP (and others) stemming from the blowout of Macondo well, the resulting explosion and fire onboard the Deepwater Horizon, the efforts to regain control of the Macondo well, and the oil spill that ensued before control of the Macondo well could be regained,” BP said in the suit.

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Per the Citizens Voice, no injuries were reported

The Atgas 2H well operated by Chesapeake Energy in Leroy Township blew out at around 2 a.m., according to Bradford County Emergency Management Agency Deputy Director Skip Roupp.

The well was in the process of being hydraulically fractured and Roupp characterized the spilled fluid as “mostly water … with some contaminants” but he did not know the exact composition of the fluid.

Evidently the crack is in the top part of the well below the blowout preventer,” he said, referring to a device used in emergency situations to choke off flow from a well. “They don’t really know what happened yet because they don’t have it controlled yet.”

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Good report; worth reading.  Some of the positive points are unlikely to get much attention, so we’ll mention them here:

  1. The National Incident Management System/Incident Command System worked as intended
  2. Personnel provided by the Responsible Party (RP) and Coast Guard personnel worked effectively together, and there was “unity of effort” throughout the response organization.
  3. The team found no evidence of collusion between the Coast Guard and RP.
  4. The response generally benefited from the ability of the Government and the private sector to rapidly assess and adapt to new or unusual contingencies and develop innovative solutions for problems not previously experienced.
  5. The knowledge acquired and capabilities learned from this experience are unprecedented, and should become a basis for significant improvements in planning, preparedness, and response for industry, Government, and the response community.

The “Political Demands” section beginning on page 75 includes relatively candid observations on the challenges associated with the management of such a high profile response.

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A recent Colin Leach comment (below) merits a separate post.  Keep in mind that formation gas is highly soluble in oil-based fluids. Under bottomhole temperature/pressure conditions, the gas may be completely dissolved in the drilling fluid, complicating kick detection.

Problem: A small amount of gas is in the riser above the BOP.  This gas has been recognized, the BOP has been shut, and the well below the BOP has been killed and circulated.

What to do next? There may be 2000 bbl of mud in the riser.  Overboard?  In any case if this is done, it may get quite exciting when the (small) gas pocket reaches surface.  Do we always send this mud overboard?  Whenever there is a doubt?

The alternative of circulating through a “riser gas handler” (if the rig is equipped with one) is quite safe as long as some back-pressure  (perhaps 200 psi as a minimum) is held on a choke in order to prevent what was termed “explosive unloading” from happening.  Without this back-pressure, the events that follow are disastrous.

Follow-up: It is time to take a step back and re-look at this whole situation.  To do so does require the realistic modeling software….OLGA, Drillbench etc.. Simple gas calculations (P1V1=P2V2…..or even allowing for Z) don’t include the dynamic effects that you will see and simply must not be used.  The gas rates that come from these simple calculations are misleadingly low.

Certainly this is an area where the industry needs some focused effort.

 

 

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In a previous post, we discussed JL Daeschler’s comments suggesting that the emergency disconnect sequence (EDS) may have actuated the shear ram, but that the sequence aborted when the ram did not close fully. Another knowledgeable commenter, while requesting not to be named, noted that:

Whether the EDS-functions terminated before the sequence was completed is clearly a relevant question.

I agree and believe this possibility may have been dismissed without being fully considered. The DNV report claims that the EDS sequence never actually initiated, probably because of a loss of communication with the stack after the initial explosion.  As evidence, the report offers the following:

There is an account of lights flashing, indicating that the EDS function had initiated. There are no accounts of any specific lights going steady, which would have indicated a function had been completed and confirmed by the subsea control pods.

Comment: Perhaps no light stopped flashing because the first step in the sequence, BSR actuation, was not concluded (i.e. the BSR never fully closed).

Reviewed ROV video indicated no evidence that the sequence had initiated; the LMRP remained latched to the BOP, the Blue and Yellow Control Pod stingers were not retracted.

Comment: This only tells us that the sequence terminated prior to unlatching he LMRP and retracting the pod stingers.  It says nothing about the timing of the BSR closure.

Note that pages 166-167 of the DNV report indicate that the EDS was manually functioned (at the test facility) via surface control and that it functioned as intended.

The report also confirms that the accumulators were functional:

HP Shear Close, EDS, AMF/Deadman and Autoshear have a common reliance on the accumulator bottles (8 x 80 gallon) located on the BOP. Testing of these accumulators determined that they functioned as intended in the as-received condition.

The report goes on to say:

This is further indication the BSR’s were activated either by the Authoshear or possibly the AMF/Deadman functions. No further failure cause analysis was performed.

Comment: So why was the EDS ruled out as the trigger for the BSR activation? Also, if the shear ram was activated by the AMF, why did that sequence terminate after the ram closed (partly)?

Comment on the riser disconnect: While closure of the BSR is a critical first step in the EDS or AMF sequence, riser disconnect, which has received very little attention, is equally important. To prevent flow, you want the well sealed before you disconnect the riser and the column of drilling fluid contained within. However when an EDS is activated, there is a good chance that the well may already have started to flow. Under those circumstances, you need to quickly disconnect the riser so the workers can be removed from the threat. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon, the failure of the riser to disconnect is as significant as the  failure of the BSR to seal the well. Although the EDS may have been activated too late to save the workers who lost their lives, they would likely have been safe if the rig had been disconnected from the well prior to the initial surge.

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