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Posts Tagged ‘well control’

Macondo is dead

Posted in accidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on August 4, 2010| 3 Comments »

I awoke to an email message from Odd Finnestad linking the BP announcement.  It’s only fitting that Odd delivered the news. He and I have been following Montara and Macondo on a daily basis since August 21, 2009, the day the Montara well blew out in the Timor Sea.  A few thoughts:

  • The real end date for the blowout was July 15th, when the containment cap shut-in the well.  It was an uncertain ending with the capping described as a temporary integrity test and talk about re-opening well vents. Fortunately, good judgement and common sense prevailed, and the well remained shut-in.
  • The efforts to prevent recurrence can now proceed with fewer distractions. It’s difficult to calmly address the issues while video images of oil gushing into the Gulf are being broadcast worldwide.
  • We need to do more than react to Macondo, and every offshore operator and contractor needs to be involved. Only 20% of Gulf of Mexico operators attended a critical industry-government hurricane conference after Katrina and Rita.  (No, I’m not going to stop ranting about this!)
  • Industry needs to look at EVERY aspect of offshore operations, not just the drilling issues associated with Macondo.  Fixing what happened at Macondo doesn’t prevent production, pipeline, and other types of drilling disasters.  Helicopter safety, lifting operations, and workplace safety issues also need to be further addressed.
  • This is a major effort and everyone needs to participate.  If you aren’t committed to improving overall safety performance, in the US and worldwide, you shouldn’t be in the business.

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A Tale of Two Spills

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on August 3, 2010| Leave a Comment »

In the less than 3 week period since Macondo was capped, we have transitioned from “doom and gloom” to “all is well.”  What next?

Click to read an interesting USA Today article.

“Oil doesn’t really kill marsh plants,” says John Pardue, director of Louisiana State University’s Hazardous Substance Research Center, who has studied the effects of oil on marshes. “You can put several inches of oil on the vegetation surface and you won’t kill the plants.”

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Macondo spill rate – 53,000 bopd before capping, 62,000 bopd at outset

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , on August 2, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Those are the latest official numbers provided by the Unified Command’s Scientific Teams. Once again, no assumptions or calculations are provided. Why? What was the range of estimates for the different methods (videos analyses, reservoir modeling, acoustics, and extrapolations based on recovery volumes)? Show us the data!

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Bayou St. Denis Well Capped

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , on August 2, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Per Nola.com, the Bayou St. Denis blowout has been capped.

“The Unified Command was able to accomplish this in less than a week due to the fantastic cooperation between the federal, state and local officials and efforts of the contractors,” Capt. John Arenstam, the Coast Guard Federal On Scene Coordinator, said in a news release.

The fact that this incident occurred at all is not so fantastic.  The Coast Guard is investigating.  We look forward to seeing the report.

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Macondo Monday

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on August 2, 2010| Leave a Comment »

End game mysteries?:  As BP prepares for the static kill operation, the well’s flow path is still not clear.   While the consensus seems to be that the flow originates in the annulus outside the production casing, irregularities during the cementing and testing of that casing suggest the possibility of flow inside the casing.  The condition of the well bore and casing strings is also uncertain. Perhaps of greatest importance will be the inspection of the BOPE after the well is plugged and the stack is pulled.  This inspection process should be closely supervised by the regulators.

Press conference etiquette?: After admitting that they joined yesterday’s Unified Command press briefing late, two reporters asked questions that had been answered earlier.  Perhaps they think their time is more important than Admiral Allen’s, or that of the other attendees, viewers, and listeners.  One of these questioners asked when the static kill operation would begin.  Admiral Allen, who answered the question politely and patiently, should have asked when it would be most convenient for the reporter. Surely, the Unified Command would want to accommodate the reporter’s busy schedule. 😉

Dispersants: As has been demonstrated at oil spill workshops and conferences for the past 30 years, you can always stir up passions by questioning the use of dispersants.  Dispersants, unlike burning and skimmers, don’t remove oil from the water (at least not directly).  The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must consider the tradeoffs and make the decisions that he or she thinks will minimize the net impact of the spill.  Given the magnitude of location of the Macondo spill, I think the OSCs made the correct calls.  Dispersants were also used (not without controversy of course) in responding to last year’s Montara blowout in the Timor Sea.

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Bayou St. Denis Blowout is Disturbing

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , on August 1, 2010| Leave a Comment »

This incident isn’t receiving much attention, perhaps because the volumes being discharged are small by comparison to Macondo and there is no “supermajor” to criticize.  I expect that there would be a tad more coverage if BP was the operator. In any event, we thank the folks at NOLA.com for tracking this one.

Despite the dearth of media attention, this is a very disturbing leak/discharge/blowout (you choose) from a safety and environmental management standpoint.  The well was apparently no longer producing and was left without any downhole barriers that would prevent flow in the event of hurricane damage, a fire, or a vessel collision (what happened).  While pollution spectaculars like Macondo deserve the notoriety, industry should be just as determined to address more systemic problems like this one.

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Orphaned Well Continues to Blow in Bayou St. Denis

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , on July 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »

AP Photo/Patrick Semansky

From NOLA.com:

CEDYCO Inc. of Houston owns the wellhead, but the company declared it “orphaned” under the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources “orphaned well” program in 2008.
That program allows companies to abdicate some responsibility for the well and gives the state permission to plug it and prepare the site for redevelopment.

Comments:

  1. Lots of explaining to do on this one.  What barriers were in place in the well bore?
  2. How can you “orphan” a well that hasn’t been temporarily abandoned or equipped with downhole plugs, especially in an area with vessel traffic?
  3. No “deep pockets” responsible party on this one.  Cleanup costs will be paid from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.  Good luck collecting damage costs.
  4. Bad practices yield bad results, regardless of location or water depth.

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Did Firefighting Contribute to the Sinking of the Deepwater Horizon?

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , on July 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Fighting Deepwater Horizon Fire

This question is receiving a lot of attention since the topic was discussed at the Department of the Interior – Coast Guard investigation.

To the best of my knowledge, this concern was first raised by a one of our very smart and experienced contributors, Dr. Malcolm Sharples, who did not wish to be identified at the time.  Malcolm is now comfortable being identified, and I thought I would draw attention to his insightful comment.  See item 3 in this 30 April post.

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Deepwater is Not the Problem, Part 2: Surface vs. Subsea BOPs

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on July 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »

As promised in “Deepwater is Not the Problem,” comparative performance data for surface and seafloor BOPs follow.  Every study and informal review that I have seen has indicated that subsea BOPs are more reliable than surface BOPs. These data are not surprising.  Because of the time and cost involved in pulling and repairing subsea stacks, preventive maintenance programs tend to be more comprehensive.

The studies cited below were completed 10+ years ago, but to the best of my knowledge the conclusions are still valid.  If there are any more recent studies, BOE would like to hear about them.

West Engineering Chart

West Engineering Paper

Recent data indicate surface BOP reliability is only one-tenth that of subsea BOP equipment.

Tertrahedron Study

Subsea BOPs have smaller failure rate than surface BOPs.

SINTEF study: This study is limited to seafloor stacks, and shows there is no difference between failure rates for deepwater and ultra-deepwater wells.

(For wells in >400 m WD) It seems that there is no correlation at all between the failure rate and the downtime related to the water depth.

SINTEF

Sintef Subsea BOP Reliability Study (click to enlarge)


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Deep Water is Not the Problem

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on July 27, 2010| 1 Comment »

In the Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling is more risky because that is where the high-rate wells are, not because the water is deep.
  • Water depth had little to do with the well integrity problems at Macondo. Similar errors in planning and execution would have yielded similar results in any water depth or on land.  Has Montara already been forgotten?
  • Subsea BOP stacks have a much better performance record than the surface stacks used in shallow water drilling (more on this later in the week).
  • Historical data indicate that blowouts occur less frequently in deep water, not more frequently (more to follow).
  • Obviously, blowouts involving high-rate wells are likely to do more damage.   This applies regardless of the water depth.   You can reduce the spill risk by prohibiting drilling in the areas with the highest production potential, but that wouldn’t be very sound energy policy and you won’t find many buyers for the leases.
  • It is safer to conduct intervention and capping operations on subsea wells.  Regulators would not even allow surface capping to be considered at Montara because of the high risk to workers.  The subsurface ROV work is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.
  • If the Macondo well was in shallow water (with the wellhead above the water surface), and well integrity concerns precluded a risky surface capping operation, how would the flow have been contained and collected?
  • Other things being equal, the environmental risk is less at deepwater locations which tend to be farther from shore.

Water depth is just one well planning consideration.  Abnormal pressures and temperatures, shallow gas, hydrogen sulfide, ice, permafrost, storms, currents, extended reach targets, and horizontal completions are some of the others.  To prevent another Macondo, in the US or anywhere else in the world, we need to focus our attention on the 3 categories of issues listed below.  These issues are important in all water depths and in all environments.

  1. Well integrity including design, construction, barriers, verification, and monitoring.
  2. BOPE performance and reliability under all conditions.
  3. Capping, containing, and collecting oil in the event of a blowout.

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