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Posts Tagged ‘safety’

Deepwater Horizon BOP Inspection Begins Today

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , on November 15, 2010| 2 Comments »

BOP stack awaiting post-Macondo inspection (from gCaptain.com)

Other than the mildly amusing skirmish about the positioning of representatives of the various factions during the inspection process (Hey, how about access for bloggers!) and some silly comments about the independence of the inspection contractor, there has been very little attention paid to the Deepwater Horizon BOP examination that is scheduled to begin today at NASA’s Michoud facility in New Orleans. The absence of media interest is surprising given the importance of this part of the Macondo investigation. Presumably, there will be more extensive coverage beginning today.

While the inspection and testing will be quite technical, some important aspects should be rather straightforward.  What is the position of the rams, particularly the shear ram?  What is the condition of the ram elements and annular preventer?  Is there evidence of control line leakage?  What can be determined about the electronics and the sequencing system designed to automatically actuate the shear ram when power is lost or when the riser is disconnected?

Hopefully, the official investigation website, which currently has no information on the BOP inspection program, will provide updates.  While we don’t expect immediate information on the findings, there should be reports explaining how the inspection program is being conducted and what has been accomplished.

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HSE and Culture

Posted in Norway, tagged , , , , , on November 14, 2010| Leave a Comment »

This week I read two pioneering PSA publications: HSE and Culture and Thought Processes.  In January 2002, Norway became the first offshore petroleum regulator to require that companies have a sound health, safety, and environmental culture. The purpose of the two publications was to help industry better understand the concept of HSE and Culture and the goals of the regulation. I recommend that you take a few moments and  take a look at the publications.

Excerpt from HSE and Culture:

Organisations with a sound HSE culture are characterised by the ability to learn, and constantly question their own practice and patterns of interaction. Informed organisations accommodate dialogue and critical reflection on their own practices. People respect each other’s expertise and are willing to share and furtherdevelop their HSE knowledge.

Excerpt from Thought Processes

Vulnerability deals with the relationship between cause and effect. A vulnerable system can be completely disabled – permanently – by a single non-conformance or a series of errors. That sounds dramatic, and fairly unlikely. But it has happened:

• Alexander L Kielland flotel
• P-36 floating platform
• Piper Alpha platform
•Sleipner A GBS

And it can happen again. Because vulnerability begins in the brain. When things are going well, people easily become over-confident. Traditional constraints are challenged and established practices rejected. The consequences spread to the rest of the production system in the formof untried technology, complex solutions, faster execution times and narrower safety margins.

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Déjà vu

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on November 9, 2010| 1 Comment »

With all of the discussion about the float collar issues, I thought I was listening to the Montara hearings this morning.   I’m surprised that neither the Commission questioners nor the panelists have mentioned Montara. When you have two major blowouts within 8 months and they have very similar root causes, the similarities should be of enormous interest. The absence of information transfer that might have prevented Macondo should be a major consideration in these and other hearings.

We have been talking about the similarities between Montara and Macondo for months.  Colin Leach’s 28 September post draws further attention to this issue.  Colin also hit the nail on the head with his comment that an additional barrier should have been installed above the float collar before proceeding.

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Nice Work by the Commission attorneys and staff

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on November 8, 2010| 1 Comment »

Hats off to the Commission attorneys and staff for today’s presentations and questioning.  They were very well prepared, conducted themselves in a professional manner, and focused on the causes (not who should be blamed). The format was excellent with the Commission presenting their tentative findings and then asking the industry panel how they felt about each finding.

Oddly, the only real speculation was by the industry panelists, most notably the comments below about the flow path and BOP performance. Not very subtle!

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Halliburton Stunner

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on November 8, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Based on lower than expected pressure readings during the cementing operation, Halliburton (Richard Vargo) contends that hydrocarbons entered the annulus (outside production casing) during cementing, rose to the wellhead before the seal assembly was set, and raised the seal assembly after it was set.  They believe that subsequent flow was inside production casing, but that the initial burst was up the annulus. This position is inconsistent with current view of the Commission and all of the other parties.

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Statoil Publishes Report on Gullfaks C Incident

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , on November 8, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The incident occurred on 19 May 2010.  We appreciate Statoil’s timely completion and public release of the report.  The report is in Norwegian, but an English summary is provided.

What happened:

  1. A platform well on Gullfaks C was drilled in managed pressure drilling (MPD) mode to a total depth of 4800 meters.
  2. During the final circulation and hole cleaning of the reservoir section, a leak in the 13 3/8” casing resulted in loss of drilling fluid (mud) to the formation.
  3. The loss of back pressure led to an influx of hydrocarbons from the exposed reservoirs until solids or cuttings packed off the well by the 9 5/8” liner shoe.
  4. The well control operation continued for almost two months before the well barriers were reinstated.

Statoil’s near-term action items:

  1. Develop new acceptance criteria and best practices for MPD on Gullfaks.
  2. Update pressure prognoses for the field.
  3. Document that the shear ram is capable of cutting the drill string.
  4. Change the shift relief plan for the Drilling Supervisor and Toolpusher on Gullfaks C.
  5. Review the procedures for communication and mustering with the emergency preparedness organization.

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National Commission Hearing: 8-9 November

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on November 7, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The hearing will focus on the causes of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and will be broadcast live on C-SPAN2.  The panelists and speakers are listed here.

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Structural Engineering Solutions

Posted in Uncategorized, tagged , on November 7, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Odd Finnestad alerted us to some brilliant engineering solutions at There I Fixed It. We have selected a few in honor of our structural engineering colleagues, whose commitment to safety, continuous improvement, and innovation never ceases to amaze us!

 

structural engineering solution to paperwork management challenges

 

 

correcting dangerous structural weakness without stopping "production"

 

 

backup seat belt option using existing structure and systems

 

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International Regulators’ Offshore Safety Conference

Posted in conferences, tagged , , , on November 3, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The conference summary is now posted.

Presentations

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Vancouver Findings and Recommendations

Posted in conferences, tagged , , , on November 3, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The following are the consensus findings and recommendations of the 200 operations, safety, and regulatory specialists who participated in the International Regulators’ Offshore Safety Conference (18-20 October, Vancouver):

  • Regulatory regimes function most effectively when a single entity has broad safety and pollution prevention responsibility.  Gaps, overlap, and confusion are not in the interest of safety or regulatory efficiency.
  • The regulator’s core responsibilities and objectives must be clearly identified.  Managers must minimize distractions so that regulatory personnel can focus on these objectives.
  • Safety management and regulatory priorities should be identified through a comprehensive risk assessment program.   Training and competency development programs should be updated to reflect the new risk information.  Contracting strategies should be reviewed to assess their safety and risk implications.
  • Government and industry should promote an improvement mentality, not a compliance mentality. Continuous communication among regulators, operators, contractors, workers, industry associations and public interest groups is essential for continuous improvement.
  • Operators and contractors must manage their companies to achieve safety objectives and must continually assess the effectiveness of their management programs. Regulators should challenge industry to resolve potential safety problems rather than seek to resolve the problems for them.
  • Regulators should serve as catalysts for learning by distributing information, hosting workshops, participating in research, and identifying gaps in standards and best practices.  Wherever possible, the best standards should be identified and applied internationally.
  • Accident investigations should be conducted independently and findings should be promptly and broadly distributed.  Industry or government should maintain comprehensive and verified incident data bases.  Offshore companies should regularly discuss the causes and implications of past accidents with their employees.
  • Industry and government cannot rely solely on incident data to identify risks.  New indicators must be explored and assessed, particularly for major hazards and safety culture. Worker input is also essential.
  • Peer-based audit programs should be considered for both regulators and operators.
  • Industry and regulators should make better use of technology for real time monitoring of safety parameters.
  • Sustaining outstanding safety performance is critical to the reputation of industry and government.  All personnel should be trained to be safety leaders and should be empowered to stop work without blame.
  • Industry and government should Investigate other actions and programs that might help promote, sustain, and monitor a culture of safety achievement.

This is very good, fundamental guidance for all governments and companies.

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