The National Commission has a diverse lineup of “heavy hitters” slated for hearings on 27-28 September. CSpan doesn’t have their schedule posted yet for these dates, but I assume they will be broadcasting the hearings live.
Posts Tagged ‘oil spill’
National Commission Agenda for 27-28 September
Posted in Uncategorized, tagged accidents, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, National Commission, offshore oil, oil spill on September 24, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Australia to Have Single Offshore Safety Regulator
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Martin Ferguson, Montara, NOPSA, oil spill, safety, well control on September 23, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Montara Blowout, Timor Sea
I awoke to two very important developments from Australia as reported by Anthea Pitt with Upstream:
- According to Energy Minister Martin Ferguson, the Montara Inquiry Report will be publicly released by the end of the year. As BOE readers know, there are important similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, most notably the production casing cementing issues that created a flow path via the shoe track on both wells and the evidence that both disasters would have been prevented if negative flow tests had been properly conducted and interpreted. Would Macondo have been prevented if BP and Transocean had followed the Montara hearings and made sure that all drilling personnel were aware of the causes of this 74-day blowout in the Timor Sea?
- Minister Ferguson also announced that the role of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) will be expanded:
By expanding Nopsa’s role, one central agency will look out for the safety of our offshore workers and the environment from exploration to decommissioning. That means it will be responsible for approvals and regulation of safety and environment, as well as integrity of facilities and day-to-day operations.
Bravo to Australia and Minister Ferguson! As I indicated in a submission to the Montara Commission and testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, a single agency must be responsible and accountable for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations if safety and pollution prevention objectives are to be achieved.
“3 beers in the Superdome” analogy
Posted in Uncategorized, tagged beer, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, oil spill, Superdome on September 22, 2010| 2 Comments »
Louisiana Superdome
CBS has caused quite a stir with their short article equating the Macondo spill to 3 beers in the Louisiana Superdome:
“How big was the oil spill in the Gulf? It was equal to pouring three cans of beer into the Superdome.”
Beer in the Superdome? How could that be possible? Certainly not during a Saints game! 🙂
I never liked these types of analogies for the following reasons:
- They imply that you are trying to downplay the problem. The Macondo spill was massive, and it is silly to argue otherwise.
- The spill affected only a portion of the Gulf, so using the volume of the entire Gulf as a denominator is unrealistic. If the spill was diluted by the entire Gulf, it wouldn’t have been necessary to disperse it. Is a spill near Cape Cod diluted by the entire Atlantic Ocean?
- Once oil is on the beach, in a marsh, or on a bird, it doesn’t matter how big the adjacent body of water is. The beach or marsh is still soiled, and the bird is still harmed.
- People whose livelihoods were affected by the spill aren’t comforted by the fact that most of the Gulf was clean.
Relief well contributed to the autopsy and burial of Macondo, not the execution
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, relief well, safety, well control on September 19, 2010| 1 Comment »
Now that Admrial Allen has officially confirmed that the dead Macondo well is in fact dead, what is the legacy of the relief well?
- The relief well was Macondo’s opposite – a technological marvel that was flawlessly planned and precisely drilled without incident.
- The relief well verified new sensing and ranging tools for locating a well.
- The relief well contributed to the “burial” of Macondo by further cementing and pressure testing the annulus
- Perhaps most importantly, the relief well provided further confirmation that Macondo flowed inside the production casing and not in the annulus surrounding that casing. Was this an unstated BP objective in supporting the decision to complete the intercept operation? Remember that after the top kill cementing operation killed the well, BP requested that the Unified Command “consider foregoing the relief well.” This was an appropriate request since the annulus could have been secured through conventional plugging and abandonment practices. Whether or not BP changed positions on the intercept, the completion of that operation seems to have helped the BP legal defense. Misinterpreting negative pressure tests, missing signs of flow, and mis-routing that flow would seem to be more defensible than improperly designing the well, ignoring centralizer recommendations, and foregoing the cement bond log.
Macondo: Different Country, Same Questions
Posted in accidents, tagged accidents, bly, bp, Commons, Gulf of Mexico, Jack Ryan, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, Tony Hayward, UK, well control on September 16, 2010| Leave a Comment »
If you haven’t heard BP executives answer the same questions (long string, centralizers, cement bond log, BOP failure, etc, etc) often enough during appearances before Congress, you can watch a UK House of Commons committee ask them to Tony Hayward and Mark Bly on cspan’s recording of yesterday’s hearing. This excellent legislative teamwork is further evidence of that special relationship between the US and UK.
I do wish that both government’s would show more interest in some of the lower profile incidents that also have major international significance. Perhaps they can coax Venezuela to release information about the Aban Pearl sinking. Even though I follow Hugo Chavez’s tweets :), I’ve learned nothing of significance about that accident.
In light of yesterday’s post about negative pressure testing, I was interested in this comment by Tony Hayward at the Common’s hearing:
We clearly have taken a lot of action to clarify and provided much greater rigor around the assessment of the negative pressure test.
Can BP tell us more?
Same test should have prevented both Montara and Macondo
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Montara, negative pressure test, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, standards, well control on September 15, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Despite the vast differences in location and water depth, both the Montara and Macondo blowouts would have been prevented if negative pressure tests had been properly conducted and interpreted after the production casing had been set.
A negative pressure test simulates an underbalanced condition in which the formation pressure exceeds the pressure exerted by the fluid column. The purpose of the test is to determine if there are leaks in the casing shoe track, casing, or seal assembly. At Macondo, the test was conducted and the evidence of inflow is quite clear. Unfortunately, that evidence was misinterpreted. See slides 14-17 in the linked presentation.
At Montara, the testimony suggests that a negative pressure test was not properly conducted. PTTEP therefore had a false sense of security regarding the integrity of the casing shoe. See page 9 of this transcript.
Both wells subsequently flowed through the shoe track and inside production casing for a combined duration exceeding 5 months.
There are currently no industry standards for conducting and interpreting negative pressure tests.
CAN HAPPEN AGAIN!
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, Australia, blowouts, Canada, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Macondodrama, Norway, offshore oil, oil spill, relief well, safety, UK, well control on September 14, 2010| Leave a Comment »
“Can’t happen again” was the mantra of the OCS oil and gas program for 40 years after the Santa Barbara blowout. “Can’t happen here” was the short-lived message of government and industry after last year’s Montara blowout in the Timor Sea. Surprisingly, new versions of the “can’t happen” message have been heard since Macondo. Companies have boasted that “it couldn’t happen to us,” and some government representatives have claimed that their regulatory regimes would have prevented the blowout. The beat goes on.
Macondo will not be the blowout that ends all blowouts, and Macondo will not be the last major offshore accident. We need to focus on reducing the risks of another disaster during drilling, production, or transportation, in deep or shallow water, arctic ice, and every other environment where operations are conducted. The new mantra, no matter where you operate or regulate, should be “CAN HAPPEN AGAIN.” That is the attitude we need if we are to prevent future accidents. We should preach the “CAN HAPPEN AGAIN” message loudly and clearly, no matter how many years (hopefully decades) elapse before the next major accident.
We’ve heard a lot of details about the shortcomings of the well design, the companies involved, and one of the regulators. However, consistent with the CAN HAPPEN AGAIN message, we need to also look at the high-level management, leadership, and regulatory issues. How do we sustain outstanding performance and minimize the risks of major accidents? Here are four suggestions that have received little attention since the blowout:
- Challenge industry. One lesson I have learned from the Norwegians is to make industry take ownership for their problems. Instead of halting deepwater drilling for six months while the government attempts to fix the problems (real and perceived), we should have given offshore operators six months to develop a plan for not only preventing another Macondo, but reducing the risks of any major drilling, production, and pipeline accidents. If the government wasn’t satisfied with the industry plan, operations could be curtailed until a good plan was developed.
- Improve management systems and cooperative industry programs. US operators and contractors are understandably in a reactive mode with a goal of lifting the moratorium. However, the next disaster will not duplicate this one. The offshore industry must provide the leadership needed to improve management systems and develop cooperative programs that will monitor performance, evaluate technology and procedures, and asses risks.
- Truly reorganize the OCS regulatory program by consolidating safety and pollution prevention functions into a single authority. Wells, platforms, and pipelines are integrated systems. You can’t divide the components among regulators and expect the regime to function effectively and efficiently. That’s not possible. A few examples (there are may more): separate agencies should not regulate connecting OCS pipelines; separate agencies should not regulate offshore cranes based on the type of facility; and multiple agencies should not regulate the integrity of floating structures. Because of the complexity of the OCS regime, regulatory and industry personnel spend too much time resolving and coordinating administrative and procedural matters. This time would be better spent focusing on mission critical safety issues. A single agency should be responsible and accountable for safety and pollution prevention at offshore facilities, including the review of plans, permit applications, and management systems, and the conduct of inspections and audits needed to assess performance and verify compliance.
- Request assistance from international regulatory partners. While numerous US entities have questioned regulators in Norway, the UK, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere, no one has actually asked these organizations for assistance. In lieu of one or more of the official US inquiries, international regulators should have been called on to review the accident and the regulatory regime. Who has spent more time assessing regulatory options than other regulators? Who knows more about establishing and achieving safety performance objectives? Who else is knowledgeable and objective, yet insulated from US political influences?
Excellent Times Picayune Animation of Macondo Slick Movement and Well Control Activities
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, oil spill, relief well, safety, well control on September 13, 2010| Leave a Comment »
BP Report Released
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, bp, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on September 8, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Our main interest was in the flow path and BOP issues:
Flow path:
The investigation team concluded that hydrocarbon ingress was through the shoe track, rather than through a failure in the production casing itself or up the wellbore annulus and through the casing hanger seal assembly.
BOP:
- The explosions and fire very likely disabled the emergency disconnect sequence
- The condition of critical components in the yellow and blue control pods on the BOP very likely prevented activation of another emergency method of well control, the automatic mode function (AMF), which was designed to seal the well without rig personnel intervention upon loss of hydraulic pressure, electric power and communications from the rig to the BOP control pods. An examination of the BOP control pods following the accident revealed that there was a fault in a critical solenoid valve in the yellow control pod and that the blue control pod AMF batteries had insufficient charge; these faults likely existed at the time of the accident.
- Remotely operated vehicle intervention to initiate the autoshear function, another emergency method of operating the BOP, likely resulted in closing the BOP’s blind shear ram (BSR) 33 hours after the explosions, but the BSR failed to seal the well.
BP’s flow path assessment is consistent with our expectations. Early on, while most of the attention was focused on the annulus, we thought that flow inside the production casing was a distinct possibility. With regard to the BOPs, BP’s explanation is a more complete than we expected at this time, given that the stack has just been recovered.
More to follow.
Gillard will continue as Prime Minister of Australia
Posted in Uncategorized, tagged Australia, Montara, offshore oil, oil spill, safety on September 7, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Julia Gillard
Martin Ferguson is likely to retain his post as Minister for Resources and Energy. We trust that he will now release the Montara Inquiry Report as promised. When has a politician ever broken a promise? Never happens in this country 🙂
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 