Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE)

Mr. Jacob (PTTEP COO): I don’t think you’ll find that, necessarily, the American system would have stopped this event happening, and there are other events that happen all the time there as well.

This comment (cheap shot?) by Mr. Jacob followed several others that served only to demonstrate that both the witness and the Commission are poorly informed about international regulatory regimes, in the US and elsewhere.   Indeed, Mr. Jacob  may be even less informed about regulatory systems than he is about well barriers and safety management systems.  “May I suggest to you, Mr. Jacob” (language favored by Mr. Howe) that companies like PTTEP are the reason a certain level of prescription is necessary.  Indeed PTTEP may be the new poster child for supporters of prescriptive regulatory regimes. Oh, and please tell us about these events that “happen all the time” in the US.

In the US offshore regime, prescription is largely in the form of industry standards and best practices.  Is that such a bad thing?  The public interest and the interest of responsible companies needs to be protected from the likes of PTTEP – companies that are willing to cut corners without regard (beyond lip service) to safety, the environment, and the importance of offshore oil and gas to our economy and national security.

More to follow after I have calmed down 🙂

Read Full Post »

Quote of the Day :):

MR WHYBROW: I hear what my friend says, and I do note that it seems that I’m the only person who is required not to try to put words into the witness’s mouth.

No major developments in today’s transcript.  Comments and observations:

1. The discussion of the 9 5/8″ casing cementing issues is a bit imbalanced in that most of the attention is on the reinjection of fluids after the influx that  followed the casing pressure test.  Very little attention has been paid to any evidence (positive or negative) of float valve closure after the cement had been pumped.  Also, there has been almost no discussion about the timing of the casing pressure test.  This test may have created or expanded the channels in the shoe.  After the influx, it was probably a mistake to inject any fluids until the cement hardened.  At that point, it would have made sense to pressure up and test the shoe.
2. The hearings have drawn attention to the absence of well integrity, planning, and cementing elements in well control training programs.  This should be a topic for discussion by WellCap and IWCF administrators, operators, and regulators.
3. While fault-finding and fact-finding are certainly related, today’s sessions seemed skewed toward the former.  We’ve read enough to know there were serious flaws in the management systems, and are not so concerned about individual guilt.
4. The testimony indicated that oil-field units were converted to metric units after the drilling reports were written, and that these revisions were solely for the purpose of satisfying the “authorities.”  US offshore regulators started down this path many years ago and reversed course after considering the safety implications.  Perhaps there is a need for further international discussion about this topic.
5. It was interesting to learn that a rig supervisor kept excerpts from drilling reports on a personal thumb drive.  I wonder how the lawyers and IT security folks like that.
6. It seems odd that Mr. Treasure, PTT’s senior drilling representative (albeit a contractor) on the rig when some critical decisions were made, did not get to review or provide any input to the PTT submission.

Read Full Post »

Q. (Mr. Berger, Counsel for the Inquiry): Have you become aware through your experience in the industry that problems with cementing are a leading factor in the cause of blowouts?
A. (Mr. Doeg, Halliburton): No, I haven’t.

Good question and a surprising response from the Halliburton employee who was the cementing contractor when the 9 5/8″ casing was set.  Mr. Doeg has 20 years of cementing experience.  What do they discuss at training sessions and safety meetings?

Q. (Mr. Berger): Were you aware that the well you were working on on 7 March last year had entered the reservoir?
A. (Mr. Doeg): No, I wasn’t.
Q. (Mr. Berger): You’ve only become aware that it entered the reservoir subsequently; is that right?
A. (Mr. Doeg): Correct.

Stunning!   Keep in mind that this was a long 9 5/8″ string being cemented through an extended horizontal section.

Food for thought (In questioning Mr. Doeg, Mr. Berger raised the possibility of compatibility issues between the Weatherford float collar and the Halliburton plugs):

Q. When you have a float collar and a bottom plug manufactured by different companies, can issues arise about their compatibility?
A. They can, yes.
Q. What sorts of issues can arise?
A. When it comes to drilling out, they generally run non-rotating plugs to prevent that, and in this case they didn’t run non-rotating plugs; they ran an additional piece of equipment to prevent them from rotating.
Q. What about when seating the bottom plug in the float collar – can issues arise where the two parts are manufactured by different companies?
A. Normally not, but with this additional piece of equipment, possibly.

Transcript

Read Full Post »