Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘offshore oil’

The oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico appears to be dissolving far more rapidly than anyone expected, a piece of good news that raises tricky new questions about how fast the government should scale back its response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

A very good article in the New York Times confirms what experienced oil spill observers expected – oil from the Macondo spill is disappearing rapidly as a result of natural processes (see SINTEF diagram below).  While marsh and coastal damage could be significant, more oil from Macondo shouldn’t add to those problems.

SINTEF Weathering Diagram

Read Full Post »

In the Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling is more risky because that is where the high-rate wells are, not because the water is deep.
  • Water depth had little to do with the well integrity problems at Macondo. Similar errors in planning and execution would have yielded similar results in any water depth or on land.  Has Montara already been forgotten?
  • Subsea BOP stacks have a much better performance record than the surface stacks used in shallow water drilling (more on this later in the week).
  • Historical data indicate that blowouts occur less frequently in deep water, not more frequently (more to follow).
  • Obviously, blowouts involving high-rate wells are likely to do more damage.   This applies regardless of the water depth.   You can reduce the spill risk by prohibiting drilling in the areas with the highest production potential, but that wouldn’t be very sound energy policy and you won’t find many buyers for the leases.
  • It is safer to conduct intervention and capping operations on subsea wells.  Regulators would not even allow surface capping to be considered at Montara because of the high risk to workers.  The subsurface ROV work is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.
  • If the Macondo well was in shallow water (with the wellhead above the water surface), and well integrity concerns precluded a risky surface capping operation, how would the flow have been contained and collected?
  • Other things being equal, the environmental risk is less at deepwater locations which tend to be farther from shore.

Water depth is just one well planning consideration.  Abnormal pressures and temperatures, shallow gas, hydrogen sulfide, ice, permafrost, storms, currents, extended reach targets, and horizontal completions are some of the others.  To prevent another Macondo, in the US or anywhere else in the world, we need to focus our attention on the 3 categories of issues listed below.  These issues are important in all water depths and in all environments.

  1. Well integrity including design, construction, barriers, verification, and monitoring.
  2. BOPE performance and reliability under all conditions.
  3. Capping, containing, and collecting oil in the event of a blowout.

Read Full Post »

Click on photo to enlarge.  MWCC information sheet.

Read Full Post »

link

Exxon, Shell, Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhilips will each give $250 million to establish a non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Co., to produce and manage the equipment. The system will be designed and built over the next 12 to 18 months to handle spills of 100,000 barrels a day in waters as deep as 10,000 feet (3,048 meters), the companies said in a statement yesterday.

Comments:

  1. Excellent and necessary initiative.
  2. Will other GoM operators participate?  Unless they can provide a similar capability, they will probably have no choice.
  3. It may be difficult to manage a capability that will probably (hopefully) never be used?  Realistic simulations and drills will be critical.
  4. Could major components of this capability be used for other purposes?  Colin Leach has suggested that an FPSO (Cascade-Chinook?) might provide the necessary collection and processing capability.  Such an FPSO could be promptly relocated to the site of a blowout.
  5. More on this later, but there are advantages to a seafloor blowout (as opposed to a blowout from a surface wellhead), particularly from a safety standpoint.  Also, seafloor BOPE has a better historicial performance record than surface BOPE.  This new capability will address the major subsea well deficiencies –  intervention, containment, and collection. 
  6. I don’t think surface wellheads should be left out of the picture.  A surface capping operation on a platform or jack-up rig is far from a slam dunk, and is more hazardous than a subsurface capping operation.
  7. Well integrity is, of course, critical to the success of any well containment operation, and that should be the primary area of consideration for all offshore operators.

Read Full Post »

Platts has an interesting report on yesterday’s hearing:

Guide said the decision to use a long string of casing instead of a liner
was made because it provided better long-term well bore integrity, not because a liner would have cost an additional $7 million to $10 million. He said the liner would have added only one additional barrier in the well.
  John Guide, BP’s Well Team Leader 

Comment:  One additional barrier is very significant when you only have 2 others and there are issues with the primary barrier (production casing cement).

Jason Mathews, a BOEM panel member, asked Guide if he knew that in the past year, Schlumberger had been brought to rigs 74 times for cement bond logs, and only three times they had been sent away without doing the logs; in two instances BP, sent the crews away.

Comment: Interesting statistic; good research by Jason and the BOEMRE team.

Read Full Post »

We believe that we should not start the static kill operation until we have installed the last liner run in the bottom of the relief well.  Admiral Allen

Comment: This is understandable given the potential for communication between the 2 wells at or near the reservoir level.

– There has been some media talk about allowing the well to flow during a possible hurricane evacuation.  I don’t see any direct quotes from Admiral Allen that specifically say that, so I hope these media reports are inaccurate.  As indicated in previous posts, this is an unnecessary measure that could be viewed as irresponsible.

-Safety Leadership has been a major emphasis of drilling contractor training programs in recent years.  Transocean’s program is summarized here.  Safety leaders create an environment in which each employee is comfortable raising any and all concerns without fear of repercussions.  Safety leaders are also encouraged to raise safety issues with the companies that contract their rigs.  Judging by comments at the BOEMRE-CG Macondo hearings, some DWH employees were not comfortable raising safety concerns to their supervisors or the operator.   During the Montara blowout hearings, there was evidence of similar reluctance on the part of contract employees.   Drilling and other contractors need to take a close look at their Safety Leadership programs and find out why these entrenched attitudes persist.

Read Full Post »

Most recently, tensions flared as BP made plans to lower its newly designed cap onto the gushing well. Last Thursday, when the cap appeared to stop the oil, all weren’t happy at the Houston crisis center. Instead, a squabble broke out between government scientists and BP engineers.

LINK.

Which of the official investigations will look at the important interactions among Unified Command participants and the effectiveness of the decisionmaking procedures?

Read Full Post »

Doug Suttles tweets at 0830 on 18 July:

Data continues to show encouraging signs and we’re reviewing w/ gov’t team. We will continue to leave the well shut in. 

Pressure is currently 6778 PSI, what we would have forecast in a scenario where the resevoir would have been depleted. 

We are continuing to run extensive tests and monitor. We’re going to take this day by day. 

There doesn’t seem to be any information that would justify a resumption of flow via the collection and production systems.  Yesterday’s official statement from Admiral Allen (below) is therefore a bit puzzling.

When this test is eventually stopped, we will immediately return to containment, using the new, tighter sealing cap with both the Helix Producer and the Q4000. Additional collection capacity of up to 80,000 barrels per day is also being added in the coming days. 

Why resume flow?

Read Full Post »

At this point, there is no evidence that we don’t   have well integrity. -Kent Wells tweet; 17 July; 0900 ET 

  • If the data continue to indicate that the well is holding pressure, why add new safety and pollution risks by resuming flow through multiple collection and production systems? 
  • Presumably they will leave the well shut-in and finish the job with the relief well.  Per Kent Wells, the relief well will intercept the well bore by the end of the month.  This would seem to be a conservative estimate.

Read Full Post »

  • Tough decision looming?: Assuming the well continues to hold pressure and other surveys don’t indicate any anomalies, will they leave the well shut-in or resume flow through the collection systems?  This will be an interesting decision.
  • Insignificant detail that is probably only of interest to me: Since 1971 when I started tracking blowout data, a relief well has not been required to halt the flow from any drilling blowout in US (Federal) offshore waters.  On several occasions, relief wells were initiated but not needed to stop the flow from a well.  Since the Macondo flow is now under control, at least at this time, this record appears to have been sustained.  A relief well will still, of course, be needed to kill the well, so this is admittedly a nuanced and largely insignificant detail (especially since nearly 3 months were required to shut-in/control the Macondo well).  

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »