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Posts Tagged ‘Montara’

On 8-9 September, the International Regulators’ Forum (IRF) met in Herndon, Virginia, to address offshore safety issues in the wake of the Macondo and Montara blowouts.  This was the first extraordinary meeting in the IRF’s 17-year history.  In a statement released after the meeting, the IRF resolved to:

  • Provide leadership on safety and safety related regulatory matters for offshore oil and gas activities.  A strategic agenda will be discussed and adopted at the next IRF meeting in October in Vancouver.
  • Develop an audit protocol looking at BOP integrity and operational issues, for use by all IRF members to provide a consistent approach.
  • Continue to strengthen sharing of regulatory practice and experience and provide a sounding board for key initiatives of members.

These and other offshore safety issues will be discussed at the upcoming (18-20 October) IRF conference in Vancouver.  This conference is open to all interested parties.

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Julia Gillard

Martin Ferguson is likely to retain his post as Minister for Resources and Energy.  We trust that he will now release the Montara Inquiry Report as promised.  When has a politician ever broken a promise?  Never happens in this country 🙂

Upstream Article on Australia’s minority government.

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This article is nicely done, but like most commentary on the factors contributing to the Macondo blowout, it assumes that the well flowed in the annulus outside the production casing.  Steps 1-3 would be irrelevant if the well flowed up through the shoe track and inside the production casing (ala Montara).

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While BP has established a $20 billion damage fund that is being administered by the Federal government, PTTEP, the party responsible for the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea, is taking a different approach.  PTTEP has denied all claims from the Indonesian government arguing that oil spill damages were limited to the immediate vicinity of the Montara field.  However, information presented at the Montara hearings indicates that the slick extended into Indonesian waters.

PTTEP Australia (PTTEP AA), a subsidiary of the Thai-listed PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited today (2 September 2010) confirmed the Government of Indonesia that it has not accepted any claims for compensation relating to the claimed impacts of oil released from the company’s Montara field in the Timor Sea last year.

What if PTTEP was the operator at Macondo?

PTTEP news release

Upstream report on the claim

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Click for an excellent summary of what may have gone wrong at Macondo and what can be done to prevent future incidents.

While there are no new details on the causes of the blowout, available information on the possible contributing factors is nicely summarized.  The presentation also includes a very good summary of risk management considerations.

Barriers against accidents are not only technical and operational and “physical” but are also non-physical built around strategic and organizational measures and decisions

During the Montara hearings and later in Macondo discussions, we raised concerns about the timing of the production casing pressure test. This issue has not received enough attention in our view, possibly because most of the Macondo focus has been on annulus flow and barriers.  It was good to see this comment in the presentation:

Pressure tested well far too early – could have blown out cement of shoe track

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Since it’s already Monday morning in Oz, our Australian bureau has returned to work and is eager to pass on some news:

  • The sense in Australia seems to be that sensitive regulatory issues delayed the release of the Montara report until after the election (and perhaps much longer if another election is needed to resolve the stalemate).

We received this comment from an oil industry manager in Australia:

The Montara report damns the regulatory agency and there are many that think that is not appropriate.  That is the reason for the holdup.

Comment: I assume the report’s criticism is primarily directed at the Northern Territory regulator.  In defense of the regulators, the current division of responsibilities between the Federal government and the States is unworkable. You can’t have one agency responsible for well integrity and another responsible for rig and facility safety.  The US has similar issues with the division of safety authority among the Departments of Interior and Transportation (pipelines), and the Coast Guard.  If the regulatory responsibilities of the former MMS are not retained in a single bureau, but divided between the two new Interior bureaus, these problems could be exacerbated.  Most of the recommendations in my 11 May testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources have received at least some attention.  One very important recommendation (no. 1) calling for a streamlined OCS regulatory regime, has not been addressed.

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BOE does not officially resume posting until 30 August, but we wanted to make sure you were aware of Magne Ognedal’s recent remarks to Upstream

“It is very frustrating,” Ognedal said. “We do not have the information we need to finish the job. We know from the transcripts of the inquiry that the Macondo and Montara blowouts appear to have very similar causes.  However we cannot draw any conclusions until we have access to the report.”

I also suggest that you read the text of Magne’s excellent speech during the Safety Luncheon at ONS in Stavanger.

Magne Ognedal Addresses ONS Safety Luncheon

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Like all swinging voters, Dirty Harry – a saltwater crocodile admired for his prediction prowess – took his time sniffing out the candidates in his enclosure at Crocosaurus Cove in Darwin today. Refusing to make a snap decision, Harry – reluctantly it seemed – chose the chicken carcass that was attached to a caricature of Prime Minister Julia Gillard.

Link

Should the croc be correct, BOE friend Martin Ferguson will presumably retain his cabinet position and release the Montara report as promised.  Why is the release of this report so important?

  1. While the transcripts of the Inquiry hearings do a pretty good job of identifying the well planning, cementing, barrier, and management issues that were contributing factors, the Commission’s confirmation of the specific root causes of the blowout is essential.
  2. Only a few BOE geeks and a handful of others have actually read all of the testimony and submissions.  The Macondo planners and Deepwater Horizon crew either were totally unaware of what happened at Montara or ignored what they had learned.  I suspect that the former was the case.
  3. Important emergency response issues, which received minimal attention during the Montara hearings, will likely be discussed in the report.  Montara demonstrated that capping and containment operations can be more difficult for a surface well than they are for a subsurface well.   For safety reasons, a surface capping operation was prohibited at Montara.  Even if the operation was allowed, it probably wouldn’t have been successful because of the way the well was suspended.  Should well suspension practices take into account the possibility of a surface capping operation?
  4. The decision to move a rig from Singapore to drill the Montara relief well, rather than use rigs that were operating off Australia, has broad industry and regulatory implications.  Will this decision be assessed in the report?
  5. Finally, the Montara Commission makes recommendations for Australia’s offshore regulatory regime. These recommendations will be of great importance to the US and other nations that are reorganizing or initiating their regulatory programs.  We expect the Commission to recommend that a single agency regulate operational safety offshore Australia.  This is consistent with the recommendation in my testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the approach taken by Norway and other leading offshore regulators.  A regulatory regime that includes multiple agencies with overlapping or segmented jurisdiction guarantees conflict, confusion, gaps, and inefficiency.  Wells, platforms, and pipelines are integrated drilling and production systems, and must be regulated as such. Similarly, permitting, auditing, and inspection are integrated regulatory functions that cannot be effectively divided among multiple agencies.  One regulator must be responsible and accountable.

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It may be winter in Australia, but the offshore debate is heating up.  I awoke to a stream of emails from Odd Finnestad who follows the Australian news very closely.  Odd noted that the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) Safety Conference opened with a presentation on the industry response to Montara.  Further from Odd:

Then, Martin Ferguson, who was apparently also present, gave an address. Quotes of his speech appear in numerous articles, and the cat is now out of the bag: The Montara report will NOT be released before the election! And, should the Gillard Labour Party win the battle, Martin says there will be a shift to a national regulator in Australia from January 1, 2012.

See this article for a good summary of Minister Ferguson’s remarks.

Creating a new all-powerful national regulator for the offshore oil and gas industry would be a top priority of a re-elected Gillard Labor government, federal resources minister Martin Ferguson said today.

While the other states appear to be on board, the West Australia government is not happy.

The most colorful quote is from APPEA CEO Belinda Robinson:

Knee-jerk reactions such as calls for moratoriums on offshore exploration were not the answer and it was important not to “overdo the self-flagellation”, she said.

BOE comment: We’re not looking for “self-flagellation,” but a little humility would be nice. Ms. Robinson and industry leaders in Australia, the US, and elsewhere need to take a close look at the safety culture of the industry they represent. The reactive studies that are necessary to satisfy government authorities are not enough.   The goal should be participation by all offshore operators in organized programs that assess across-the-board risks and address problem areas before major accidents occur.

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From a poster who has requested anonymity (for background about this topic, see the 2 preceding posts):

There has been a lot of hard work done to update Mike and bring him into the modern world.  I too have had experiences with “Mike” and at a minimum they are distracting and most cases unsafe.  Mike and those like him are bullies, plain and simple.  They may have technical skills, however their people skills are lacking.  Mike doesn’t only work for Operators.  I don’t think there is an appreciation of the complex people relationships that are laid over the technical issues and inevitably there are culture clashes.  It appears that regardless of Transocean and the Deepwater Horizon having worked for BP, the relationships between senior BP and TO personnel was extremely disfunctional.  As someone with multiple decades of experience, I was amazed that what I believed were top flight organizations appear to have not progressed out of the stone age.  I’m not sure what the solution is here.  The competance of all individuals expecially those in senior positions is very important, however the skill set must include more than technical competance alone.  Significant time and money are spent in well control schools, but when the people involved can’t communicate, all such training doesn’t realize much benefit.  It may be trite, but there needs to be a TEAM.  I thought the major players had that concept in their management schemes but the recent history, at least for this incident, does not appear to indicate this.  It appears there is another big task to add to the long list of items needing attention to prevent another such occurance like Macando … and Montara.

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