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Posts Tagged ‘macondo’

As promised in “Deepwater is Not the Problem,” comparative performance data for surface and seafloor BOPs follow.  Every study and informal review that I have seen has indicated that subsea BOPs are more reliable than surface BOPs. These data are not surprising.  Because of the time and cost involved in pulling and repairing subsea stacks, preventive maintenance programs tend to be more comprehensive.

The studies cited below were completed 10+ years ago, but to the best of my knowledge the conclusions are still valid.  If there are any more recent studies, BOE would like to hear about them.

West Engineering Chart

West Engineering Paper

Recent data indicate surface BOP reliability is only one-tenth that of subsea BOP equipment.

Tertrahedron Study

Subsea BOPs have smaller failure rate than surface BOPs.

SINTEF study: This study is limited to seafloor stacks, and shows there is no difference between failure rates for deepwater and ultra-deepwater wells.

(For wells in >400 m WD) It seems that there is no correlation at all between the failure rate and the downtime related to the water depth.

SINTEF

Sintef Subsea BOP Reliability Study (click to enlarge)


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The oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico appears to be dissolving far more rapidly than anyone expected, a piece of good news that raises tricky new questions about how fast the government should scale back its response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

A very good article in the New York Times confirms what experienced oil spill observers expected – oil from the Macondo spill is disappearing rapidly as a result of natural processes (see SINTEF diagram below).  While marsh and coastal damage could be significant, more oil from Macondo shouldn’t add to those problems.

SINTEF Weathering Diagram

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In the Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling is more risky because that is where the high-rate wells are, not because the water is deep.
  • Water depth had little to do with the well integrity problems at Macondo. Similar errors in planning and execution would have yielded similar results in any water depth or on land.  Has Montara already been forgotten?
  • Subsea BOP stacks have a much better performance record than the surface stacks used in shallow water drilling (more on this later in the week).
  • Historical data indicate that blowouts occur less frequently in deep water, not more frequently (more to follow).
  • Obviously, blowouts involving high-rate wells are likely to do more damage.   This applies regardless of the water depth.   You can reduce the spill risk by prohibiting drilling in the areas with the highest production potential, but that wouldn’t be very sound energy policy and you won’t find many buyers for the leases.
  • It is safer to conduct intervention and capping operations on subsea wells.  Regulators would not even allow surface capping to be considered at Montara because of the high risk to workers.  The subsurface ROV work is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.
  • If the Macondo well was in shallow water (with the wellhead above the water surface), and well integrity concerns precluded a risky surface capping operation, how would the flow have been contained and collected?
  • Other things being equal, the environmental risk is less at deepwater locations which tend to be farther from shore.

Water depth is just one well planning consideration.  Abnormal pressures and temperatures, shallow gas, hydrogen sulfide, ice, permafrost, storms, currents, extended reach targets, and horizontal completions are some of the others.  To prevent another Macondo, in the US or anywhere else in the world, we need to focus our attention on the 3 categories of issues listed below.  These issues are important in all water depths and in all environments.

  1. Well integrity including design, construction, barriers, verification, and monitoring.
  2. BOPE performance and reliability under all conditions.
  3. Capping, containing, and collecting oil in the event of a blowout.

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Energy Training and Resources Macondo Well Diagram

A former colleague sent me a link to this comprehensive ETR report on Macondo.  The report provides a good primer on drilling and the issues associated with the blowout. Nicely done!

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Click on photo to enlarge.  MWCC information sheet.

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link

Exxon, Shell, Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhilips will each give $250 million to establish a non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Co., to produce and manage the equipment. The system will be designed and built over the next 12 to 18 months to handle spills of 100,000 barrels a day in waters as deep as 10,000 feet (3,048 meters), the companies said in a statement yesterday.

Comments:

  1. Excellent and necessary initiative.
  2. Will other GoM operators participate?  Unless they can provide a similar capability, they will probably have no choice.
  3. It may be difficult to manage a capability that will probably (hopefully) never be used?  Realistic simulations and drills will be critical.
  4. Could major components of this capability be used for other purposes?  Colin Leach has suggested that an FPSO (Cascade-Chinook?) might provide the necessary collection and processing capability.  Such an FPSO could be promptly relocated to the site of a blowout.
  5. More on this later, but there are advantages to a seafloor blowout (as opposed to a blowout from a surface wellhead), particularly from a safety standpoint.  Also, seafloor BOPE has a better historicial performance record than surface BOPE.  This new capability will address the major subsea well deficiencies –  intervention, containment, and collection. 
  6. I don’t think surface wellheads should be left out of the picture.  A surface capping operation on a platform or jack-up rig is far from a slam dunk, and is more hazardous than a subsurface capping operation.
  7. Well integrity is, of course, critical to the success of any well containment operation, and that should be the primary area of consideration for all offshore operators.

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Platts has an interesting report on yesterday’s hearing:

Guide said the decision to use a long string of casing instead of a liner
was made because it provided better long-term well bore integrity, not because a liner would have cost an additional $7 million to $10 million. He said the liner would have added only one additional barrier in the well.
  John Guide, BP’s Well Team Leader 

Comment:  One additional barrier is very significant when you only have 2 others and there are issues with the primary barrier (production casing cement).

Jason Mathews, a BOEM panel member, asked Guide if he knew that in the past year, Schlumberger had been brought to rigs 74 times for cement bond logs, and only three times they had been sent away without doing the logs; in two instances BP, sent the crews away.

Comment: Interesting statistic; good research by Jason and the BOEMRE team.

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We believe that we should not start the static kill operation until we have installed the last liner run in the bottom of the relief well.  Admiral Allen

Comment: This is understandable given the potential for communication between the 2 wells at or near the reservoir level.

– There has been some media talk about allowing the well to flow during a possible hurricane evacuation.  I don’t see any direct quotes from Admiral Allen that specifically say that, so I hope these media reports are inaccurate.  As indicated in previous posts, this is an unnecessary measure that could be viewed as irresponsible.

-Safety Leadership has been a major emphasis of drilling contractor training programs in recent years.  Transocean’s program is summarized here.  Safety leaders create an environment in which each employee is comfortable raising any and all concerns without fear of repercussions.  Safety leaders are also encouraged to raise safety issues with the companies that contract their rigs.  Judging by comments at the BOEMRE-CG Macondo hearings, some DWH employees were not comfortable raising safety concerns to their supervisors or the operator.   During the Montara blowout hearings, there was evidence of similar reluctance on the part of contract employees.   Drilling and other contractors need to take a close look at their Safety Leadership programs and find out why these entrenched attitudes persist.

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Most recently, tensions flared as BP made plans to lower its newly designed cap onto the gushing well. Last Thursday, when the cap appeared to stop the oil, all weren’t happy at the Houston crisis center. Instead, a squabble broke out between government scientists and BP engineers.

LINK.

Which of the official investigations will look at the important interactions among Unified Command participants and the effectiveness of the decisionmaking procedures?

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  • As indicated in the Weather Undergound map above, a tropical system may be approaching, and weather may be the key factor in determining the next step at Macondo.  Is the hurricane season about to begin in earnest?  Fortunately the well is shut-in, and will likely remain shut-in (this is good news despite attempts to describe it otherwise).
  • BP is now considering a static kill operation – slowly injecting mud and killing the well from the top.  This should work, but timing is the key.  Could the operation be completed in what remains of the weather window? 
  • With regard to the relief well, is it prudent to initiate the Macondo intercept given the weather uncertainties?  Clearly, you do not want to have to relocate the DD3 in the middle of a bottom kill operation. 
  • Keep a close watch on the weather, as tropical waves and storms can appear and intensify overnight.

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