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Posts Tagged ‘macondo’

From a poster who has requested anonymity (for background about this topic, see the 2 preceding posts):

There has been a lot of hard work done to update Mike and bring him into the modern world.  I too have had experiences with “Mike” and at a minimum they are distracting and most cases unsafe.  Mike and those like him are bullies, plain and simple.  They may have technical skills, however their people skills are lacking.  Mike doesn’t only work for Operators.  I don’t think there is an appreciation of the complex people relationships that are laid over the technical issues and inevitably there are culture clashes.  It appears that regardless of Transocean and the Deepwater Horizon having worked for BP, the relationships between senior BP and TO personnel was extremely disfunctional.  As someone with multiple decades of experience, I was amazed that what I believed were top flight organizations appear to have not progressed out of the stone age.  I’m not sure what the solution is here.  The competance of all individuals expecially those in senior positions is very important, however the skill set must include more than technical competance alone.  Significant time and money are spent in well control schools, but when the people involved can’t communicate, all such training doesn’t realize much benefit.  It may be trite, but there needs to be a TEAM.  I thought the major players had that concept in their management schemes but the recent history, at least for this incident, does not appear to indicate this.  It appears there is another big task to add to the long list of items needing attention to prevent another such occurance like Macando … and Montara.

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G’Day Australia.  There are now only 2 weeks until the Federal election. Ironically, the election, which may have delayed the release of the Montara Inquiry report, will be held on the first anniversary of that blowout.

This report will play an important role in keeping our workers safe, protecting our environment and safeguarding our energy security. Minister Martin Ferguson

BOE fully agrees with Minister Ferguson’s statement about the importance of the Montara Inquiry report and hopes that he or his successor promptly releases the report after the election.  The lessons learned at Montara will not only prevent accidents in Australia, but elsewhere in the world. In light of the disturbing similarities between the two blowouts, it is possible that closer international attention to Montara might even have prevented the Macondo blowout.

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  1. Now that the Unified Command has had a couple of days to review the static kill data (which were certainly considered in planning the cementing operation that was concluded yesterday), please provide an update on the latest thinking with regard to the well’s flow path.
  2. Please post a cross section schematic (best estimate) of the well after the completion of yesterday’s cementing operation.

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Kent Well’s response to a reporter’s question and Colin Leach’s comment on BOE seem to give credence to our suspicion that the flow path for the Macondo well was inside the production casing!  If true, this is enormously significant for the following reasons:

  1. The root cause of Macondo is eerily similar to that at Montara in that oil and gas entered the well via compromised cement in the casing shoe and a failed float.  Did the BP engineers and TO crew even know about Montara?  This shows why accident information must be promptly circulated and brought to the attention of key personnel everywhere in the world. It also demonstrates why the Montara report needs to be released without further delay.
  2. Presumed contributing factors that would be irrelevant or less significant: the long string vs. liner/tieback decision, and the failure to run a Cement Bond Log, additional centralizers, or a lockdown sleeve on the casing seal.
  3. Contributing factors that would have even greater importance: selection of the casing point (integrity at the base of the well), waiting on cement time, timing of the positive and negative pressure tests (this is a topic that warrants much more scrutiny and discussion), and failure to set a cement plug before displacing the mud with sea water.

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Click to read the full “Oil Budget” report (just released).

The vast majority of the oil from the BP oil spill has either evaporated or been burned, skimmed, recovered from the wellhead or dispersed – much of which is in the process of being degraded.

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I awoke to an email message from Odd Finnestad linking the BP announcement.  It’s only fitting that Odd delivered the news. He and I have been following Montara and Macondo on a daily basis since August 21, 2009, the day the Montara well blew out in the Timor Sea.  A few thoughts:

  • The real end date for the blowout was July 15th, when the containment cap shut-in the well.  It was an uncertain ending with the capping described as a temporary integrity test and talk about re-opening well vents. Fortunately, good judgement and common sense prevailed, and the well remained shut-in.
  • The efforts to prevent recurrence can now proceed with fewer distractions. It’s difficult to calmly address the issues while video images of oil gushing into the Gulf are being broadcast worldwide.
  • We need to do more than react to Macondo, and every offshore operator and contractor needs to be involved. Only 20% of Gulf of Mexico operators attended a critical industry-government hurricane conference after Katrina and Rita.  (No, I’m not going to stop ranting about this!)
  • Industry needs to look at EVERY aspect of offshore operations, not just the drilling issues associated with Macondo.  Fixing what happened at Macondo doesn’t prevent production, pipeline, and other types of drilling disasters.  Helicopter safety, lifting operations, and workplace safety issues also need to be further addressed.
  • This is a major effort and everyone needs to participate.  If you aren’t committed to improving overall safety performance, in the US and worldwide, you shouldn’t be in the business.

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In the less than 3 week period since Macondo was capped, we have transitioned from “doom and gloom” to “all is well.”  What next?

Click to read an interesting USA Today article.

“Oil doesn’t really kill marsh plants,” says John Pardue, director of Louisiana State University’s Hazardous Substance Research Center, who has studied the effects of oil on marshes. “You can put several inches of oil on the vegetation surface and you won’t kill the plants.”

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Those are the latest official numbers provided by the Unified Command’s Scientific Teams. Once again, no assumptions or calculations are provided. Why? What was the range of estimates for the different methods (videos analyses, reservoir modeling, acoustics, and extrapolations based on recovery volumes)? Show us the data!

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Link to EPA Release. The results are not surprising.

These results confirm that the dispersant used in response to the oil spill in the Gulf, Corexit 9500A, is generally no more or less toxic than the other available alternatives.

Good, timely work by EPA.  Also:

EPA believes dispersants should only be used sparingly and when absolutely necessary. Since the well was capped, only 200 gallons of dispersant have been applied to the Gulf, but constant monitoring continues.

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End game mysteries?:  As BP prepares for the static kill operation, the well’s flow path is still not clear.   While the consensus seems to be that the flow originates in the annulus outside the production casing, irregularities during the cementing and testing of that casing suggest the possibility of flow inside the casing.  The condition of the well bore and casing strings is also uncertain. Perhaps of greatest importance will be the inspection of the BOPE after the well is plugged and the stack is pulled.  This inspection process should be closely supervised by the regulators.

Press conference etiquette?: After admitting that they joined yesterday’s Unified Command press briefing late, two reporters asked questions that had been answered earlier.  Perhaps they think their time is more important than Admiral Allen’s, or that of the other attendees, viewers, and listeners.  One of these questioners asked when the static kill operation would begin.  Admiral Allen, who answered the question politely and patiently, should have asked when it would be most convenient for the reporter. Surely, the Unified Command would want to accommodate the reporter’s busy schedule. 😉

Dispersants: As has been demonstrated at oil spill workshops and conferences for the past 30 years, you can always stir up passions by questioning the use of dispersants.  Dispersants, unlike burning and skimmers, don’t remove oil from the water (at least not directly).  The On-Scene Commander (OSC) must consider the tradeoffs and make the decisions that he or she thinks will minimize the net impact of the spill.  Given the magnitude of location of the Macondo spill, I think the OSCs made the correct calls.  Dispersants were also used (not without controversy of course) in responding to last year’s Montara blowout in the Timor Sea.

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