Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘macondo’

Industry Response Needs To Go Beyond Deepwater Drilling

Posted in accidents, tagged , , on September 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »

BP has announced a new safety unit and other organizational changes. For more on the changes, see the Upstream report.

From a BOE perspective, the most interesting comment in the BP release was this Bob Dudley quote:

Our response to the incident needs to go beyond deepwater drilling. There are lessons for us relating to the way we operate, the way we organize our company and the way we manage risk.

I hope the rest of the offshore industry has the same view and is prepared to work together to assess and mitigate operational risks. To date, industry has reacted impressively to issues raised since the Macondo well blew out on 20 April.  However, what is being done to identify operational and safety risks that could trigger the next disaster? When will complete, consistent, and verified international incident data be collected and published?.  How do you manage risks without such data?  Why weren’t the lessons from Montara quickly disseminated around the world?  If they were, Macondo may have been prevented.

Read Full Post »

Colin comments on Montara-Macondo Float Collar Issues

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| Leave a Comment »

We have commented frequently about the similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, particularly the root cause casing shoe issues. In this post, Colin Leach draws attention to the float shoe and collar issues that permitted oil and gas to enter both wells. Click here to view the full post.

The Bly report (page 70) noted some significant “inconsistencies” in the operation of the float shoe/float collar (see full post). This is so similar in nature to the “inconsistencies” in the 9 5/8″ cement job on the Montara well to be scary. The bottom line is that both disasters could have been prevented if these “inconsistencies” had been recognized and additional barriers placed above the float collar. In fact even if there are no “inconsistencies”, the placing of an additional barrier or so seems like an exceptionally prudent step, which would not take that much time or effort.

Read Full Post »

Deep water is not the problem – Update

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| 1 Comment »

As previously posted (July 27, 2010), deep water had little to do with the well integrity problems and other contributing factors leading to the Macondo blowout. The Bly (BP) report further confirms this position.

Of the eight key findings in the Bly report (listed below), only number 4 could be considered to be more of a deepwater issue.  The BOP failures may also have been influenced by deepwater factors.  However, as previously noted, surface BOPs have a much higher failure rate than subsea stacks.

While the Montara blowout was in relatively shallow water, slight variations of findings 1 through 4 were the primary causes of that accident.

BP findings:

  1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.
  4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.
  5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.
  6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.
  7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.
  8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

Read Full Post »

Department of the Interior Officials Testify at Commission Hearings

Posted in accidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on September 27, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Secretary Salazar, Deputy Secretary Hayes, and BOEMRE Director Bromwich testified at today’s National Commission hearings. Director Bromwich made several important announcements and comments of interest to BOE readers:

  1. He has completed his public meetings and will submit his report to the Secretary by the end of the week, approximately two months ahead of schedule.  Does this point to an early end to the drilling moratorium?
  2. Two significant interim final rules will also be issued by the end of the week.  These rules will address well integrity,  BOP performance, and other issues raised in the 30-day report submitted to the President at the end of May.
  3. New drilling will not be authorized until operators and contractors can demonstrate compliance with the new rules.
  4. BOEMRE resources will be reallocated to assist with the workload associated with the resumption of drilling.

Chairman Reilly expressed concerns about the leasing and regulatory functions reporting to the same Assistant Secretary under the new organizational structure.  He also drew attention to the regulatory regimes in Norway, the UK, and elsewhere, and the importance of studying those programs.

Secretary Salazar’s goal is for the US offshore oil and gas program to serve as the “gold standard” for safe and clean operations around the world.

Read Full Post »

National Commission Hearings – 27 September

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 26, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Monday’s hearings will be broadcast on CSpan 2 beginning at 0900 ET. Admiral Allen will be the first witness and will address decision-making within the Unified Command.  Given the number of high profile witnesses and the limited time allotted to each witness,  in-depth questioning would seem to be unlikely.  Will this be a day of short speeches?

Read Full Post »

National Commission Agenda for 27-28 September

Posted in Uncategorized, tagged , , , , , , on September 24, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The National Commission has a diverse lineup of “heavy hitters” slated for hearings on 27-28 September. CSpan doesn’t have their schedule posted yet for these dates, but I assume they will be broadcasting the hearings live.

Read Full Post »

Australia to Have Single Offshore Safety Regulator

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on September 23, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Montara Blowout, Timor Sea

I awoke to two very important developments from Australia as reported by Anthea Pitt with Upstream:

  1. According to Energy Minister Martin Ferguson, the Montara Inquiry Report will be publicly released by the end of the year. As BOE readers know, there are important similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, most notably the production casing cementing issues that created a flow path via the shoe track on both wells and the evidence that both disasters would have been prevented if negative flow tests had been properly conducted and interpreted.  Would Macondo have been prevented if BP and Transocean had followed the Montara hearings and made sure that all drilling personnel were aware of the causes of this 74-day blowout in the Timor Sea?
  2. Minister Ferguson also announced that the role of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) will be expanded:

By expanding Nopsa’s role, one central agency will look out for the safety of our offshore workers and the environment from exploration to decommissioning. That means it will be responsible for approvals and regulation of safety and environment, as well as integrity of facilities and day-to-day operations.

Bravo to Australia and Minister Ferguson! As I indicated in  a submission to the Montara Commission and testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, a single agency must be responsible and accountable for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations if safety and pollution prevention objectives are to be achieved.

Read Full Post »

“3 beers in the Superdome” analogy

Posted in Uncategorized, tagged , , , , on September 22, 2010| 2 Comments »

Louisiana Superdome

CBS has caused quite a stir with their short article equating the Macondo spill to 3 beers in the Louisiana Superdome:

“How big was the oil spill in the Gulf? It was equal to pouring three cans of beer into the Superdome.”

Beer in the Superdome?  How could that be possible?  Certainly not during a Saints game! 🙂

I never liked these types of analogies for the following reasons:

  1. They imply that you are trying to downplay the problem.  The Macondo spill was massive, and it is silly to argue otherwise.
  2. The spill affected only a portion of the Gulf, so using the volume of the entire Gulf as a denominator is unrealistic.  If the spill was diluted by the entire Gulf, it wouldn’t have been necessary to disperse it. Is a spill near Cape Cod diluted by the entire Atlantic Ocean?
  3. Once oil is on the beach, in a marsh, or on a bird, it doesn’t matter how big the adjacent body of water is.  The beach or marsh is still soiled, and the bird is still harmed.
  4. People whose livelihoods were affected by the spill aren’t comforted by the fact that most of the Gulf was clean.

Read Full Post »

Relief well contributed to the autopsy and burial of Macondo, not the execution

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on September 19, 2010| 1 Comment »

Now that Admrial Allen has officially confirmed that the dead Macondo well is in fact dead, what is the legacy of the relief well?

  1. The relief well was Macondo’s opposite – a technological marvel that was flawlessly planned and precisely drilled without incident.
  2. The relief well verified new sensing and ranging tools for locating a well.
  3. The relief well contributed to the “burial” of Macondo by further cementing and pressure testing the annulus
  4. Perhaps most importantly, the relief well provided further confirmation that Macondo flowed inside the production casing and not in the annulus surrounding that casing.  Was this an unstated BP objective in supporting the decision to complete the intercept operation? Remember that after the top kill cementing operation killed the well, BP requested that the Unified Command “consider foregoing the relief well.”  This was an appropriate request since the annulus could have been secured through conventional plugging and abandonment practices. Whether or not BP changed positions on the intercept, the completion of that operation seems to have helped the BP legal defense.  Misinterpreting negative pressure tests, missing signs of flow, and mis-routing that flow would seem to be more defensible than improperly designing the well, ignoring centralizer recommendations, and foregoing the cement bond log.

Read Full Post »

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , on September 17, 2010| Leave a Comment »

who 'dat?

The BOP stack from the Macondo well is pictured in the foreground while being transported up the Mississippi River.  New Orleans is in the background.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »