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Posts Tagged ‘Deepwater Horizon’

Colin comments on Montara-Macondo Float Collar Issues

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| Leave a Comment »

We have commented frequently about the similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, particularly the root cause casing shoe issues. In this post, Colin Leach draws attention to the float shoe and collar issues that permitted oil and gas to enter both wells. Click here to view the full post.

The Bly report (page 70) noted some significant “inconsistencies” in the operation of the float shoe/float collar (see full post). This is so similar in nature to the “inconsistencies” in the 9 5/8″ cement job on the Montara well to be scary. The bottom line is that both disasters could have been prevented if these “inconsistencies” had been recognized and additional barriers placed above the float collar. In fact even if there are no “inconsistencies”, the placing of an additional barrier or so seems like an exceptionally prudent step, which would not take that much time or effort.

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Deep water is not the problem – Update

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| 1 Comment »

As previously posted (July 27, 2010), deep water had little to do with the well integrity problems and other contributing factors leading to the Macondo blowout. The Bly (BP) report further confirms this position.

Of the eight key findings in the Bly report (listed below), only number 4 could be considered to be more of a deepwater issue.  The BOP failures may also have been influenced by deepwater factors.  However, as previously noted, surface BOPs have a much higher failure rate than subsea stacks.

While the Montara blowout was in relatively shallow water, slight variations of findings 1 through 4 were the primary causes of that accident.

BP findings:

  1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.
  4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.
  5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.
  6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.
  7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.
  8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

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Department of the Interior Officials Testify at Commission Hearings

Posted in accidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on September 27, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Secretary Salazar, Deputy Secretary Hayes, and BOEMRE Director Bromwich testified at today’s National Commission hearings. Director Bromwich made several important announcements and comments of interest to BOE readers:

  1. He has completed his public meetings and will submit his report to the Secretary by the end of the week, approximately two months ahead of schedule.  Does this point to an early end to the drilling moratorium?
  2. Two significant interim final rules will also be issued by the end of the week.  These rules will address well integrity,  BOP performance, and other issues raised in the 30-day report submitted to the President at the end of May.
  3. New drilling will not be authorized until operators and contractors can demonstrate compliance with the new rules.
  4. BOEMRE resources will be reallocated to assist with the workload associated with the resumption of drilling.

Chairman Reilly expressed concerns about the leasing and regulatory functions reporting to the same Assistant Secretary under the new organizational structure.  He also drew attention to the regulatory regimes in Norway, the UK, and elsewhere, and the importance of studying those programs.

Secretary Salazar’s goal is for the US offshore oil and gas program to serve as the “gold standard” for safe and clean operations around the world.

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National Commission Hearings – 27 September

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 26, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Monday’s hearings will be broadcast on CSpan 2 beginning at 0900 ET. Admiral Allen will be the first witness and will address decision-making within the Unified Command.  Given the number of high profile witnesses and the limited time allotted to each witness,  in-depth questioning would seem to be unlikely.  Will this be a day of short speeches?

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Germany proposes deepwater drilling ban for NW Europe; how thoughtful!

Posted in accidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on September 26, 2010| Leave a Comment »

From the Huffington Post:

Oil-producing countries on Thursday rejected a German proposal for a moratorium on deep-water drilling in the Northeast Atlantic that reflected environmental concerns after the BP Gulf of Mexico oil spill.

So Germany, which has essentially no offshore oil and gas production in its sliver of the North Sea, proposed a ban on deepwater drilling at an OSPAR meeting in Bergen, Norway?  Does the word chutzpah come to mind?  The equivalent might be a Norwegian proposal to ban the manufacturer of luxury cars at a meeting in Stuttgart!

The German proposal also called for making sure that offshore operations meet the highest safety standards and demanded an analysis of whether the circumstances that led to the Deepwater Horizon accident could also occur in the Northeast Atlantic.

Now there is some original thinking.  No one has ever suggested that before! (sarcasm intended)  Don’t you think Norway, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other countries that actually produce oil and gas might be looking into these issues?  I can assure you that they are, but that they are doing so quietly and professionally without the type of “grandstanding” demonstrated by Germany at the OSPAR meeting in Bergen.

Representatives from Germany and other nations with concerns about the safety of offshore oil and gas operations are encouraged to join us in Vancouver next month for serious discussions about the regulatory practices, technology, and management systems that minimize safety risks.

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National Commission Agenda for 27-28 September

Posted in Uncategorized, tagged , , , , , , on September 24, 2010| Leave a Comment »

The National Commission has a diverse lineup of “heavy hitters” slated for hearings on 27-28 September. CSpan doesn’t have their schedule posted yet for these dates, but I assume they will be broadcasting the hearings live.

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Australia to Have Single Offshore Safety Regulator

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on September 23, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Montara Blowout, Timor Sea

I awoke to two very important developments from Australia as reported by Anthea Pitt with Upstream:

  1. According to Energy Minister Martin Ferguson, the Montara Inquiry Report will be publicly released by the end of the year. As BOE readers know, there are important similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, most notably the production casing cementing issues that created a flow path via the shoe track on both wells and the evidence that both disasters would have been prevented if negative flow tests had been properly conducted and interpreted.  Would Macondo have been prevented if BP and Transocean had followed the Montara hearings and made sure that all drilling personnel were aware of the causes of this 74-day blowout in the Timor Sea?
  2. Minister Ferguson also announced that the role of the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) will be expanded:

By expanding Nopsa’s role, one central agency will look out for the safety of our offshore workers and the environment from exploration to decommissioning. That means it will be responsible for approvals and regulation of safety and environment, as well as integrity of facilities and day-to-day operations.

Bravo to Australia and Minister Ferguson! As I indicated in  a submission to the Montara Commission and testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, a single agency must be responsible and accountable for the regulation of offshore oil and gas operations if safety and pollution prevention objectives are to be achieved.

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Relief well contributed to the autopsy and burial of Macondo, not the execution

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on September 19, 2010| 1 Comment »

Now that Admrial Allen has officially confirmed that the dead Macondo well is in fact dead, what is the legacy of the relief well?

  1. The relief well was Macondo’s opposite – a technological marvel that was flawlessly planned and precisely drilled without incident.
  2. The relief well verified new sensing and ranging tools for locating a well.
  3. The relief well contributed to the “burial” of Macondo by further cementing and pressure testing the annulus
  4. Perhaps most importantly, the relief well provided further confirmation that Macondo flowed inside the production casing and not in the annulus surrounding that casing.  Was this an unstated BP objective in supporting the decision to complete the intercept operation? Remember that after the top kill cementing operation killed the well, BP requested that the Unified Command “consider foregoing the relief well.”  This was an appropriate request since the annulus could have been secured through conventional plugging and abandonment practices. Whether or not BP changed positions on the intercept, the completion of that operation seems to have helped the BP legal defense.  Misinterpreting negative pressure tests, missing signs of flow, and mis-routing that flow would seem to be more defensible than improperly designing the well, ignoring centralizer recommendations, and foregoing the cement bond log.

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Relief well intercepts Macondo

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on September 17, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Admiral Allen’s statement:

I have received extensive briefings over the last 24 hours regarding the final effort to intercept the Macondo well.  Through a combination of sensors embedded in the drilling equipment and sophisticated instrumentation that is capable of sensing distance to the well casing, BP engineers and the federal science team have concluded that the Development Driller III relief well has intersected the Macondo well.  This determination was made based on a loss of drilling fluids that indicated communication had been established beyond the relief well, the pressure exerted against the drill bit as it came in contact with the well casing and, finally, an increase in pressure in the choke line of the Macondo well blow out preventer.  While each of these indicators taken separately would not necessarily be conclusive, the aggregate data available supports the conclusion that the two wells are joined.  It is also important to note that none of the measurements supported a scenario where the annulus of the well is in communication with the reservoir.  Accordingly, we intend to proceed with preparation to cement the annulus and complete the bottom kill of the well.  Further information will be provided as cementing procedures are completed.

Observations:

  1. The relief well engineering team and crew performed exceptionally despite the many distractions and interruptions. Outstanding work.
  2. The new ranging and sensing equipment, combined with real-time measurement-while-drilling technology, made this complex operation seem routine.
  3. The above report seems to confirm that the annulus had been sealed with cement above the producing reservoir.  This was accomplished either when the production casing was cemented prior to the blowout or during the top-kill operation, presumably the former.
  4. There was no report of oil in the mud returns or other evidence of of oil in the annulus surrounding the production casing.  If no oil was encountered in the annulus, this would seem to confirm BP’s conclusion that the well flowed inside the production casing.
  5. Flow was stopped by the capping stack on July 15, and the Macondo well was killed when mud and cement were injected during the top-kill operation.  Since the well was already dead, the cementing of the annulus that will follow is actually part of the plugging and abandonment operation.  While the annulus could have been secured through more conventional plugging procedures, this does not detract from the relief well team’s extraordinary achievement.

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Same test should have prevented both Montara and Macondo

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 15, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Despite the vast differences in location and water depth, both the Montara and Macondo blowouts would have been prevented if negative pressure tests had been properly conducted and interpreted after the production casing had been set.

A negative pressure test simulates an underbalanced condition in which the formation pressure exceeds the pressure exerted by the fluid column.  The purpose of the test is to determine if there are leaks in the casing shoe track, casing, or seal assembly. At Macondo, the test was conducted and the evidence of inflow is quite clear.  Unfortunately, that evidence was misinterpreted.  See slides 14-17 in the linked presentation.

At Montara, the testimony suggests that a negative pressure test was not properly conducted.  PTTEP therefore had a false sense of security regarding the integrity of the casing shoe. See page 9 of this transcript.

Both wells subsequently flowed through the shoe track and inside production casing for a combined duration exceeding 5 months.

There are currently no industry standards for conducting and interpreting negative pressure tests.

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