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Posts Tagged ‘blowouts’

Too many distractions before Macondo blew?

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on October 9, 2010| Leave a Comment »

There were so many simultaneous activities — starting with the displacing of mud to the pumping of fluids overboard — it was difficult to see what was going on. John Gisclair, Sperry Sun (see Times Picayune summary of yesterday’s BOEM-Coast Guard hearing)

 

John Gisclair

 

Too much at once? Hurrying to finish the job? Cost concerns?  No one in charge? Distracted by managers visiting the rig? One or more of these human and organizational factors appears to have contributed to the blowout.

Similarly, the rigid commitment to “batching” the development wells (for efficiency reasons) seems to have been a factor contributing to the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea.  If after removing the corrosion cap on the production casing, the work on the H1 well had continued in series (i.e. casing tied-back, BOP installed, and well secured) before moving on to another well, this blowout may have been prevented.

At both Macondo and Montara, time pressures (perceived or real) may also have affected the way negative-pressure tests were conducted or assessed.  These tests should have detected the influx of hydrocarbons via the shoe track.

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Views on Vancouver

Posted in conferences, tagged , , , , , , , , on October 8, 2010| Leave a Comment »

In less than 10 days, we kick off the International Regulators’ Offshore Safety Conference in Vancouver.  The venue is top-notch, the list of delegates is long and impressive, and the speakers are world leaders in offshore operations, safety, and regulatory practices.  Everything is in place for a productive conference; now it is up to us.  We must challenge the speakers, each other, and conventional wisdom if we want to make a difference.  We need to understand where we have been, and then focus on where we are going.  In that regard, the “Roundtable Discussions” will be an important part of the conference.  If you plan to attend the conference and would like to assist with the Roundtable Sessions, send a note to edanenberger@gmail.com.

Here are ten issues that I look forward to discussing with other delegates:

  1. How do we develop a comprehensive and verified international incident data base?   The IRF data and some of the industry efforts are good starts, but where do we go from there?
  2. What other performance data should be routinely collected?
  3. How do we assess emerging and hidden risks?  In that regard, I am looking forward to Torleif Husebø’s presentation: PSA’s Risk Level Measuring Scheme and how available data are collected and used.
  4. Looking beyond centralizers, long-strings, and corrosion caps, what are the management lessons from Macondo and Montara?
  5. Is there such a thing as a hybrid regulatory regime?  While a certain amount of prescription is necessary in any regulatory system, how can a regime have both  “command and control” and “safety case” elements?  Aren’t they contradictory?
  6. How do we develop and encourage safety leaders?  How do we measure their progress.  In that regard, I am really looking forward to Mark Fleming’s presentation: Know where you are going rather than where you have been! A Leaders’ guide to continuous safety performance measurement
  7. Can regulators inhibit industry safety achievement?  How do we encourage innovation and leadership?  How do we deal with those who have no interest in either?
  8. Should standards participation and safety research be a part of every operator’s safety management programs?
  9. Can the international community help provide stability and perspective during crises like Macondo?
  10. What are the next steps in international cooperation on offshore safety?

 

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National Commission Releases 4 Draft Staff Papers

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on October 6, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Decision Making Within the Unified Command

The Use of Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

The Challenges of Oil Spill Response in the Arctic

The Amount and Fate of the Oil

 

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Two Items From Yesterday’s CG-BOEM Macondo Hearings

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , on October 6, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Absent live streaming or television, the Times Picayune seems to be providing the best coverage of the Coast Guard – BOEM Macondo hearings in New Orleans.  While the legal sparring has attracted the most press interest, two other items in this Times Picayune article caught my attention.

Part of Keplinger and Fleytas’ duties was to monitor indicators of gas detectors and alarms from the bridge. Keplinger was busy showing visiting BP and Transocean officials a video-game-style simulator for 45 minutes to an hour before the explosions, he said, but he insisted that Fleytas was keeping him abreast of readouts of the rig’s systems.

Comment: Just as school teachers shouldn’t have been flying in the space shuttle, “tourists” shouldn’t have been visiting a complex drilling operation when the crew was in the process of setting production casing and suspending a potentially dangerous well. While the visit was well-intended, the last thing the crew needed on that night was to be distracted by a group of corporate executives.  The distraction they caused was comparable to driving on a dangerous highway while getting text messages from your boss. Visiting windows should be limited to relatively low-risk operations (e.g. when drilling ahead prior to reaching target intervals), and these windows should immediately close if complications develop.

Keplinger flashed some anger at Capt. Curt Kuchta, captain of the Deepwater Horizon rig, during his testimony. He noted that a fellow rig worker, Chris Pleasant, had to ask Kuchta three times whether to disconnect the rig from the wellhead before he got the go-ahead.

Comment: One of the benefits of drilling from a floating and dynamically positioned rig is the ability to move off location if trouble arises.  The failure to disconnect the riser and move away from the well at the first indication of flow contributed significantly to the tragic consequences.  The technical and human factors that prevented such a disconnect must be thoroughly examined.

Further comment: The absence of live streaming of these important safety hearings is inexcusable.  If a senator or governor were testifying, I expect that the cameras would be there.

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Complaints: C-SPAN Says “No” and Transcripts Too Slow!

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , on October 5, 2010| 2 Comments »

  • C-SPAN has opted not to cover this weeks BOEMRE – Coast Guard Macondo hearings.  Instead, they are presenting recordings of political rallies, assorted senatorial and gubernatorial candidate debates, and similar fare.  In other words, all three channels will be dedicated to the usual political posturing that already receives non-stop national coverage, and the investigation into one of the more significant accidents in US history will be ignored.
  • Why does it take 3 weeks to post the transcripts of these hearings? The Australians posted each Montara transcript within hours after the day’s session ended.

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Joint BOEMRE-Coast Guard Panel Resumes Questioning

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , on October 2, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Capt. Hung Nguyen, David Dykes, and Jason Mathews question the witness. Sylvia Murphy and Kirk Malstrom monitor attentively from the 2nd row.

The panel that is most closely investigating the technical and operational aspects of the Macondo blowout reconvenes on Monday morning at 0800 CT in New Orleans.

I would assume that one of the CSpan stations will be covering the hearings, but their broadcast schedule for next week has not yet been posted.

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Drilling and Safety Management Rules Announced

Posted in accidents, Offshore Energy - General, Regulation, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 30, 2010| 2 Comments »

Today, BOEM released fact sheets describing the Drilling Safety and Safety and Environmental Management (SEMS) rules. The complete documents will be available for review as soon as they are published in the Federal Register.

Based on the fact sheet, the Drilling Safety Rule does not appear to include any significant surprises.  The rule seems to be generally consistent with the recommendations in Secretary Salazar’s 27 May Safety Measures Report to the President (the “30-Day Report”).  This is an Interim Final Rule that will be effective upon publication.

According to the fact sheet, the SEMS Rule will incorporate all elements of API RP 75 into BOEM regulations.  This is an improvement, in my opinion, from the proposed rule which incorporated only 4 elements of RP 75.  The effective date for this rule is not indicated in the fact sheet.

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Several interesting items!

Posted in Uncategorized, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 30, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Safety culture is how the organization behaves when no one is watching.

Also, NOPSA’s September Newsletter has some interesting updates including information on the jackup failure offshore China.

And how does a reporter question the humility of engineers? 🙂

Engineers do amazing things, but they aren’t always as smart as they think, nor their systems as robust as they seem on paper.

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Colin comments on Montara-Macondo Float Collar Issues

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| Leave a Comment »

We have commented frequently about the similarities between the Montara and Macondo blowouts, particularly the root cause casing shoe issues. In this post, Colin Leach draws attention to the float shoe and collar issues that permitted oil and gas to enter both wells. Click here to view the full post.

The Bly report (page 70) noted some significant “inconsistencies” in the operation of the float shoe/float collar (see full post). This is so similar in nature to the “inconsistencies” in the 9 5/8″ cement job on the Montara well to be scary. The bottom line is that both disasters could have been prevented if these “inconsistencies” had been recognized and additional barriers placed above the float collar. In fact even if there are no “inconsistencies”, the placing of an additional barrier or so seems like an exceptionally prudent step, which would not take that much time or effort.

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Deep water is not the problem – Update

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , on September 28, 2010| 1 Comment »

As previously posted (July 27, 2010), deep water had little to do with the well integrity problems and other contributing factors leading to the Macondo blowout. The Bly (BP) report further confirms this position.

Of the eight key findings in the Bly report (listed below), only number 4 could be considered to be more of a deepwater issue.  The BOP failures may also have been influenced by deepwater factors.  However, as previously noted, surface BOPs have a much higher failure rate than subsea stacks.

While the Montara blowout was in relatively shallow water, slight variations of findings 1 through 4 were the primary causes of that accident.

BP findings:

  1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons.
  3. The negative-pressure test was accepted although well integrity had not been established.
  4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.
  5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well.
  6. Diversion to the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig.
  7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition.
  8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well.

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