Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘Australia’

Well Capping Operations: Montara vs. Macondo

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on November 30, 2010| Leave a Comment »

West Atlas Jackup and Montara Wellhead Platform

While there has been much post-Macondo discussion about the complexity of subsea containment and capping operations for deepwater wells, Macondo was ultimately capped and killed before being intersected by the relief well. The same cannot be said for the shallow water Montara well, which was killed by a relief well after flowing for 74 days.

Capping a flowing well is never routine, regardless of the water depth. However, the safety risks are greater for surface wells.  Those risks combined with the low probability of success are why a capping operation was not even attempted at Montara.  These were the concerns:

  1. The risk of a fatality was estimated at an alarming 25-30%.
  2. The risk of ignition while retracting the cantilever of the West Atlas jackup, a necessary step in the capping operation, was high.
  3. Only the 20-inch casing was tied-back to the wellhead platform. The 13 3/8″ casing was suspended just above the water surface. (According to testimony during the inquiry, the 13 3/8″ casing was not cemented back inside the 20″ casing.)
  4. Unless they were going to tie-back the 13 3/8″ casing while the well was flowing (probably not feasible and not mentioned as a possibility in the Inquiry report), they would have had to install a specially made BOP on the 20.”  If they were able to install this BOP and shut-in the well, flow would have undoubtedly broached the casing at the 20″ inch shoe.  One possible alternative may have been to install a diverter under the BOP and attempt a dynamic kill operation (i.e. direct the flow downwind and away from the rig while pumping mud down the well).  This too would have been complex and risky.

Given the very high safety risk and the low probability of success, I believe the regulator and operator made the correct decision in forgoing a capping attempt. The experiences at Macondo and Montara indicate that capping considerations must be taken into account during well planning activities for both subsea and surface wells, and that they latter pose greater safety risks.  Given the fire potential, having the wellhead at the surface is not an advantage when it comes to capping a flowing well.  It’s better to have the wellhead on the seafloor where the robotic equipment is doing the work.

Read Full Post »

Halliburton cementing study referenced in Montara Report

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , on November 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »

I was unaware of the Halliburton study referenced in the Montara Inquiry Report:

A 2001 Halliburton study of USA Gulf of Mexico cementing failures in 4000 wells showed that (i) approximately one in six casing shoes required remedial work after primary cementing (by way of a so‐called ‘squeeze job’); and (ii) intermediate casing shoes failed shoe tests 70 per cent more often than shallower casings because they were more likely to be over‐displaced.

This paper was presented at an SPE conference in New Orleans.  Click here to purchase the paper or read a good abstract.

Questions:

  1. Have other analyses and reports been prepared using these data?
  2. Would Halliburton make the data base available for the common good if they receive legal protection?
  3. In light of the worldwide interest in better understanding well integrity risks, would Halliburton and others expand the data base to include other regions?
  4. Surely, there must be other private data bases that would be useful for assessing operational risks and developing mitigations. Are the owners willing to identify these data bases? Can they be protected from liability risks if they agree to make the information accessible?

Read Full Post »

Montara Inquiry Report – Cementing Items

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on November 26, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Selected cementing recommendations from the Montara report:

Recommendation 30: Tracking and analysis of cementing problems/failures should occur to assess industry trends, principal causes, remedial techniques and so on.

Comment: This is an excellent recommendation that needs to be expanded to include other failures (e.g. BOPE) and incident data.

Recommendation 31: It is recommended that industry, regulators, and training/research institutions liaise with one another with a view to developing better techniques for testing and verifying the integrity of cemented casing shoes as barriers (particularly in atypical situations such as where the casing shoe is located within a reservoir in a horizontal or high angle position at great depth).

Recommendation 33: It should be standard industry practice to re‐test a cemented casing shoe (that is, after WOC) whenever the plugs do not bump or the float valves apparently fail. Standard industry practice should require consideration of other tests in addition to a repeat pressure test.

Comment: Negative pressure test guidance should be the highest priority.

Recommendation 37: Consideration should be given to ways to ensure that contractors who are involved in barrier installation (such as cementing companies) have a direct interest in the performance of works to a proper standard. In particular, consideration should be given to (i) preventing contractors from avoiding the economic consequences of negligent installation of barriers; and/or (ii) imposing specific legislative standards of workmanship on contractors with respect to well control (similar to those which presently apply to licensees).

Comment: I’m not sure I agree with this one.  It seems to me that one party should be responsible and accountable for the well construction, and that should be the operator. Operators should choose contractors who have outstanding performance records, apply the highest standards, and work effectively with the operator’s team to ensure that barriers are properly installed and tested.

 

Read Full Post »

Western Australia Responds

Posted in accidents, Regulation, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on November 24, 2010| Leave a Comment »

WA’s Mines and Petroleum Minister, Norman Moore, is firmly opposed to the Federal proposal for a single national regulator.

We are yet to be persuaded by this, or any other report, that a national regulator would be the way to go. Norman Moore

 

Read Full Post »

Montara Report Released!

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , on November 24, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Montara Blowout - Timor Sea

Our virtual vigil is over.  I awoke to messages from Odd, Anthea, and Kevin that the day had finally arrived – the Montara Report has been released. Not only do we have the Inquiry report, but also the government’s response and PTTEP’s action plan.  We’ll be digesting this over the next few days (along with a turkey dinner), but below are a few key items (direct quotes from the government’s response) that are likely to be of interest to BOE readers:

  • To create a single national regulator the Government will expand the functions of the existing National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) to include regulation of structural integrity, environment plans and day-to-day operations associated with petroleum activities in Commonwealth waters. There is a fundamental connection between the integrity of structures, the safety of people, and protection of the environment. The expanded authority – to be named the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) – will also regulate safety, integrity and environment plans for minerals extraction and greenhouse gas storage activities in Commonwealth waters.
  • In recognition of the global nature of the offshore petroleum industry, and Australia’s increasingly important role, the Government intends to host an international conference for governments, regulators and the offshore petroleum industry to share the lessons from Montara and to learn from the experience of other nations. The conference will beheld in Australia during 2011.
  • An important feature of objective-based regulation is that it encourages continuous improvement rather than acompliance mentality. It is essential that a regulatory system encourage the creator of the risk to move beyond minimum standards in a continuous effort for improvement, and not just accept the minimum standard. The risk of specific standards is that they can shift the burden of responsibility from the operator to the government and stifleinnovation. The Australian objective-based regime retains the focus clearly on the operator to evaluate risk andachieve fit for purpose design in order to reduce risk to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’.

Read Full Post »

Montara Development to Proceed

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , on November 15, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Montara Blowout - Timor Sea - 2009

A spokesman for PTTEP says the damaged rig will be towed away next month and a replacement will be in place by June next year subject to government approvals. ABC-Australia

Food for thought:

  • Should a major blowout automatically disqualify a company from further exploration and development within that field?
  • Should PTTEP have voluntarily agreed to (been required to) assign their Montara rights to another company?
  • Should leases or operating licenses be automatically suspended after such major accidents?
  • Shouldn’t exploration and development rights be contingent on safe and responsible operating practices?
  • Do PTTEP and other operators deserve a second chance under such circumstances? Third chance? How many?

Read Full Post »

Déjà vu

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , , , , , , , , , on November 9, 2010| 1 Comment »

With all of the discussion about the float collar issues, I thought I was listening to the Montara hearings this morning.   I’m surprised that neither the Commission questioners nor the panelists have mentioned Montara. When you have two major blowouts within 8 months and they have very similar root causes, the similarities should be of enormous interest. The absence of information transfer that might have prevented Macondo should be a major consideration in these and other hearings.

We have been talking about the similarities between Montara and Macondo for months.  Colin Leach’s 28 September post draws further attention to this issue.  Colin also hit the nail on the head with his comment that an additional barrier should have been installed above the float collar before proceeding.

Read Full Post »

Western Australia Resists Single Regulator

Posted in Regulation, tagged , , , on November 4, 2010| Leave a Comment »

From Western Australia Business News:

The gulf between the Western Australian government and Canberra continues to widen, with state mines and petroleum minister Norman Moore writing to local oil and gas companies for support to block plans for a single national oil regulator.

Comment: What is Mr. Moore offering the companies in return for their support? This “turf” battle shows why you can’t have multiple authorities regulating the same facilities.  Disputes, self-interest, conflicting agendas and priorities,  and “turf” issues drain too much energy from the regulators and the industry being regulated.  Concerns about critical operational risks are superseded by coordination activities and debates about who is in charge.

Read Full Post »

Day 139 of the Montara Report Vigil

Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged , , , on November 4, 2010| Leave a Comment »

Those who read this obscure blog regularly know that we have been railing about the release of the Montara Inquiry Report since it was delivered to Energy Minister Ferguson on 18 June 2010. The report has now sat on the Minister’s desk for nearly twice as long as the Montara well flowed into the Timor Sea at an announced rate (cough, cough) of 400 barrels per day.

BOE wants to thank Minister Ferguson for helping teach us the virtue of patience, an important life skill that some of us had not previously mastered. In our newly enlightened state, we are becoming more observant. As a result, we noticed that the Australian Senate has already passed legislation strengthening the National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA).

After reviewing information about the legislation here and here, I am a bit confused about the changes being enacted.  However, if the concerns (below) of Tina Hunter, an Assistant Professor at Bond University who had previously submitted testimony to the Montara Inquiry, have not been yet been addressed, Parliament needs to revise the legislation.  Multiple regulators are a problem, not a solution.  (The US needs to take notice.)

These legislative changes proposed will still split the responsibilities for Well Operations Management Plans between NOPSA and the responsible Delegated Authority (who assesses the well design and construction and drilling applications)….Furthermore, the regulatory amendments do not consider the environmental regulation of well operations and integrity, which also remains with the relevant Commonwealth or State Authority. Therefore, whilst in principle these proposed legislative amendments will provide benefits for the regulation of well integrity, it will still split the regulatory responsibility of well integrity between multiple regulators. Tina Hunter

Read Full Post »

Hydrocarbon Releases

Posted in accidents, conferences, IRF, tagged , , , , , , , on November 2, 2010| 1 Comment »

The above slide is excerpted from Torleif Husebo’s presentation at the Vancouver conference.  Since Piper Alpha in 1988, offshore safety leaders have been gathering and assessing hydrocarbon release data.  Norway, the UK, Australia, the Netherlands and other nations track these data because they are an important indicator of fire and explosion risks. The IRF reports these data as part of their performance measurement project.

Obviously, when hydrocarbons are unintentionally released at an offshore facility you have the potential for a very dangerous situation.   However, because of objections voiced when the MMS updated incident reporting requirements 5 years ago, the US government does not collect the detailed information needed to track the size and cause of these releases.  The US is thus unable to monitor trends and benchmark against other nations around the world.

Offshore companies have done well in responding to the drilling issues raised following the blowout.  However, the post-Macondo offshore industry needs to provide broad safety leadership.  A commitment to collecting performance data and assessing risk trends at OCS oil and gas facilities is absolutely essential.  A good place to start would be to initiate a cooperative hydrocarbon release data gathering program.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »