“I am deeply honored to join the Interior Department and continue my public service career on behalf of the American people. I’ve dedicated my life to keeping the public safe, and I look forward to continuing that service alongside the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement’s incredible career employees,” said Director Sligh.
After a several year lag in deepwater Gulf of Mexico development, a new generation of projects is moving toward first production. Shell’s Vito and Whale, BP’s Argos, Chevron’s Anchor, and Murphy’s King’s Quay are similar in many ways including the following:
Floating production units
Lighter, smaller semisubmersible designs
Excellent structural integrity and storm performance characteristics
Lower project costs, shorter cycle times
4000 to 8600′ water depth
Subsea wells, small surface footprint
High production rates anticipated: 100,000 – 150,000 BOE/D
Standardized equipment
Energy efficient gas turbines
Advanced remote monitoring, fewer onboard staff
Simpler = safer (assuming equivalent well and production safety system integrity)
Limited number of wells + high production rates/well + efficient power generation and processing equipment + restricted flaring + pipeline transportation = low GHG intensity production
The International Regulators’ Forum (IRF) does a good job of compiling safety performance data for offshore oil and gas operations in member countries. Because these data are collected by the respective regulators and compiled in accordance with established guidelines, we consider the IRF compilations to be the most credible international incident summary data for the offshore industry.
BOE looked at the numbers for the IRF countries with the highest level of activity in terms of hours worked – Brazil, Norway, UK, and US. These countries accounted for 90% of the total hours worked in 2020, the last year for which data are available. The 2020 hours worked (millions) were also relatively similar for the 4 countries: Norway – 41.2, UK – 42.4, US – 50.4, Brazil – 50.7. The differences in hours worked were somewhat greater in the prior years, but not dramatically so.
We charted the fatality and lost-time (>3 days) data (below). Our intent at this point is to draw attention to the IRF data sets, not to assess and compare performance. We do think the overall safety performance in these and other IRF countries, while far from perfect, is quite good given the hundreds of millions of hours worked, complexity of operations, logistical challenges, and difficult operating environments. We recommend that the IRF prioritize the timely posting of these data, and begin providing causation information so that companies and other interested parties can better identify performance issues and safety trends.
While the text of the announcement implies otherwise, the new name prioritizes the “transition” over concerns about energy supply, security, and reliability. In that regard, the timing seems questionable.
Why not the North Sea Energy Authority (NSEA) or UK Offshore Energy Authority (UKOEA)?
Will OPEC+ be impressed? Perhaps China will add a few coal-fired power plants in honor of the name change.
The term energy transition somehow sounds like it is a well-lubricated slide from one reality to another. In fact, it will be far more complex: Throughout history, energy transitions have been difficult, and this one is even more challenging than any previous shift.
The 19th century is known as the “century of coal,” but, as the technology scholar Vaclav Smil has noted, not until the beginning of the 20th century did coal actually overtake wood as the world’s No. 1 energy source. Moreover, past energy transitions have also been “energy additions”—one source atop another. Oil, discovered in 1859, did not surpass coal as the world’s primary energy source until the 1960s, yet today the world uses almost three times as much coal as it did in the ’60s.
“Norway cannot escape the unpleasant fact: this is a form of war profit”, daily paper Dagbladet wrote in an editorial. “While Ukraine is being destroyed, and most other countries are mainly feeling the negative effects of the war, such as higher energy prices, higher food prices and general inflation, we are making a gain”, it said.
While demand will remain strong, supply is a concern:
“Capex cuts by international oil companies and national oil companies in 2020 was about 35%,” he said. “We’re now showing another 23% reduction in capex levels” from pre-pandemic levels this year. In 2019, E&P companies spent $525 billion, an amount which plummeted to $341 billion in 2021, he added. “We have to get back to $525 billion over several years until 2030 to restore market balance,” McMonigle said. “I’m afraid what we’re seeing with the energy crisis is on our doorstep.”
Per our previous post on this topic, the Ukranian shelf may contain more than 70 Tcf of natural gas, most of which was seized by Russia along with Crimea. This illegal seizure of resources in 2014 should be considered as part of any long-term settlement and before easing sanctions on Russia.
…when in 2014, two-thirds of the former Ukrainian water area passed to Russia with the occupation of Crimea, only a few experts assumed that the struggle for control over energy resources might have been among the main reasons for annexation. Against the background of Moscow’s famous explanation “Why Crimea? Be[cause]Kosovo!”, this version looked unconvincing, but there are many reasons to give it a second glance.
The naysayers often argue that Russia doesn’t have the technology to extract gas on the deep-water shelf. This is true, at least now. However, as researchers note, Russia’s short-term objective was not to benefit from the Black Sea gas but to block its production by the Western companies and hence secure its own positions in the European market.
Furthermore, Russia largely relies on an energy leverage in international relations. Thus, “The Energy Strategy of Russian Federation Until 2020” starts with the statement: “Russia has significant reserves of energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis for economic development, an instrument for domestic and foreign policy.”