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Archive for the ‘oil spill response’ Category

The pipeline spill just north of Refugio State Beach on May 19, 2015, coated miles of shoreline and marine habitat, and dolphins, elephant seals, sea lions, pelicans and other birds. | Santa Barbara Independent

We can scream all we want (with some justification) about the California Coastal Commission, Santa Barbara County, and intractable environmental organizations, but the Santa Ynez Unit would still be producing today were it not for an ugly, preventable pipeline spill.

What happened:

At approximately 10:55 a.m. Pacific Daylight Time (PDT) on May 19, 2015, the Plains Pipeline, LP (Plains), Line 901 pipeline in Santa Barbara County, CA, ruptured, resulting in the release of approximately 2,934 barrels (bbl) of heavy crude oil. An estimated 500 bbl of crude oil entered the Pacific Ocean.

Why it happened:

1) Ineffective protection against external corrosion of the pipeline
 The condition of the pipeline’s coating and insulation system fostered an environment that led to the external corrosion.
 The pipeline’s cathodic protection (CP) system was not effective in preventing corrosion from occurring beneath the pipeline’s coating/insulation system.
2) Failure by Plains to detect and mitigate the corrosion
 The in-line inspection (ILI) tool and subsequent analysis of ILI data did not characterize the extent and depth of the external corrosion accurately.
3) Lack of timely detection of and response to the rupture
 The pipeline supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system did not have safety-related alarms established at values sufficient to alert the control room staff to the release at this location.
 Control room staff did not detect the abnormal conditions in regards to the release as they occurred. This resulted in a delayed shutdown of the pipeline.
 The pipeline controller restarted the Line 901 pipeline after the release occurred.
 The pipeline’s leak detection system lacked instrumentation and associated calculations to monitor line pack (the total volume of liquid present in a pipeline section) along all portions of the pipeline when it was operating or shut down.
 Control room staff training lacked formalized and succinct requirements, including emergency shutdown and leak detection system functions such as alarms.

Plains Pipeline was the responsible party, but that doesn’t absolve the companies that were dependent on Plains to transport their production. Given the organized opposition that emerged following the Santa Barbara blowout in 1969 (the result of a reckless well plan), the integrity of that pipeline was critical to their business strategy and they should have exercised some oversight.

Offshore disasters have had enormous consequences for the oil and gas industry in terms of lost opportunities. Think about this: prior to the Macondo blowout, the Obama administration had proposed an oil and gas lease sale in the Atlantic and the Florida Senate was holding hearings about leasing in Florida State waters. Such lease sales are now completely out of the question.

Regulations and standards are not enough. We need open discussion about incidents, large and small, and a willingness to be critical of the responsible parties.

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Guyana’s Oil Spill Bill (attached) has much in common with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that we implemented for US offshore faciities and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation that I attended in 1990. A couple of issues warrant highlighting:

Operator/licensee responsibility:The definitions correctly establish the operator or license holder as the responsible party. This means that in the event of a well blowout while drilling from a mobile drilling unit, the licensee/operator would be the responsible party. This aligns with the “operator responsibility” mantra that is fundamental to the US offshore program. Drilling and other contractors are managed by the operator and are the operator’s responsibility.

Unlimited liability: The liability section (Part VI) establishes an unlimited liability standard for the responsible party. As previously discussed in more detail, this is a daunting, open-ended obligation that would trouble permittees in any industry. The unlimited liability provision could preclude responsible independent operators, including Guyanese companies, from seeking licenses.

The unlimited liability standard (par. 17) is qualified with a provision (pasted below) that also favors major international companies.

The unlimited liability provision therefore does not seem to apply to parent companies idemnifying a project. This was a point of contention during the parliamentary debate. The Kaieteur News delves into the issue and is not entirely convinced by the Government’s defense. Their article closes as follows:

It is important to note that stakeholders have argued that since ExxonMobil Guyana Limited (the responsible party) does not have adequate assets, the burden of oil spill-related costs could be left on Guyana, especially in the absence of unlimited coverage from the parent company. These and other “flaws” have prompted Guyanese to urge President Irfaan Ali not to assent to the Bill, passed in the National Assembly on May 16, 2025. Be that as it may, the Ministry maintained that the “robust statutory framework now established protects Guyana and its people.”

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The attached BSEE document provides guidance for determining pollution inspection frequencies for unmanned facilities. Thoughts:

  • Reasonable risk-based approach
  • A minimum of bi-weekly visual and physical inspections for low risk platforms producing dry gas
  • Any platform with significant oil production and storage, and no real time monitoring system, will have to be visually inspected at least every 3 days (daily if other risk factors apply) and boarded weekly
  • Any platform that had spillage totaling > 1 bbl in the past 2 years will have to be visually inspected every other day and boarded weekly.
  • Provides for the application of technology (cameras, drones, innovative monitoring systems) to reduce inspection frequencies.

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According to the Texas General Lands Office, which provided the above photos, a patch has been applied to the leaking pipeline riser on an abandoned platform in High Island Block 98-L. The gas condensate spray has been stopped.

Crews from the U.S. Coast Guard, Texas General Land Office, and the Texas Railroad Commission monitored the operation. It’s unclear who the responsible party is and who funded and performed the work.

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Pictures from Click2Houston:

This is yet another example of the importance of proper well plugging, platform removal, and decommissioning financial assurance. It’s noteworthy that Texas is among the states suing to block BOEM’s financial assurance rule for Federal waters. A serious collaborative Federal, State, and industry effort to address decommissioning issues is long, long overdue.

Key points from the Facebook post by State Representative Terri Leo Wilson (full post pasted below):

  • 8 miles offshore Galveston County (TX State waters extend 3 marine leagues/9 nautical miles/10.35 statue miles offshore)
  • flowline riser leaking natural gas and condensate (badly corroded platform)
  • no recoverable oil
  • abandoned platform
  • additional research is needed to fully determine ownership of the leak source (???)

HIGH ISLAND BLOCK 98-L INCIDENT :

The Texas General Land Office (GLO) is sharing the following information:

On Sunday, July 14, 2024, at 8:00 pm, the Oil Spill La Porte Office Response Officer received notification of a natural gas/oil discharge off the coast of Crystal Beach, Galveston County. The spill was reported to be from a platform in High Island Block 98-L, about eight miles offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. Oil Spill personnel traveled via response boat to investigate on Monday morning and determined the discharge to be from a flowline riser leaking natural gas and condensate. Although the leak can be seen from the water, no recoverable oil was visible. The platform is abandoned, as defined by the Texas Railroad Commission, placing it within the Railroad Commission’s statutory authority for administration. The wells are not covered as part of the GLO’s current well plugging MOU with the Railroad Commission. The platform and associated wells are documented in the Oil Spill program’s abandoned well listings.

On Wednesday, July 17, La Porte office staff, with US Coast Guard and Railroad Commission personnel, inspected the platform area again. The leak is still present but has not increased. Railroad Commission staff stated that additional research is needed to fully determine ownership of the leak source.

The Coast Guard reports receiving a call from Channel 2-KPRC (NBC) in Houston regarding the leak and also seeing social media posts by a local area fishing group.

At this time: No injuries reported, No impact to commerce, No impact to wildlife.

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The government’s decision to require that a capping stack be located in Guyana is prudent. Although the need for a capping stack is dependent on multiple barrier failures and is thus extremely low, the environmental and economic consequences of a prolonged well blowout warrant timely access to this tertiary well control option.

A capping stack must be properly maintained and deployable without delay. In that regard, BSEE has a good program for testing Gulf of Mexico capping stack readiness. Capping stack drills are an important post-Macondo addition to the unannounced oil spill response program that dates back to 1981.

The capping stack designed during the Macondo blowout shut-in the well on 15 July 2010. The decision process that allowed the well to remain shut-in was a bit perplexing, and we had a bizarre situation where the Federal Incident Commander threatened to require the resumption of the blowout. The same well integrity concerns had prematurely ended the “top kill” operation on 28 May, allowing the well to flow unnecessarily into the Gulf for an additional 48 days (5/28-7/15). (See this important paper by LSU Petroleum Engineering professor Dr. Mayank Tyagi et al: Analysis of Well Containment and Control Attempts in the Aftermath of the Deepwater Blowout in MC252)

“Troy Naquin, BSEE New Orleans District, observes as a capping stack is carefully lowered onto the deck of ship to be transported more than 100 miles offshore for a drill designed to test industry’s ability to successfully deploy it in case of an emergency, May 8, 2023.” BSEE photo/Bobby Nash

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To what extent was the Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system shut-in responsible for the Nov. to Feb. production decline (chart below)? The MPOG wasn’t cleared for production until earlier this month, so we may not know until the investigation report is published and the EIA posts April 2024 production data (2 month lag).

The NTSB is leading the investigation on the MPOG spill. This short summary is all they have posted so far, but we should see a preliminary report soon. The NTSB’s final reports are frequently delayed. They still haven’t finalized their report on the Dec. 2022 Gulf of Mexico helicopter crash.

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After 5 months of investigation, the Main Pass Oil Gathering (MPOG) system has finally been cleared for production. (The Coast Guard update only says that the pipeline passed the integrity test, but I assume the operators may resume production though the MPOG system.)

Only a small connector leak that was previously reported was identified during the extensive integrity testing. The Coast Guard had advised that the connector leak was not the source of the large sheen that was observed in November.

So what was the source of the November sheen and what was the basis for the 1.1 million gallon spill volume estimate? The sheen was not indicative of a spill of that magnitude. Did the Coast Guard et al assume a worst case loss from the MPOG system, even though no leak had been identified?

Is this the most oversight ever for a pipeline integrity test?

The removal and replacement of the spool piece and the subsequent integrity test of the MPOG line were conducted under the close supervision of the Unified Command and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. During both operations, spill response vessels were on site, along with divers, remotely operated vehicles, helicopters equipped with trained oil observers and multi-spectral imaging cameras, and other containment and recovery equipment. No material discharge of oil was observed during these operations.

Unified Command

The NTSB has the lead in the investigation into the source of the sheen. Don’t expect any findings soon.

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Average GoM oil production from Nov. to Jan. was more than 130,000 BOPD below the July to Oct. average. Production in Jan. 2024 was 245,000 BOPD lower than Sept. 2023 production. (See the table and chart below.)

The production shut-ins associated with the mysterious November sheen in the Main Pass area were no doubt a contributing factor to the decline, but the magnitude and duration of those shut-ins has not been disclosed. The source of the sheen has apparently still not been determined, nor has any information been provided on the status of the Federal investigation. The absence of transparency is disappointing.

production monthGoM oil production (BOPD, 1000’s)
Jan. 20241752
Dec. 20231829
Nov. 20231845
Oct. 20231950
Sept 20231997
Aug. 20231890
July 20231935
EIA data

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