Good news; production has ramped up nicely via the LMRP cap.
Getting a better picture of the well’s flow rate potential.
Archive for the ‘well control incidents’ Category
10,500 bbls of oil recovered on 5 June; 22 MMCF flared
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, oil spill, safety, well control on June 6, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Well Cap Lowered Over Riser Stem (Update)
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on June 4, 2010| Leave a Comment »
We won’t get a good read on the cap’s effectiveness until its placement is adjusted and oil production is stabilized. Flow to the surface may also be initiated through the choke and kill lines, which could supplement and improve the effectiveness of the cap system.
Update from Deepwater Horizon Response Facebook page:
The LMRP Cap is in place and nitrogen pressure head is slowly being reduced in the riser. Throughout the day, the vents in the cap will be closed as production begins on the surface. The goal is to ensure methane hydrates do not form in the cap.
Thursday Morning Commentary – 3 June
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, bp, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on June 3, 2010| 2 Comments »
- “Worst environmental disaster in US history” – Reporters may want to wait until all of the data are in before making those kind of statements. Largest oil spill doesn’t necessarily equate to the worst environmental disaster. Some very large spills have had minimal long-term environmental damage, while the effects of some smaller spills have been quite serious. The extensive long-term monitoring program will give us the answers.
- Loss of wetlands – Louisiana has experienced serious wetland losses for years with little attention from the national media. The barrier islands, which were approved by Admiral Allen, have been on the drawing board for some time and are primarily for wetlands restoration purposes. Ironically, these islands may not have been approved and funded were it not for the oil spill.
- BP employees – I’d like to see some reporting from the standpoint of typical BP employees. Their lives have also been shattered. The very existence of their company, which has lost 1/4 of its market value, is threatened. While few BP employees had anything to do with the Macondo disaster, they are all working hard to set things right and continue their domestic and international operations. It must be frustrating to realize that no matter how hard they work, it won’t be good enough to satisfy the critics.
- Will the national reaction do more damage than the spill? US production is threatened in the Gulf and elsewhere, and jobs are already being lost. Preventing offshore drilling and production doesn’t prevent oil consumption. As long as we consume oil, there will be a risk of spilling it during the production and transportation process. We need to better manage those risks. We didn’t eliminate tanker transport after Valdez, and we shouldn’t eliminate offshore exploration and production in the wake of Macondo. Let’s not boycott ourselves and make OPEC the primary beneficiary of this disaster.
- “Nationalize BP”- Just when you thought the commentary couldn’t get any sillier, you hear this kind of nonsense. Hugo Chavez must be smiling.
Odds and Ends
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on June 2, 2010| Leave a Comment »
- Kudos: To Admiral Landry for a job well done. Since April 20, she has had the most challenging and thankless job in America, and performed it very well. I’m sure she is happy to return to her “day job.”
- Remarkable: The work done by the ROVs and the people who deploy and control them. If you haven’t watched the feed, check it out.
- Impressive: Admiral Allen’s briefings. His summaries are concise and informative. His responses to questions are direct. Not much repetitive boilerplate.
- Improved: More complete and detailed information is being provided on the the well intervention work.
- Prediction: The LMRP cap will be successfully installed and will soon be recovering most of the oil. We should be able to observe the key operations on the ROV cameras. This will be very interesting, particularly when the final cut is made and the cap is installed.
The Psychology of Well Control
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged blowouts, drilling, macondo, psychology, safety, Sonnemann, well control on June 1, 2010| Leave a Comment »
I was in the audience almost 18 years ago when Paul Sonnemann made an outstanding presentation on the thought processes and human response tendencies that contribute to well control incidents and other accidents. These tendencies may have been significant contributing factors at both Montara and Macondo. With Paul’s permission I have attached a copy of his 1992 paper. I strongly suggest that you read it.
While considering new regulations, standards, and procedures, the industry and government need to look closely at the issues identified in Paul’s paper.
Macondo Blowout: Finger Pointing Guide
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Coast Guard, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, Minerals Management Service, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on June 1, 2010| 1 Comment »
The Washington Salute - "You Did It!"
Not surprisingly, the finger pointing in Washington is as out-of-control as the well that precipitated it. This public spectacle is now more closely followed than the actual spill response. As a result, perceptions become reality and reality is altered to support perceptions.
If you want to participate in the bash-fest and dare to compete with Washington’s best, here are some tips:
- Shoot high; go after the top dogs. Blast President Obama, President Bush, and every other President going back to James Buchanan. Why did Buchanan allow Colonel Drake to drill the first oil-well in Buchanan’s home state of Pennsylvania in 1859. Why wasn’t he more visible when the well started to flow? Where was his leadership? Did you see the mess? No wonder they call it Oil Creek.
- Criticize every Secretary of the Interior starting with Albert Fall who in 1922 leased, without competitive bidding, the Teapot Dome fields to Harry Sinclair of Sinclair Oil. Talk about the culture of corruption which Fall fostered and the Department’s inability to clean house.
- Humiliate every employee of the MMS. When you are pointing the finger, don’t worry about getting the bureau’s name right (90% of the critics don’t). Feel free to call it the Minerals and Mining Service, Marine Minerals Survey, Mineral Management Service (which mineral?), Minerals Management Services (which services?) or any other name you can say with a snarl. Be sure to make some juvenile comment about how the MMS is literally in bed with industry. Don’t bother to read the investigation reports which show how few people were actually involved and are much less sensational than the media accounts.
- Take a cheap shot at the Coast Guard by shouting that the military needs to take over the spill response. Sadly, even some retired military officers have made such comments. They should know better.
- Take shots at whale lovers. If it weren’t for them we could go back to burning whale oil.
- Criticize alternative energy proponents for the slow pace of renewable energy development. Point out how Cape Wind has been dragging their feet on the Nantucket Sound project. (BTW, it was the maligned employees of MMS who took the initiative, on their own, to draft the legislation that provided a framework for offshore renewable energy development. Were it not for their leadership, renewable energy development would have been even further delayed.)
- Take a few swipes at BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and Cameron, but save your best shots for other oil industry targets. BP et al are too easy for the real pros. Talk about your vast experience in working with this industry. If that’s too big of a stretch, even by Washington standards, talk about your friend or relative who worked in the industry.
- Point to past incidents regardless of their relevance. Disregard historical data that contradict your position.
- Don’t criticize US energy consumption, at least not if you have any political ambitions. Consumption is fine; production is the problem.
- Lastly, take your shots with great confidence. Style is more important than substance. Be loud and certain.
Remember Harry Truman’s sage advice:
“If you want a friend in Washington,” he once said, “get a dog.”
Hydrate Formation: Problem or Solution?
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Colin Leach, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, hydrates, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on May 30, 2010| Leave a Comment »
hydrate plug removed from pipeline
In a recent conversation, Colin Leach suggested an interesting plugging option for the Macondo well – hydrates. Why not take advantage of nature and induce hydrate formation to plug the well? We know that hydrates are difficult to prevent when methane mixes with water under the pressure conditions at Macondo. Why not pump cold water down the choke line where it will mix with methane in the stack to form hydrates and plug the well? To optimize the hydrate formation, methane could be injected down the kill line.
Hydrates would definitely form. Chances are good that natural forces would form a solid hydrate plug that would prevent further flow from the well. The only risk would be that the hydrates would form too slowly (unlikely given the experience with the seafloor containment chamber) or that they wouldn’t completely plug the well. The presence of a hydrate plug would also require additional caution when the well is finally re-entered (after the relief well has secured the downhole flowpaths). The best time to attempt the hydrate option would seem to be right now, after the more conventional BOP intervention attempts and before cutting the riser to install the cap.
“No Mas” – Top Kill Can’t Overcome Bottom Pressure
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on May 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »
The Top Kill Operation has been terminated. The next step is to cut the riser above the lower marine riser package and install a cap above that. Oil and gas will flow inside drill pipe to the support vessel. A riser will also be installed and hot water will be pumped down the drill pipe riser annulus to prevent hydrate formation.
Top Kill Reports Are Not Good Enough
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on May 29, 2010| Leave a Comment »
While I have great respect for the technical and operational teams who are conducting the well intervention work, their allies and supporters are being alienated by the people who are managing the news. From Day 1, the information on the well intervention operations has not been good enough, not even close. We received no details on the repeated ROV attempts to actuate BOPE, very little information about the design and operation of the ill-fated seafloor collection chamber, and are now being totally stonewalled on the critical and long awaited top kill operation.
This is not a private drilling program or research project. This became a public operation when the well blew out on April 20th. Public resources are threatened, and the regional and national economic implications are enormous. How and why are the top kill and other technical data confidential?
The Unified Command needs to stop managing the news and tell us what is happening. For each injection period, we need the starting time, ending time, pressure fluctuations, injection rates, and volume and types of materials injected. For observation periods, we need pressure readings versus time. This information is surely being collected and summarized. Share those summaries with the stakeholders in this massive effort – the American people.
Top Kill Confusion
Posted in accidents, well control incidents, tagged accidents, blowouts, Deepwater Horizon, drilling, Gulf of Mexico, macondo, offshore oil, oil spill, safety, well control on May 28, 2010| Leave a Comment »
Why did BP stop mud injection for approximately 20 hours, starting at 2300 CT on the first day of the operation, not resuming until yesterday evening? Prior to the start of the top kill operation, there was no indication that there would be a long pause after an initial pumping period, and according to BP there have been no equipment problems. While stopping to monitor pressure data is understandable, the length of the pause is puzzling.
Why was no one advised that the long-awaited and enormously significant operation had been temporarily suspended? Apparently, Admiral Allen was not aware of the suspension when he spoke with the LA Times yesterday morning, so it is not surprising that no one else knew. The media and other interested observers were watching the seafloor cameras all day looking for signs that the operation was having some effect. Why didn’t someone simply advise that the operation had been temporarily suspended while data were being evaluated?
