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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

The Deepwater Driller III (pictured) has spudded the first relief well.

Discoverer Enterprise will support seafloor contaiment system.

While BOE’s eager but poorly managed staff struggles to keep pace, Upstream is providing excellent coverage of the well intervention, relief well, and seafloor containment system stories.  This is the news of greatest interest to our small, but highly sophisticated readership.  (For extensive coverage of news celebrities standing near the shore or bravely venturing into streamers of oil, turn your attention to the network news.)

Anyway, lots of new developments: the relief well was spudded, another rig is on the way to drill a second relief well, the seafloor containment system is ready to be transported to the site, and plans to install a second BOP stack (on top of the first) proceed.   But perhaps of greatest interest to BOE readers is the report that BP had closed the rams but did not stem the flow.  The BP spokesman suggested that the rubber portions of the rams may have been eroded and were thus unable to seal the well.   This makes sense for the pipe rams and annular preventers (although some flow reduction would still be expected), but what about the shear ram?  Was it closed?  Was it unable to cut pipe that was inside the stack?  What happened when the crew attempted to shut-in the well prior to evacuation?  When can we expect a statement from Cameron, the BOP manufacturer?

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This blowout is a national tragedy with 11 fatalities, 3 critical injuries, many lives disrupted, and a major ongoing oil spill.  Nonetheless, as with every disaster, there are some positives.  A  few come to mind:

  1. 115 workers were rescued following the initial explosion.
  2. The first ever deepwater oil containment and collection system is being built.  Should the responders not be able to soon stop flow from the well, this system will be deployed and evaluated.
  3. An innovative and unprecedented attempt may be made to install and operate a second BOP (above the failed stack).
  4. New spill cleanup options such as underwater dispersants are being studied.  The resulting data will be very useful to oil spill researchers.
  5. Lessons from Macondo are likely to trigger improvements in BOP systems and well integrity assurance procedures.

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Let me be clear: BP is responsible for the leak; BP will be paying the bill. President Obama

While this is clearly the case for “removal costs,” damage costs are a different matter.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 establishes liability limits as follows:

for an offshore facility except a deepwater port, the total of all removal costs plus $75,000,000;

With regard to maximum liability, a MODU like the Horizon would be treated the same as an offshore facility.  Removal costs are “costs to prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution,” not economic costs to affected parties.

The liability limits do not apply in the event of  “(A) gross negligence or willful misconduct of, or (B) the violation of an applicable Federal safety, construction,or operating regulation by,the responsible party, an agent or employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a contractual relationship with the responsible party.”

The legal battles have already begun and will last for at least a decade.

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Second BOP to be stacked on well

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A couple of points raised by our highly informed readers:

1. With regard to allegations about deficiencies in BP’s Atlantis (deepwater production facility), an industry source closely involved with the project (but not a BP employee) offered the following comment:

Atlantis was by far, in my opinion, the best of the bunch; proceeded as a normal construction project. The PMs were the best I’ve come across

2. While the absence of an acoustic backup system (BOP) no longer seems to be significant in this case, the effectiveness of such systems is an important point of discussion.  Some readers have voiced support for acoustic backups.  Others believe the ambient noise associated with a seafloor blowout would render these acoustic systems ineffective.  Has the noise issue been evaluated?  Should a Joint Industry Project be initiated to evaluate the performance of these systems?

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Mark Levin interviewed a DWH crew member who provides insights regarding the events leading up to the blowout and the evacuation.  His comments are generally consistent with the Halliburton release (below) and the “street-talk” about the status of operations at the time of the incident.  I suggest that you take a few minutes to listen.

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As one of several service providers on the rig, Halliburton can confirm the following:

— Halliburton performed a variety of services on the rig, including cementing, and had four employees stationed on the rig at the time of the accident. Halliburton’s employees returned to shore safely, due, in part, to the brave rescue efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard and other organizations.

— Halliburton had completed the cementing of the final production casing string in accordance with the well design approximately 20 hours prior to the incident. The cement slurry design was consistent with that utilized in other similar applications.

— In accordance with accepted industry practice approved by our customers, tests demonstrating the integrity of the production casing string were completed.

— At the time of the incident, well operations had not yet reached the point requiring the placement of the final cement plug which would enable the planned temporary abandonment of the well, consistent with normal oilfield practice.

— We are assisting with planning and engineering support for a wide range of options designed to secure the well, including a potential relief well.

Halliburton continues to assist in efforts to identify the factors that may have lead up to the disaster, but it is premature and irresponsible to speculate on any specific causal issues.

Full Halliburton News Release

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  1. Yesterday’s report that the Horizon crew tried to activate BOPE before evacuating is very significant.  We have now learned that the crew, the fail-safe closure mechanisms triggered by the power-loss and riser disconnect, and the ROV backup could not close the rams.  Therefore, the absence of an acoustic backup system does not appear to be significant in this incident.  An acoustic backup or any other type of backup would just be signaling the BOP to close, the same way the crew and automatic systems did, and the result would have presumably been the same.
  2. A smart guy in Houston (doesn’t want his name used) raised an interesting thought last night.  If they had time between the first flow and the start of the fire, would they have been better off initiating a drive-off routine that disconnected the riser from the well and moved the rig away from the location? (Keep in mind that this was a dynamically positioned rig.)   The fire would have been prevented or minimized, lives might have been saved, and the rig would not have sunk.  Why not establish an escape option that takes advantage of a DP rig’s mobility?
  3. The same contact also suggested that continuous pumping of fire-water into internal compartments may have caused the rig to sink.
  4. Escape procedures and lifeboat issues have not received much attention to date, but are sure to be an important aspect of the investigation.
  5. MMS postponed the National SAFE Awards scheduled for Monday.  This was the correct decision under the circumstances.

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I missed today’s news conference, but Upstream has excellent coverage including information that the crew did try to activate BOPE before evacuating.

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  1. NOAA estimates that flow rate could be up to 5000 BOPD.  Comment: The technical basis for this and other flow estimates should be provided.
  2. First in situ burn conducted successfully.  Comment: No surprise.  In situ burning is neither new nor unproven.  This is the best means of removing large volumes of oil from the water quickly and completely. Kudos to the in situ burning pioneers – Ed Tennyson, Dave Evans, Al Allen, and Merv FingasKudos to the folks at Ohmsett where slick burning and fire booms were tested extensively in a tank. Kudos to Canada and Norway for having the foresight to allow this capability to be tested in experimental offshore spills.  Unfortunately, these small, controlled research spills are virtually impossible to conduct in US waters.
  3. Department of Defense being contacted for suggestions.  Comment: Appropriate step, but don’t expect any ideas that have not been previously considered.
  4. BOP actuation and cementing operations (also a major point of discussion during the Montara hearings in Australia) are receiving press attention.  Comment: These issues will be a major focus of the investigation.  The findings will be discussed and applied internationally.
  5. A third oil release point has been identified near the base of the riser.

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