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Archive for the ‘accidents’ Category

BOE friend and internationally recognized well control expert Colin Leach has submitted an excellent paper suggesting new procedures that will improve well design and intervention.  Click here to read Colin’s paper.

The goal is to eliminate the possibility of what actually could happen not being recognized (at the time of the design). This is achieved by having a core of knowledge against which individual operating companies and outside assessors can assess designs and approaches. Communication between the operator and the “knowledge core”would be confidential as long as a well control incident did not occur. The format of this “knowledge core” is such that it eliminates the “committee think” within an operating company where a dissenting individual (who is actually knowledgeable) can be overruled by a committee vote.

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While the Norwegian model is built on trust, cooperation, and sharing of experience and information,” asserts Dr Lindøe, “the situation in the USA is nearly the opposite.”

When an accident happens on the Norwegian continental shelf, the parties convene to uncover any weaknesses in systems or routines that contributed to workers making a mistake. There is agreement that this is how to achieve better results, rather than spending resources on finding scapegoats and not bothering to change the systems.

In the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon, MMS has been criticised for having too cozy a relationship with the companies and for having reduced the number of inspections,” says Researcher Helge Ryggvik of the University of Oslo. “Yet its inspection activities are more comprehensive than on the Norwegian continental shelf. And unlike the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, MMS has its own helicopters and can conduct unannounced inspections.”

This excellent Research Council of Norway article, which discusses some of the differences between the US and Norwegian systems, should be mandatory reading for regulators and operators. Ironically, I made some similar comments to a wind turbine safety committee last week.  In assessing the root causes of accidents and the associated equipment and procedural issues, we must not lose sight of the fundamental regulatory objectives and how they can best be achieved.

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bottom of the flowing Macondo well

Based on the latest information provided by Admiral Allen, the relief well has reached 11817′ below the sea floor and is thus only 273′ above the 9 7/8″ casing shoe on the flowing Macondo well.  After drilling another 200+ feet, they will open (enlarge) the relief well and install a 9 7/8″ liner.  They will then drill a few hundred feet beneath the liner and intercept the flowing well.  They will presumably kill the flow in the annulus outside the casing (assuming that is a flow path) with heavy mud before milling into the 7″ casing, killing any flow inside that casing, and plugging the well bore with cement.  Stay tuned.

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Per Admiral Allen:

Regarding the relief wells, Development Driller III now is at a distance of 11,641 feet below the seafloor.  As you know, they’re going through a series of operations which we call ranging.  They’re into their fourth cycle of this.  In ranging, they withdraw the drill pipe and put down an electrical cable and actually try and sense the magnetic field around the wellbore.  They are within around 15 feet of the wellbore at this point.  They will continue down 700, 800 more feet, slowly close into the wellbore, and when they know they’ve got it exactly in range, know exactly where the drill pipe is in relation to the wellbore, then they will attempt to move in and drill through the wellbore and then the casing as well.  At that point they’ll be in a position to be able to try the bottom kill or to be able to insert the mud, and hopefully after that, put a cement plug in that will kill the well.

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DD3

BOE doesn’t really care about where LeBron James chooses to play basketball, but we are big fans of the team on the Development Driller III or DD3. The DD3 crew, some of whom are Deepwater Horizon survivors, is ahead of schedule and predictions for an early intercept and well kill are approaching irrational exuberance levels. This may be the most important well in history, and crew has responded to the challenge.

After the DD3 crew finishes the job, we owe them a victory parade in New Orleans.  “Throw me somethin’ mista! 🙂

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Interesting comments from Jane Cutler, CEO of Australia’s National Offshore Safety Petroleum Safety Authority, in NOPSA’s excellent newsletter:

The incidents in the Gulf of Mexico (Deepwater Horizon) and at the Montara wellhead platform are different in many respects, particularly in technical matters. However, they share some common factors prompting regulatory action.

I agree entirely with Ms. Cutler.  International regulators and operators must work in concert to address and resolve these issues.

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BP has released a slide presentation and animation on the relief wells showing the intercept point below the 9 7/8″ casing shoe.   The exact sequence of operations once they reach the intercept point will be interesting to observe. They should encounter flow when they reach the 7″ casing annulus (assuming that is a flow path; there still seems to be some uncertainty in that regard).  Will they attempt to kill the flow in the annulus before milling into the 7″ casing?  Is there flow inside the 7″ casing via channels in the casing shoe? Is there drill pipe inside the casing?

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-The duration of the Montara blowout was 75 Days. Ironically, Day 76 of the Macondo blowout will be the 4th of July.

-Eleven days have elapsed since the Montara Report was presented to Minister Ferguson, who has apparently retained his cabinet position in the new government.  Now that the cabinet has been settled, perhaps there will be more public clamor for the report?

-Cap Summit in DC? – According to Admiral Allen, government and industry experts will convene on Wednesday to decide whether to change the collection cap.  Other designs would provide a better seal and facilitate higher recovery rates via free-standing risers, but the well would flow unabated during the changeover.

-More Macondo irony:  Since the oil spilled is “avoidably lost,” royalties will presumably be due on both the oil spilled and the oil “produced” at Macondo.  However, for fields in water depths greater than 800m, the Deepwater Royalty Relief Act  of 1995 exempts the first 87.5 million barrels of oil equivalent from Federal royalties.  Court interpretations of this poorly written legislation have determined that this relief must be applied on a lease (not field) basis, making the royalty exemption much more generous.  Ironically, Kerr McGee (now part of Macondo partner Anadarko) filed the law suit that resulted in this favorable decision for industry.  MMS, which has been repeatedly (and incorrectly) denounced for being “too cozy with industry,” fought hard for the less generous interpretation.

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The House Energy and Commerce Committee has posted a discussion draft of the Blowout Prevention Act of 2010.   A hearing is scheduled for 30 June.

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Hurricane Juan - "Sudden Storm" killed 9 offshore workers in 1985

The offshore industry has an outstanding hurricane evacuation record, but the Macondo blowout adds a significant new dimension to the decision making process.  Disconnect the production risers and 35,000 to 60,000 bopd flow directly into the Gulf.  Suspend the relief wells and the final Macondo solution gets moved that much farther into the future.

There will be pressure to minimize the downtime and that would be a mistake.  Days, not hours, will be needed to prepare for the evacuations.  Decisions will have to be made well in advance of a storm’s arrival and will be based on less reliable long-term weather forecasts.  If a shutdown decision is made too soon, hundreds of thousands of additional barrels of oil pour into the Gulf.  If the decision is delayed, lives are threatened.

The most frightening scenarios are associated with “sudden storms” which can form in or near the Gulf and explode into hurricanes in hours, not days.  The rapid formation and development of these storms precludes an orderly shutdown and evacuation process, and poses a major safety threat to workers.  In 1985, nine offshore workers were killed when Hurricane Juan formed suddenly in the Gulf and personnel could not be safely evacuated.

Let’s hope that the well is brought under control before any hurricanes enter or form in the Gulf.  If not, decision makers need to exercise extreme caution and shutdown operations before lives are threatened.

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