Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘oil spill’

The oil slick in the Gulf of Mexico appears to be dissolving far more rapidly than anyone expected, a piece of good news that raises tricky new questions about how fast the government should scale back its response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

A very good article in the New York Times confirms what experienced oil spill observers expected – oil from the Macondo spill is disappearing rapidly as a result of natural processes (see SINTEF diagram below).  While marsh and coastal damage could be significant, more oil from Macondo shouldn’t add to those problems.

SINTEF Weathering Diagram

Read Full Post »

In the Gulf of Mexico, deepwater drilling is more risky because that is where the high-rate wells are, not because the water is deep.
  • Water depth had little to do with the well integrity problems at Macondo. Similar errors in planning and execution would have yielded similar results in any water depth or on land.  Has Montara already been forgotten?
  • Subsea BOP stacks have a much better performance record than the surface stacks used in shallow water drilling (more on this later in the week).
  • Historical data indicate that blowouts occur less frequently in deep water, not more frequently (more to follow).
  • Obviously, blowouts involving high-rate wells are likely to do more damage.   This applies regardless of the water depth.   You can reduce the spill risk by prohibiting drilling in the areas with the highest production potential, but that wouldn’t be very sound energy policy and you won’t find many buyers for the leases.
  • It is safer to conduct intervention and capping operations on subsea wells.  Regulators would not even allow surface capping to be considered at Montara because of the high risk to workers.  The subsurface ROV work is perhaps the biggest Macondo success story.
  • If the Macondo well was in shallow water (with the wellhead above the water surface), and well integrity concerns precluded a risky surface capping operation, how would the flow have been contained and collected?
  • Other things being equal, the environmental risk is less at deepwater locations which tend to be farther from shore.

Water depth is just one well planning consideration.  Abnormal pressures and temperatures, shallow gas, hydrogen sulfide, ice, permafrost, storms, currents, extended reach targets, and horizontal completions are some of the others.  To prevent another Macondo, in the US or anywhere else in the world, we need to focus our attention on the 3 categories of issues listed below.  These issues are important in all water depths and in all environments.

  1. Well integrity including design, construction, barriers, verification, and monitoring.
  2. BOPE performance and reliability under all conditions.
  3. Capping, containing, and collecting oil in the event of a blowout.

Read Full Post »

link

Exxon, Shell, Chevron Corp. and ConocoPhilips will each give $250 million to establish a non-profit organization, the Marine Well Containment Co., to produce and manage the equipment. The system will be designed and built over the next 12 to 18 months to handle spills of 100,000 barrels a day in waters as deep as 10,000 feet (3,048 meters), the companies said in a statement yesterday.

Comments:

  1. Excellent and necessary initiative.
  2. Will other GoM operators participate?  Unless they can provide a similar capability, they will probably have no choice.
  3. It may be difficult to manage a capability that will probably (hopefully) never be used?  Realistic simulations and drills will be critical.
  4. Could major components of this capability be used for other purposes?  Colin Leach has suggested that an FPSO (Cascade-Chinook?) might provide the necessary collection and processing capability.  Such an FPSO could be promptly relocated to the site of a blowout.
  5. More on this later, but there are advantages to a seafloor blowout (as opposed to a blowout from a surface wellhead), particularly from a safety standpoint.  Also, seafloor BOPE has a better historicial performance record than surface BOPE.  This new capability will address the major subsea well deficiencies –  intervention, containment, and collection. 
  6. I don’t think surface wellheads should be left out of the picture.  A surface capping operation on a platform or jack-up rig is far from a slam dunk, and is more hazardous than a subsurface capping operation.
  7. Well integrity is, of course, critical to the success of any well containment operation, and that should be the primary area of consideration for all offshore operators.

Read Full Post »

Most recently, tensions flared as BP made plans to lower its newly designed cap onto the gushing well. Last Thursday, when the cap appeared to stop the oil, all weren’t happy at the Houston crisis center. Instead, a squabble broke out between government scientists and BP engineers.

LINK.

Which of the official investigations will look at the important interactions among Unified Command participants and the effectiveness of the decisionmaking procedures?

Read Full Post »

Statement by Admiral Allen this morning (19 July):

I authorized BP to continue the integrity test for another 24 hours and I restated our firm position that this test will only continue if they continue to meet their obligations to rigorously monitor for any signs that this test could worsen the overall situation.

Comments: 

  • Interesting wording.  Why imply that shutting-in the well is some type of special favor to BP?  One would think that BP would be directed (not allowed) to keep the well shut-in. 
  • I have seen no reason for discontinuing the “test.”  The reported gas observation could be a natural seep of which there are hundreds in the deepwater Gulf.  Even if there is minor gas seepage associated with near surface well integrity issues, this seepage will end when the source (the Macondo reservoir) is killed.  It is extremely unlikely that shutting in the Macondo well would create new channels (not associated with the well bore) all the way from the reservoir back to the seafloor. 
  • I thought last night’s leak about a leak was interesting.  Was the press leak intentional? Who was the leaker intending to embarass?  BP?  The Unified Command?  Admiral Allen?  Strange.

Read Full Post »

Doug Suttles tweets at 0830 on 18 July:

Data continues to show encouraging signs and we’re reviewing w/ gov’t team. We will continue to leave the well shut in. 

Pressure is currently 6778 PSI, what we would have forecast in a scenario where the resevoir would have been depleted. 

We are continuing to run extensive tests and monitor. We’re going to take this day by day. 

There doesn’t seem to be any information that would justify a resumption of flow via the collection and production systems.  Yesterday’s official statement from Admiral Allen (below) is therefore a bit puzzling.

When this test is eventually stopped, we will immediately return to containment, using the new, tighter sealing cap with both the Helix Producer and the Q4000. Additional collection capacity of up to 80,000 barrels per day is also being added in the coming days. 

Why resume flow?

Read Full Post »

At this point, there is no evidence that we don’t   have well integrity. -Kent Wells tweet; 17 July; 0900 ET 

  • If the data continue to indicate that the well is holding pressure, why add new safety and pollution risks by resuming flow through multiple collection and production systems? 
  • Presumably they will leave the well shut-in and finish the job with the relief well.  Per Kent Wells, the relief well will intercept the well bore by the end of the month.  This would seem to be a conservative estimate.

Read Full Post »

  • Tough decision looming?: Assuming the well continues to hold pressure and other surveys don’t indicate any anomalies, will they leave the well shut-in or resume flow through the collection systems?  This will be an interesting decision.
  • Insignificant detail that is probably only of interest to me: Since 1971 when I started tracking blowout data, a relief well has not been required to halt the flow from any drilling blowout in US (Federal) offshore waters.  On several occasions, relief wells were initiated but not needed to stop the flow from a well.  Since the Macondo flow is now under control, at least at this time, this record appears to have been sustained.  A relief well will still, of course, be needed to kill the well, so this is admittedly a nuanced and largely insignificant detail (especially since nearly 3 months were required to shut-in/control the Macondo well).  

Read Full Post »

Capping Stack BOP onboard the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration close to the MC252 location 7 July 2010.

Capping Stack BOP Before Installation on Well

Here we go ……

  1. Close rams to shut-in flow from the top while allowing flow through choke and kill lines on sides of capping stack.
  2. Slowly close kill line.
  3. Slowly close choke line.
  4. If the pressure holds through all 3 steps, Secretary Chu does a touchdown dance in the BP control room (BOE exclusive :))

Other:

  1. Operation will be halted every 6 hours to monitor pressure;
  2. Ongoing ROV monitoring of well and seafloor;
  3. Remote sensing systems looking for evidence of leakage outside the wellbore;
  4. Up to a 48 hour process

Read Full Post »

The Federal Government is unnecessarily delaying the release of a report into last year’s Montara oil spill off Australia’s north coast, the Northern Territory Opposition says.

link

On a related note, it would be great if preliminary findings from the DOI/DHS Macondo investigation could be released as soon as possible.  There is much work to be done and all interested parties (in the US and elsewhere) need the best available information so that they can assess their programs.  Better to err on the side of releasing findings to soon with any necessary caveats and disclaimers.  In that regard, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce has done a good job of making their findings available without delay.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »