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Archive for September, 2010

BOE has previously commented that completion of the Macondo relief well appeared to be unnecessary, and and that the intercept adds additional risk to the plugging and abandonment operation.  Pasted below are disconcerting Unified Command and BP statements about the intercept followed by BOE comments:

I have stated over and over again, let me be perfectly clear. I am the National Incident Commander. I issue the orders. This will not be done until we complete the bottom kill. Admiral Allen, 5 August 2010

Comment: While I believe Admiral Allen has performed well in the difficult and thankless job of incident commander (as did Admiral Landry before him) and wanted to make it clear that the government was in charge of this operation, this strong statement appears to have painted the Unified Command into a corner.

… in response to BP’s request to consider foregoing the relief well, the government scientific technical team has determined that the benefits of the bottom kill procedure outweighs the risks. (14 August letter from Admiral Allen to BP)

Comment: Reading between the lines, we assume that at least some BP engineers favored foregoing the relief well intercept, and wanted to proceed with a conventional plugging and abandonment operation.  Was their proposal given serious consideration?  How could it have been given the Admiral’s prior statements about completing the relief well?

We are currently working with BP engineers and our science team to look at test results and do investigations to lead us to the best way to mitigate any risk of intercepting the annulus and increasing the pressure in the annulus. Admiral Allen, 16 August

Comment: Much attention continues to be focused on mitigating the risks of an operation that appears to be unnecessary.

There are several reasons for the relief well to be completed, including demonstrating that the difficult procedure can be done, providing more scientific data about the leak and giving closure to an oil-weary public. BP CEO Bob Dudley, 29 August

Comments: This BP statement seems to contradict their prior request to forgo completion of the relief well.  With regard to Mr. Dudley’s rationale for completing the relief well, I’ll offer the following:

  1. If BP believes they need to demonstrate relief well intercept capability (not necessary in my view), they should drill into one of the thousands of depleted wells in the Gulf, not Macondo.
  2. This is not a risk-free science project.  Are the risks and delays justified?
  3. The “oil-weary public” needs an offshore industry that is committed to safety and pollution prevention, not symbolic gestures.

And in order to speed the process up, but also ensure that we had the right pressure controls on the well, I’ve signed a directive out to BP earlier this morning, directing them to take a series of measurements on the well head that would allow us to ascertain whether or not the seal in the ring – in the casing hanger were in place and had not lifted and, if that was the case, then to be able to put what we call a sleeve over the top of it that would basically walk that down to the point where it could withstand over one million pounds of pressure and would obviate the need to be able to cement the annulus at the top.

And subject to BP providing me the plans and the results of those tests, that would allow us to go ahead and proceed more quickly without having to cement the top of the annulus.  And based on a revised schedule from BP, we might be able to accelerate going ahead and finishing out the relief well. Admiral Allen, 10 September

Comment: Let me get this straight.  They are going to put off the cementing of the annulus, which will have to be done anyway and would provide a barrier should something go wrong with the intercept, so they can conduct tests (that would be unnecessary if they first cemented the annulus) for the purpose of expediting completion of the long-delayed relief well? Huh?

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  • NOPSA has issued an excellent Health and Safety Performance Report for Australian offshore operations.  Here’s the link.
  • BOE fave Martin Ferguson has retained his energy post in the new government.  We trust that he will release the Montara Inquiry report without further delay.
  • Per Upstream, the destroyed West Atlas jackup rig is being removed from the Montara wellhead platform in the Timor Sea, and all wells have been secured with barriers.  In light of the lessons learned at Montara, can we assume that corrosion caps and well fluids are not being counted as barriers?  What is next for the Montara?  Will PTTEP be authorized to resume development of the field?  Should they be?

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On 8-9 September, the International Regulators’ Forum (IRF) met in Herndon, Virginia, to address offshore safety issues in the wake of the Macondo and Montara blowouts.  This was the first extraordinary meeting in the IRF’s 17-year history.  In a statement released after the meeting, the IRF resolved to:

  • Provide leadership on safety and safety related regulatory matters for offshore oil and gas activities.  A strategic agenda will be discussed and adopted at the next IRF meeting in October in Vancouver.
  • Develop an audit protocol looking at BOP integrity and operational issues, for use by all IRF members to provide a consistent approach.
  • Continue to strengthen sharing of regulatory practice and experience and provide a sounding board for key initiatives of members.

These and other offshore safety issues will be discussed at the upcoming (18-20 October) IRF conference in Vancouver.  This conference is open to all interested parties.

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Transocean slams the BP Macondo report:

However, rig owner Transocean slammed the report, saying: “This is a self-serving report that attempts to conceal the critical factor that set the stage for the Macondo incident: BP’s fatally-flawed well design.”

BOE Comment: At a time when the safety of oil and gas operations is rightfully under intense scrutiny, this ugly dispute further undermines public confidence in offshore exploration and development.  BP, Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron, and other feuding companies need to resolve their disputes so they can fully and credibly participate in the critical industry and governmental programs that are addressing offshore safety and pollution prevention issues.

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“The goal of our efforts is a culture of safety, in which protecting human life and preventing environmental disasters are the highest priorities, while making leasing and production safer and more sustainable,” said Assistant Secretary Wilma Lewis, who chaired the Safety Oversight Board.

The report of the Department of the Interior’s Safety Oversight Board has been posted on the DOI website.  The report recommends certain improvements in DOI’s offshore oil and gas regulatory program. Because of my participation in this project, I won’t comment on the specifics of the report.  I will say that I was impressed by the professionalism of the Board and the DOI staff who assisted with the project.  All views were openly discussed and carefully considered.

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Here is the link.

Our main interest was in the flow path and BOP issues:

Flow path:

The investigation team concluded that hydrocarbon ingress was through the shoe track, rather than through a failure in the production casing itself or up the wellbore annulus and through the casing hanger seal assembly.

BOP:

  1. The explosions and fire very likely disabled the emergency disconnect sequence
  2. The condition of critical components in the yellow and blue control pods on the BOP very likely prevented activation of another emergency method of well control, the automatic mode function (AMF), which was designed to seal the well without rig personnel intervention upon loss of hydraulic pressure, electric power and communications from the rig to the BOP control pods. An examination of the BOP control pods following the accident revealed that there was a fault in a critical solenoid valve in the yellow control pod and that the blue control pod AMF batteries had insufficient charge; these faults likely existed at the time of the accident.
  3. Remotely operated vehicle intervention to initiate the autoshear function, another emergency method of operating the BOP, likely resulted in closing the BOP’s blind shear ram (BSR) 33 hours after the explosions, but the BSR failed to seal the well.
BP’s flow path assessment is consistent with our expectations.  Early on, while most of the attention was focused on the annulus, we thought that flow inside the production casing was a distinct possibility.  With regard to the BOPs, BP’s explanation is a more complete than we expected at this time, given that the stack has just been recovered.
More to follow.

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    While we wait for the Bly Report (BP), Colin Leach (without the benefit of staff and access) has issued his concise and credible report on Macondo. I recommend that you take a few minutes to read it. Many thanks to Colin for his continued leadership on offshore safety issues.

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    BOE has learned that “The Bly Report,” BP’s internal investigation into the causes of the Macondo blowout, will be posted tomorrow at 0700 ET on BP’s website.

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    Courtesy of Upstream:

    UK Workers Accuse Transocean of Bullying and Intimidation.

    Union Calls for Shutdown of the P-31, 33, and 35 Floating Production Facilities offshore Brazil.

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    Julia Gillard

    Martin Ferguson is likely to retain his post as Minister for Resources and Energy.  We trust that he will now release the Montara Inquiry Report as promised.  When has a politician ever broken a promise?  Never happens in this country 🙂

    Upstream Article on Australia’s minority government.

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