Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘proposed rule’

For 40 years, challenges associated with bankruptcies (or the threat thereof), a divided offshore industry, political pressure, hurricane damage, and unresolved legal issues have hindered initiatives to better protect the public from decommissioning liabilities. Nonetheless, regulators and industry were able to prevent taxpayers from incurring any decommissioning costs. Unfortunately that is no longer the case.

For the first time in history, the govt has funded decommissioning on the OCS (and bragged about it – photo below).

Federally funded decommissioning operation in the Matagorda Area of the Gulf.

BOEM’s proposed revisions to the decommissioning regulations (attached) would facilitate the transfer of aging structures to companies with limited assets, and in some cases, poor or undemonstrated safety records.

The proposal would reduce or eliminate the supplemental financial assurance requirement if a predecessor lessee has a strong credit rating. For that strategy to work, related decommissioning issues must be addressed. and clarifications and boundaries provided to ensure taxpayers are protected from decommissioning liabilities.

Predecessor liability, which is important because it helps prevent companies from assigning leases for the purpose of avoiding decommissioning obligations, was not established in the regulations until much of the OCS infrastructure was already installed. In a final rule that was effective on 8/20/1997, my office (thanks to the perseverance of Gerry Rhodes, John Mirabella, and Dennis Daugherty) codified the joint and several liability principle in 30 CFR 250.110 as follows:

(b) Lessees must plug and abandon all well bores, remove all platforms or other facilities, and clear the ocean of all obstructions to other users. This obligation:
(1) Accrues to the lessee when the well is drilled, the platform or other facility is installed, or the obstruction is created; and
(2) Is the joint and several responsibility of all lessees and owners of operating rights under the lease at the time the obligation accrues, and of each future lessee or owner of operating rights, until
the obligation is satisfied under the requirements of this part.

Prior to the that rule, the official policy of the Dept. of the Interior, as expressed in a 1988 letter from the Director of the Minerals Management Service (see excerpt pasted below), was that lease assignors would NOT be held accountable should their successors fail to fulfill their decommissioning responsibilities.

A major unanswered question regarding decommissioning obligations is thus the extent to which predecessor liability applies to leases assigned prior to the 1997 regulation. According to BOEM data, 771 remaining platforms were installed at least 10 years before the rule change, and 504 were installed at least 20 years prior. For assets transferred prior to the rule change, do the predecessors retain liability? BOEM should explain its position on this issue.

Other predecessor liability questions that need to be answered:

  • Now that the reverse chronological guidance has been scrapped, what will be the process for determining which predecessors will be held responsible?
  • If the govt doesn’t ensure that the new lessees fulfill their performance obligations (e.g. funding escrow accounts, well plugging, insurance, etc.), are predecessors still liable?
  • What if the structures were poorly maintained by the new lessees, complicating decommissioning and increasing the costs
  • Should a predecessor several transfers removed from operating the facilities still be held responsible?

Two examples of what can happen (and has happened):

Example 1: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to Proud Production, a reputable independent. After years of operations, Proud can no longer profitably produce from the lease. Proud assigns the lease to CCC Oil & Gas, a small and highly efficient operator. After the lease is no longer profitable, even for a company with a low cost structure, CCC assigns the lease to Elmer’s E&P, a sketchy, barely solvent operating company with a poor compliance record. Elmer rather predictably neglects maintenance and declares bankruptcy after a decline in oil prices. Should Big AAA Oil, which had no say in the last 2 transfers in the assignment chain, be financially responsible for decommissioning the facilities?

Example 2: Big AAA Oil assigns a lease to DDD Development Company. Per the terms of the assignment, DDD establishes an Abandonment Escrow Account, as provided for in 30 CFR 556.904. BOEM allows DDD to withdraw funds from the account for purposes not authorized in the regulations. Should Big AAA Oil be liable for decommissioning costs after DDD is no longer solvent? (See “The troubling case of Platforms Hogan and Houchin.”)

For predecessor liability to be fairly and effectively implemented, and survive legal challenges, BOEM should:

  • Before approving lease assignments, verify that the assignors and assignees have contractually specified, to BOEM’s satisfaction, how the decommissioning of assigned assets will be funded.
  • Not approve subsequent lease assignments until the predecessor that is being held financially responsible has approved a funding agreement with the new lessees.

Another important concern is that BOEM’s proposal does not correct two prior changes that further expose the public to decommissioning liabilities:

Read Full Post »

The attached comments were submitted to BOEM via Regulations.gov. The comments address specific provisions of the proposed rule and include a recommendation to hold companies fully accountable for their lease transfers, but not for subsequent transfers in which they are not a party.

Do I get a t-shirt for being one of the first 2000 entries? 😀

Read Full Post »

In a draft rule published on June 29, 2023, BOEM proposes to discontinue using a company’s record of compliance in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance for decommissioning. BOEM’s full explanation for this surprising change is pasted at the end of this post.

Opposing view:

  • BOEM should be more attentive, not less, to safety performance and compliance data. If they were, taxpayers would have been better protected from the risks associated with the lease acquisitions by Fieldwood, Cox, Black Elk, Signal Hill, and others, and their subsequent bankruptcies.
  • Safe operations, as reflected in compliance and performance data, are critical to a company’s financial success.
  • BOEM wrongly infers that Incidents of Noncompliance (INCs) are solely dependent on the number and complexity of facilities. Decades of normalized compliance data have told us that there are marked differences among operators in terms of compliance and safety performance. Companies at the bottom of the performance table don’t usually survive.
  • Accidents are not mere matters of chance; management and culture matter.
  • Honor Roll companies, large and small, have superior compliance records, and in 2022 these companies had 50-90% fewer INCs/facility-inspection than the Gulf of Mexico average.
  • Does BOEM expect noncompliance leaders to be concerned about decommissioning obligations? The record shows that they are not.
  • Cox’s 2023 bankruptcy was predictable given their past safety performance. In 2022, Cox was a violations leader by any measure, and was responsible for 9 of the 30 safety incidents that were significant enough to require investigation by BSEE.
  • Fieldwood’s terrible 2021 safety performance has been discussed, and there was ample evidence of performance problems prior to their bankruptcy declaration in 2018. In 2016 and 2017 Fieldwood was, by far, the GoM violations leader with 818 INCs, 401 of which required a facility or component shut-in.
  • Ironically (or maybe not), the only other company that was even in the same noncompliance ballpark as Fieldwood in 2016 and 2017 was future Cox affiliate Energy XXI GOM. Energy XXI earned 465 INCs (240 shut-ins) during that 2 year period. Did BOEM object to or otherwise comment on the 2018 Cox-Energy XXI merger?
  • Black Elk Energy was new in 2007 and quickly became a violations leader. Between 2010 and 2012, BSEE cited Black Elk 415 times. 218 of these violations were serious enough to require facility or component shut-ins. On November 16, 2012, explosions at Black Elk’s West Delta 32 platform killed 3 workers, and 2 others suffered severe burns. Criminal charges and a complex bankruptcy followed. BSEE records show 1107 INCs during the company’s short history, 464 of which required facility or component shut-ins.
  • The rapid growth of Fieldwood, Cox, and Black Elk was in part facilitated by lax lease assignment and financial assurance policies. Operating companies should have to demonstrate that they can operate safety and comply with the regulations before they are approved to acquire more properties.
  • The Signal Hill saga was documented nearly 2 years ago, and none of the questions raised in that post have been answered. Violations data and inspector feedback predicted the Signal Hill/POOI failure. Nonetheless, and despite the objections of regional staff, Signal Hill was allowed to tap into its decommissioning account to cover operating expenses. Responsibility for decommissioning Platforms Hogan and Houchin is still uncertain.
  • Bankruptcy has been used to avoid or transfer decommissioning obligations. In that regard, Chevron’s comprehensive objection to Fieldwood’s restructuring plan is telling.
  • Given that BSEE, not BOEM, is responsible for safety and compliance, I sincerely hope that regulatory fragmentation was not a factor contributing to BOEM’s decision to discontinue the use of compliance data in determining financial assurance needs.

BOEM’s explanation for the proposal to eliminate the record of compliance criterion:

BOEM also proposes to eliminate the existing “record of compliance” criterion found in the current version of § 556.901(d)(1)(v). BOEM has determined that the number of INCs a company receives correlates with the number of OCS properties it owns, not its financial stability, and therefore, BOEM has concluded that it is not an accurate predictor of its financial health. BOEM reviewed BSEE’s Incidents of Non-Compliance (INCs) records and its Increased Oversight List, which represent BSEE’s cumulative records of violations of performance standards on the part of OCS operators and lessees and determined that the number of incidents of non-compliance typically increases with the size and complexity of the operator’s or lessee’s operations, including the ratio of incidents to number of components. Because larger companies (regardless of credit score) tend to have more properties and components and therefore more INCs, BOEM determined that record of compliance criterion does not accurately predict financial default. BOEM’s review of this information confirmed the feedback BOEM received in response to the 2016 NTL, namely that companies with a large number of properties and facilities tended to receive a large number of INCs and had more individual properties on the Increased Oversight List. BOEM specifically requests comments regarding the use of fines and violations as a criterion in the determination of a company’s ability to fulfill decommissioning obligations, and any data or analysis addressing any correlation between the number of violations and the risk of financial default. BOEM also requests comments on whether the elimination of the INC’s criteria would create a disincentive to comply with regulations. BOEM also requests comment on whether or not the cost of decommissioning is likely to increase based on the type, quantity, and magnitude of previous violations.

On a related note, BOEM/BSEE should consider a followup to the John Shultz thesis which found that INCs are a very good predictor of accidents and spills.

Read Full Post »

Some preliminary thoughts about BOEM’s proposed revision to the decommissioning financial assurance regulations for US offshore oil and gas operations:

  1. BOEM has rather surprisingly proposed to eliminate consideration of a company’s compliance record in determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. An opposing view will be posted tomorrow.
  2. If a lease has proved reserves with a value of at least three times that of the estimated decommissioning cost, no supplemental financial assurance would be required. Comparing two imprecise and variable estimates is neither a simple nor reliable method for determining the need for supplemental financial assurance. BOEM should look at the history of the Carpenteria field (Santa Barbara Channel) and the reserve estimates that were provided to discount decommissioning risks. More on this at a later date.
  3. Transferor liability applies only to those obligations existing at the time of transfer; new facilities, or additions to existing facilities, that were not in existence at the time of any lease transfer are not obligations of a predecessor company and are considered obligations of the party that built such new facilities and its co- and successor lessees. This is a good policy, but is difficult to implement. Some of the complexities may need to be addressed. More later.
  4. The “reverse chronological order” provision was withdrawn in April, so there is no defined process for issuing decommissioning orders to predecessor lessees. Is it good policy to first issue such orders to companies who may have owned leases decades ago, in some cases prior to the establishment of transferor liability in the 1997 MMS “bonding rule?”
  5. The proposed rule would clarify that BOEM will not approve the transfer of a lease interest until the transferee complies with all applicable regulations and orders, including the financial assurance requirements. BOEM needs to be firmly enforce this policy. See tomorrow’s post.
  6. The proposed rule would not allow BOEM to rely upon the financial strength of predecessor lessees when determining whether, or how much, supplemental financial assurance should be provided. This is a good provision.
  7. BOEM proposes to use the P70 probabilistic value to set the amount of any required supplemental financial assurance. These estimates do not seem sufficiently conservative to protect other parties and the public in the event of default. This is particularly true after storm damage which can increase plugging costs more than tenfold.
  8. The probabilistic cost estimates were updated in 2020 and are based on data submitted subsequent to 2016 and 2017 NTLs. How often will these estimates be updated?
  9. The final rule should specify that funds may not be withdrawn from decommissioning accounts for operational purposes, and that BOEM approval is required for such withdrawals.

Read Full Post »

Just posted in the Federal Register.

Read Full Post »

Although OSHA is withdrawing the Vaccination and Testing ETS as an enforceable emergency temporary standard, OSHA is not withdrawing the ETS to the extent that it serves as a proposed rule

OHSA Notice

Should we call the proposed rule an ETS variant?

Read Full Post »