As posted in January, most analysts predicted that Chevron and Hess would prevail. Now that the arbitration panel has ruled, Chevron’s acquisition of Hess can be completed.
The position of Exxon and its partner, Chinese govt owned CNOOC, never made much sense given that Chevron was not buying the Stabroek share, they were buying the company that holds that share.
Not much attention has been paid to the importance of Chevron’s acquisition of Hess’s Gulf of America assets. The combined company will be the 3rd largest GoM oil producer (behind Shell and bp) and the second largest gas producer (behind only Shell). Hess acquired 20 GoA leases in Sale 261, ranking first in total high bids ($88 million) among all participants.
Exxon senior vice president Neil Chapman said he was confident that a three-member arbitration panel would rule in Exxon’s favor and determine it had a right-of-first-refusal to purchase Hess’ stake in a Guyana oil joint venture operated by Exxon.
Hess: “We remain confident that the arbitration will confirm the Stabroek right of first refusal does not apply to the merger.”
On May 26 in London a three-judge International Chamber of Commerce panel will finally begin considering the Exxon claim that the Stabroek joint operating agreement grants them the right-of-first-refusal in Chevron’s acquisition of Hess’s 30% share of the massive field (>11 billion boe) offshore Guyana.
Exxon’s rather unlikely ally in this case is state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. How did CNOOC get a stake in Stabroek and why is their position on the Hess acquisition hypocritical?
CNOOC became a 25% Stabroek partner by acquiring Canadian Nexen in 2013. Their Nexen acquisition, which included Canadian, US, and international assets, was only reluctantly approved by the Canadian and U.S. governments, and probably would not be approved today.
CNOOC’s Stabroek acquisition is thus very similar to Chevron’s. In both cases, the entire company, not just the Stabroek asset, was acquired.
The Stabroek acquisition has proven to be most fortuitous for CNOOC, not only because of the oil and gas resources, but also through the deepwater development expertise that has been gained. Now CNOOC is trying to further leverage their Stabroek position by joining Exxon in challenging the Chevron acquisition.
It would be great if the arbitration proceedings were streamed, but that will not be the case. It also appears unlikely that media will be allowed to attend or that transcripts will be made available.
As previously noted, I would have liked the Guyanese government to be more assertive in this dispute. Stabroek is Guyana’s offshore gem, their most important economic asset. This lengthy dispute has to affect partner teamwork and communication. From safety, environmental, and production standpoints, do you want feuding partners managing such an important national asset?
Chevron is not buying the Stabroek share; they are buying the company that holds that share. Hess is to be part of Chevron and there would be no change of control from the standpoint of the partnership.
As an offshore operator, Exxon has been highly responsible from a safety standpoint. However, the company is not reluctant to stretch the envelope when it comes to contract rights. The most recent example was their acquisition of 163 GoM oil and gas leases for carbon disposal purposes, contrary to the terms of the sale notice and lease contracts.
Interestingly, Exxon’s partner in this dispute is state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation. CNOOC acquired their 25% Stabroek share when they purchased Nexen, a Canadian company (sound familiar?). Both the Canadian and US governments had reservations about this acquisition and nearly nixed the deal. Would either government bless that acquisition today?
An International Chamber of Commerce arbitration panel will hear the Stabroek case in May 2025, and the final decision is expected by September 2025.
Reuters has published an interesting article on the Exxon/CNOOC vs. Chevron/Hess dispute scheduled for arbitration next year in Paris. According to Reuters (emphasis added):
“Getting the panel to consider the appraised value is central to Exxon’s claim that the deal is an asset acquisition disguised as a merger. Exxon believes the Guyana asset is so valuable that the merger would trigger a change of control and give Exxon and CNOOC a right of first refusal to the asset sale, the people said.“
The Exxon argument implies that Hess’s only major asset is its share of Stabroek, which is hardly the case. Hess’s 30% Stabroek share is without question an important asset with great long-term potential, but Hess is also a major player elsewhere, most notably in the Bakken formation in North Dakota and the Gulf of Mexico. Implying that Hess was a single asset acquisition is thus misleading:
In Q4 of 2023, Hess produced 194,000 boepd in the Bakken formation vs. a Stabroek share of 128,000 bopd.
In 2023, Hess produced 20 million barrels of oil in the GoM and 40 bcf of gas making them the 8th highest oil producer and 7th highest gas producer.
Hess acquired 20 GoM leases in Sale 261, ranking first in total high bids ($88 million) among all participants.
Chevron and Hess GoM assets have significant potential for synergy. The combined company would be the 3rd largest GoM oil producer (behind Shell and bp) and the second largest gas producer (behind only Shell).
This dispute will continue to smolder given the delay in the arbitration hearings until May 2025. As previously mentioned, I believe the Government of Guyana should have intervened. I’m all for companies settling their disputes privately, but this dispute is over Guyanese resources, and the protracted delay could have implications for Guyana.
In light of the TikTok drama in Washington, I thought I’d take another look at Chinese ownership of Gulf of Mexico oil and gas leases.
A year ago, it was reported that State owned China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) was considering an exit from its operations in the US, Canada, and the UK because of sanctions concerns. That may still be the case for other properties, but CNOOC has retained its Gulf of Mexico lease interests.
Per BOEM lease data, CNOOC continues to own 25% and 21% interest respectively in the important Stampede (Green Canyon 468, 511, and 512) and Appomattox (Mississippi Canyon 391, 392, and 393) deepwater projects. CNOOC reports are positive on those operations, noting that the production wells have performed better than expected.
CNOOC also owns interest in five other GoM leases. No CNOOC lease interest has been assigned to other companies in the past two years.
I welcome foreign investment in our offshore program, and see little downside in Chinese entities owning minority shares of OCS leases. GoM lease ownership does advance CNOOC’s understanding of deepwater exploration and development technology, but that knowledge can also be acquired elsewhere, sometimes in partnership with US companies (as is the case in Guyana).
Chevron continues to operate in Venezuela and is a beneficiary of the easing of US sanctions that facilitated the resumption of oil exports. Is the government of Guyana okay with Stabroek partners helping to support the regime that claims much of their offshore oil?
On the other hand, what about Exxon’s Stabroek partner, state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp.? CNOOC has a 25% share of the Stabroek block (vs. 45% for Exxon and 30% for Hess) as a result of their takeover of (Canadian) Nexen in 2013. The CNOOC acquisition of Nexen was similar to Chevron’s acquisition of Hess. Was Exxon okay with that change in ownership?
CNOOC hasn’t released any public statements on the Stabroek dispute, but appears to be aligned with Exxon. Presumably, CNOOC also wants a larger share of the Stabroek pie. Is the Government of Guyana okay with an ally of Venezuela increasing their influence and having access to geologic, reservoir, and operational data for the Stabroek block? CNOOC is also partnered with Exxon on the block they acquired at the most recent licensing round.
Given the national security implications, is the Government of Guyana okay with leaving the resolution of this dispute to an ICC tribunal in Paris?
If we pause any of our developments, Maduro succeeds. He has no right in international law to tell the people of Guyana, a sovereign country, how to pursue its affairs.
And that is why we are forging ahead with our development in all 83,000 square miles…if we get paralyzed by this at the government level then we will fall prey to what he is trying to achieve.
IRVING, Texas – ExxonMobil increased its estimate of the discovered recoverable resource for the Stabroek Block offshore Guyana to approximately 10 billion oil-equivalent barrels.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 