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Terry Barr, President of Samson Oil and Gas, provided some interesting Macondo perspectives to the Wall Street Journal.

This well failed its casing integrity test and nothing was done. The data collected during a critical operation to monitor hydrocarbon inflow was ignored and nothing was done. This spill is about human failure and it is time BP put its hand up and admitted that.

If the contrast between the Montara and Macondo political responses wasn’t already evident, take a look at today’s events.  While Tony Hayward was being hammered once again at a congressional hearing despite establishing a $20 billion damage payment fund, Australian Resources Minister Martin Ferguson seems to be in no hurry to release the Montara Inquiry Report.  According to Australia Broadcasting, Mr. Ferguson says he has to take into account legal considerations:

So as to ensure that I do not prejudice any potential further investigations which could include criminal offenses, or undermine any natural justice considerations of any individuals.

Say what?  How about preventing future accidents?

NWS Earle Executive Officer Caudill, Kevin Costner, and Ohmsett Manager Bill Schmidt (1999 photo at Ohmsett)

Leading researchers from around the world are drawn to the Minerals Management Service’s Ohmsett facility at Naval Weapons Station Earle in New Jersey to test their oil spill response theories and equipment.  Kevin Costner’s oil separator, which has received much recent attention, is well known to MMS and Ohmsett. The Costner Industries system is used to separate and recycle  the oil used for Ohmsett testing.  Learn more about Ohmsett including testing capabilities for renewable energy devices.

Ohmsett - Pool of Dreams

Check out this entertaining Australian TV bit on the Gulf of Mexico spill.

BOE Exclusive: An international expert (pictured above) has been hired to assist the Flow Rate Technical Group.  He will calculate a precise flow rate with five significant figures.

Yesterday’s announcement of a new flow rate range (35,000 to 60,000 bopd) was not accompanied by any data, assumptions, or analysis.  When will the documentation and supporting information be released?

Appointments

Michael Bromwich

Michael Bromwich, a former Federal prosecutor, will lead the reorganization of the Minerals Management Service into two new bureaus and a minerals revenue office.  I hope he meets as many MMS personnel as time allows.  He will be pleasantly surprised by their knowledge, integrity, and commitment.

In addition to former Senator Bob Graham and former EPA Administrator Bill Reilly, President Obama named the following individuals to head the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling:

Frances G. Beinecke: President of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a non-profit corporation that works to advance environmental policy in the United States and across the world.

Donald “Don” Boesch: President of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, where he is also a professor of Marine Science and vice chancellor for Environmental Sustainability for the University System of Maryland.

Terry D. Garcia: Executive vice president for mission programs for the National Geographic Society.

Cherry A. Murray: Appointed dean of the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS) and the John A. and Elizabeth S. Armstrong Professor of Engineering and Applied Sciences in July 2009, and the past president of the American Physical Society.

Frances Ulmer: Chancellor of the University of Alaska Anchorage (UAA), Alaska’s largest public university.

BOP Testing Timeline

Transocean’s interim report is circulating online.  Click here: Transocean Investigation

A BP plan review prepared in mid-April recommended against the full string of casing because it would create “an open annulus to the wellhead” and make the seal assembly at the wellhead the “only barrier” to gas flow if the cement job failed. Despite this and other warnings, BP chose the more risky casing option, apparently because the liner option would have cost $7 to $10 million more and taken longer.

While the circumstances and details differ significantly, Montara (Timor Sea blowout) flashed across my mind repeatedly while reading this informative letter from Chairmen Waxman and Stupak to BP.  Common themes:

  1. Well integrity roulette: high risk well design
  2. Suspect production casing cement job
  3. Only one questionable barrier above the cement
  4. Multiple poor decisions on barriers
  5. Schedule concerns, time and efficiency pressure
  6. Failure to run Cement Bond Log and conduct confirming tests
  7. Mud weight and conditioning issues

The Unified Command’s collegial atmosphere seems to have given way to letter writing and public posturing.  Agency and company logos are no longer side-by-side on the official response website banner and joint briefings ended shortly after the Top Kill disappointment.  What all this means for future emergency response operations and the Unified Command concept remains to be determined.  Major spill response exercises and table-top drills cannot simulate the stress associated with a long battle like Macondo, and the resulting legal, administrative, and political tension.

In any event, a 13 June letter from Doug Suttles to Admiral Watson outlines BP’s impressive production strategy for the Macondo, pending completion of the relief well.  Most elements of this collection and production plan had been previously identified.  However, I was surprised by the following sentence on page 3:

Install a new LMRP cap with sufficient seal integrity to ensure a successful relief well kill operation.

I believe this is the first time BP has suggested that the success of the relief well was in any way linked to seafloor capping or wellhead intervention operations.  I assume BP is simply acknowledging that the kill operation would be easier if flow from the cap is constrained and back-pressure imposed on the flowing well.  Perhaps BP would like to elaborate.

From the Philadelphia Inquirer:

“Our preliminary investigation found there was a failure to the blowout preventer,” the DEP’s Weaver said Monday. “The blowout preventer did not function properly. If it had, there would not have been a blowout. The company also confirmed that the blowout preventer failed.”

The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection is investigating.