While the Norwegian model is built on trust, cooperation, and sharing of experience and information,” asserts Dr Lindøe, “the situation in the USA is nearly the opposite.”
When an accident happens on the Norwegian continental shelf, the parties convene to uncover any weaknesses in systems or routines that contributed to workers making a mistake. There is agreement that this is how to achieve better results, rather than spending resources on finding scapegoats and not bothering to change the systems.
In the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon, MMS has been criticised for having too cozy a relationship with the companies and for having reduced the number of inspections,” says Researcher Helge Ryggvik of the University of Oslo. “Yet its inspection activities are more comprehensive than on the Norwegian continental shelf. And unlike the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, MMS has its own helicopters and can conduct unannounced inspections.”
This excellent Research Council of Norway article, which discusses some of the differences between the US and Norwegian systems, should be mandatory reading for regulators and operators. Ironically, I made some similar comments to a wind turbine safety committee last week. In assessing the root causes of accidents and the associated equipment and procedural issues, we must not lose sight of the fundamental regulatory objectives and how they can best be achieved.
Bud's Offshore Energy (BOE) 