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Posts Tagged ‘well control’

Q. (Mr. Berger, Counsel for the Inquiry): Have you become aware through your experience in the industry that problems with cementing are a leading factor in the cause of blowouts?
A. (Mr. Doeg, Halliburton): No, I haven’t.

Good question and a surprising response from the Halliburton employee who was the cementing contractor when the 9 5/8″ casing was set.  Mr. Doeg has 20 years of cementing experience.  What do they discuss at training sessions and safety meetings?

Q. (Mr. Berger): Were you aware that the well you were working on on 7 March last year had entered the reservoir?
A. (Mr. Doeg): No, I wasn’t.
Q. (Mr. Berger): You’ve only become aware that it entered the reservoir subsequently; is that right?
A. (Mr. Doeg): Correct.

Stunning!   Keep in mind that this was a long 9 5/8″ string being cemented through an extended horizontal section.

Food for thought (In questioning Mr. Doeg, Mr. Berger raised the possibility of compatibility issues between the Weatherford float collar and the Halliburton plugs):

Q. When you have a float collar and a bottom plug manufactured by different companies, can issues arise about their compatibility?
A. They can, yes.
Q. What sorts of issues can arise?
A. When it comes to drilling out, they generally run non-rotating plugs to prevent that, and in this case they didn’t run non-rotating plugs; they ran an additional piece of equipment to prevent them from rotating.
Q. What about when seating the bottom plug in the float collar – can issues arise where the two parts are manufactured by different companies?
A. Normally not, but with this additional piece of equipment, possibly.

Transcript

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It was a long and difficult day on the witness stand for Mr. Noel Treasure, PTTEP’s senior representative on the West Atlas during the problematic 9 5/8″ casing cementing job.  The transcript provides evidence of the stress that Mr. Treasure has  been under since the blowout.  While we are troubled by many of PTTEP’s actions at Montara, we nonetheless appreciate the difficult times that key participants in the incident are experiencing.  Although no one was injured at Montara, the blowout will still have a substantial human cost.  There are no winners.

Most of the disussion involved the key 9 5/8″ casing cementing issues including the serious miscalculation of cement volumes, the float failures and fluid influx, a remedy (reinjection of cement/fluids) that probably exacerbated the problem, the absence of a pressure test to check the floats, shoe, and casing after the cement had set,  and internal confusion and miscommunication.  Other testimony discussed the absence of a hydrostatic overbalance in the suspended well bore, the decisions leading to the use of corrosion caps as barriers in lieu of cement or mechanical plugs, and the failure to install the 13 3/8″ cap, partly because the well slot was being reserved as a “parking spot” for the BOP stack.

While the Montara blowout could and should have been prevented, the incident does draw further attention to the need for improvements in the consistency, reliability, and standardization of cementing operations.  Cementing issues are associated with well control problems, sustained casing pressure in producing wells, and post-abandonment leakage.  Best practices documents should not just address standard procedures, but also remedies, including actions  that should be followed when irregularities, such as float valve failures, are identified.

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I want to suggest to you that the primary purpose of PCCs is actually to perform an anticorrosive function, particularly in relation to MLS systems that are subsurface of the sea – Tom Howe, Counsel for the Inquiry

-Mr. Howe made it clear that these caps are primarily for corrosion prevention, particularly in the case of mud line suspensions such as the Montara wells.  Regardless of their pressure containing capabilities, PCCs are difficult to test in situ and must be removed with the BOPE in place to avoid operating without a barrier.  Other highlights of the Day 3 testimony:

-Seadrill/Atlas engaged in a bit of damage control after implying yesterday that their OIM had lead responsibility for all operations at the facility.  In a response to a question from the Seadrill attorney, Mr. Gouldin (Seadrill) rephrased his position as follows:

In various parts of my evidence yesterday, there were issues that came up about the OIM having full responsibility, but he can only undertake that responsibility if he is given clear and full information and facts from the other parties involved in the operation.  He cannot operate in isolation. When I answered that the responsibility is there – yes, the responsibility is there to be transparent to him at all times in order to allow him to fully enact his duties. That’s what I meant in my response.

-In questioning Mr. Gouldin and Mr. Millar (Seadrill/Atlas), Mr. Howe clearly established that there was fluid influx following the cementing of the 9 5/8″ casing and that the response to this influx (injecting cement and fluid volumes greater than the influx) likely exacerbated the problem.

-Mr. Howe presented evidence that the the inhibited sea water that was left in the suspended well may not have been sufficiently weighted to over-balance the formation pressure in the reservoir

-Insufficient cement volumes may have facilitated gas migration during cementing.

-Senior PTTEP personnel were aware that the 13 3/8″ corrosion cap had not been installed.  Mr. Howe suggested that the cap may not have been installed because it was in poor condition.

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Mr. Howe, I salute you.  You are providing a great service for responsible offshore operators, contractors, and regulators worldwide.

These transcripts should be mandatory reading for everyone involved with offshore safety and all petroleum engineering students.  More to follow.

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THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Howe, before you start, let me remind the people in the Commission that if I say I’m starting at 11.20, I mean to start at 11.20.

Amen Commissioner Borthwick!

David Gouldin, Operations Manager for Seadrill Limited (Atlas), was today’s witness.  The transcript is a very interesting read for us operations, regulatory, and safety geeks.  Featured topics included licensee-contractor relationships and responsibilities, what constitutes a barrier in the casing, measuring pressure beneath a corrosion cap, and the root cause cementing and well integrity issues.  Particularly interesting were the discussions about authority and accountability.   In US waters, the lessee/operator is the responsible party for all oil and gas activities on a lease.  This accountability is well established.  This does not appear to be the case in Australia, and Mr. Howe, Counsel for the Inquiry (I continue to be impressed by his preparation and questioning)  suggested “one way of perhaps addressing that is to make it absolutely clear that the licensee can’t outsource safety and ultimate control to anyone.”  I fully agree with that sentiment.  One party must be accountable and that party should be the licensee.

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Montara Blowout

BOE  has reviewed reports and comments submitted to the Australian Commission of Inquiry.  Submissions by the operator, PTTEP, and the drilling contractor, Atlas, confirm the “street talk” about cementing issues and the absence of a second barrier in the suspended well.  BOE is troubled by a number of issues associated with this incident and has provided comments to the Commission.  We will continue to track reports on this and other offshore incidents.

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